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Abstract  
 
This thesis is in accordance with the requirements for the completion of the International 
Relations Master Program. First, the aim of this thesis was to test the existing theory that a 
failed or collapsed regime is a necessary component for the presence of a change in witchcraft 
victimology from elderly women to urban children. This was done by analyzing the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Angola, and Ghana. The second chapter 
illustrates the state of the art of literature regarding the theories underlying this research, 
alternative explanations for a shift in victimology, and type of regimes present in African states. 
The third chapter explains the between-case multi-criterial analysis conducted to ascertain each 
case’s regime type and the presence (or lack thereof) of a shift in witchcraft victimology. The 
fourth chapter relays the results of the analysis where it was determined that out of the four 
cases, two were in accordance with the existing theory, and two refuted it. The fifth and final 
chapter concludes this thesis by critically examining the results and methodology and a 
conclusory statement claiming that a collapsed and failed regime is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for the shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations from elderly women 
to urban children.  
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Introduction 
 
Children are the living embodiment of the future, however what many fail to realize is that by 
the year 2050, every two out of five children will be born in Africa, equating to what UNICEF 
has deemed a future for humanity that is increasingly African (“Generation 2030” 7). While 
concerns of poverty and its reverberations in the Global South are being assessed by the United 
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals to ensure a brighter future, many other life 
threatening socio-cultural variables are at play in contemporary African societies that have yet 
to be adequately addressed by policymakers and academics alike, impeding structural 
transformations that could stabilize future generations (UNDP 79-80). One of the more recent 
phenomenon posing a physical as well as psychological threat to the youth of African societies 
is a shift in victimization of those accused of being involved in witchcraft related practices, 
with urban children having become the newest targets of witch-hunts and the ostracism that 
accompanies its accusations (Snow 3; UNICEF “Children” 14). A child witch is often defined 
as a child between the ages of 0-18 who is suspected, accused, and labeled by their family and 
community as having engaged, or is engaging, in witchcraft and malevolent magic (UNICEF 
“Children” 14). Children across the African continent who are labelled as witches are in 
increasing danger of abuse, discrimination, torture, or death. These children and adolescents 
discarded from society resort to stealing, begging, or prostitution for survival at ages as young 
as five years old, for children are most vulnerable to being accused of being witches from the 
ages of three to ten (Mungai; UNICEF “Children” 16). Since the large-scale targeting of 
Africa’s urban youth is a recent occurrence, it is important to understand the driving 
mechanisms behind it before being able to effectively implement humanitarian counter-
measures.  
 
The emergence of the phenomenon of child witches in Africa has various contributing causes, 
all revolving around a change in the narrative of how children have come to be viewed 
(Itauma). This change, which began to take place in the early 2000s, coincided with several 
important occurrences that altered the perception of children and childhood in Africa. First, the 
creation and overt use of child soldiers in Central and West Africa created a communal fear of 
children that was previously non-existent (Molina 19). Second, the increase of urban street-
children and orphans attracted public disdain since their presence represented the recent 
destruction of the familial structure brought about by the AIDS/HIV epidemic, civil war, and 
drought or famine (Snow 3-4; Adinkrah 743; Miguel 1156; Molina 19). Finally, platforms of 
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entertainment, mainly films and cinema commonly portraying children as witches, began 
serving as wide-spread protagonists in intensifying witchcraft beliefs and accusations targeting 
children within African communities (Riedel “Children in Africa” 32; Itauma). This 
combination of increased fear, resentment, and legitimized suspicion of children in many 
African societies produced an idea of a new paranormal threat in the 21st century that 
manifested itself in the form of child witches.    
 
In the contemporary literature there is an eclectic collection of scholarly work on these 
contributing factors to the phenomenon of African child witches from a multitude of 
disciplines, amongst which include mainly theology, anthropology, sociology, ethnology, 
socio-economics, and others (Koning 160; Snow). Yet, the field of International Relations (IR) 
has remained rather docile on the subject; those who do engage on the matter tend to do so with 
a focal point of human rights and rights of the child under direction of International 
Governmental Organizations (United Nations) or Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g. Safe 
Child Africa), but seldom for political science motives (Snow 9). Therefore, to fully grasp the 
nature of the situation a multifaceted and holistic approach is needed, indicating a demand for 
increased research from an IR perspective. Discrepancies and lack of academic fervor on the 
matter has additionally led the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights to call 
for further empirical research into “its causes and effects in selected countries and local 
settings” (Hanson and Ruggiero 27; Adinkrah 750). Currently, there is a single dominating IR 
theory regarding African child witches adopted by scholars and policymakers alike, which 
claims that child witch accusations in urban contexts can only occur in regions of political 
collapse, where states are facing a crisis and potential failure (Cimpric 12; Molina 5; de Boeck 
11; Snow 11; Adinkrah 743; Miguel 1156). However, a recent study of Nigeria illustrated that 
witch-hunts directed at urban children do not require such extreme social and political disarray 
to be present, but instead appears to also occur in less cataclysmic, weak states (Snow 2). 
Therefore, because of this recent contradictory development, the legitimacy of this theory has 
been called into question.  
 
The subsequent research will henceforth contribute to the lack of empirical research by 
addressing the question of: how does regime type and regime durability influence the recent 
shift in victimology in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents? This thesis 
therefore aims to test the validity of the widely accepted theory that only collapsed and failed 
states produce the phenomenon of child witches since new contradictory evidence has come to 
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light. Answering this question will moreover assist in adjusting the scope of future research to 
be able to properly identify a fundamental set of indicators or influential factors to ultimately 
alleviate the dangerous problem facing Africa’s future generations. Therefore the following 
thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents a literature review to establish both a 
theoretical foundation as well as an assessment of the current academic standing on the issue 
of influential factors that has contributed to the targeting of urban children as witches. The 
second chapter outlines the specifications of the research design, illustrating the methodology, 
variables, data, and sources of the research. The third chapter discusses the results of the 
multiple-case analysis conducted, examining the necessity of the “failed” component in the 
shift in victimization. The fourth chapter takes a critical look at the research performed and 
discusses the possibilities of how the conclusions drawn can be taken into account to further 
solidify and develop a base for future IR work on the subject of urban child witchcraft 
accusations. The fifth and final chapter of this thesis ends with conclusory remarks.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the state of the art of literature regarding the theories underlying this 
research, alternative explanations, and type of regimes present in African states. Thus, the 
following chapter contains three sections. The first section establishes a theoretical foundation 
in which this research is based by first elaborating on the failed state theory which prompted 
this research, followed by an explanation of the witchcraft paradigm surrounding the 
phenomenon, then a discussion of the scapegoating theory, and finally an analysis of the 
emergence of the ‘child witch’ is discussed. The second section then analyzes each existing 
explanation of witchcraft accusations (alternative to that being analyzed here of regime type 
and durability) in the themes of cultural, economic, and political inclinations to target urban 
children as witches. Finally, the third section explains the main existing regime types found 
amongst African states in order to properly identify and distinguish one regime type from 
another.  
 
Section 1: Theoretical Framework 
Failed States 
The concept of a failed state and state failure began to gain academic and policy attention 
approximately two decades ago. Often the notion of a failed state adopts the western concept 
of a state, requiring first the definition of what a state is and secondly what it entails to have 
failed as a state. This research refers to the state as that which governs its people within its own 
internationally legitimized sovereign territory under a liberally democratic system of 
governance (Griffith et al. 228-229). This means that the state must fulfil the conditions of 
upholding civil and political liberties and services, encouraging political competition for all 
positions of government power by holding regular and fair elections, and providing functional 
public administration and institutions (Griffiths et al. 71). A failed state is thus a state that is 
unable to fulfil these conditions and no longer holds the monopoly of power. In the case of 
African states, by means of decolonization after World War II, the majority of fledgling states 
seceded under pre-established sovereign territories and with imported and foreign forms of 
state organization (mainly liberal democracy as described above), commencing their 
independence under artificial pretences (Griffiths et al. 229; Herbst “The Past” 252). African 
states were expected to utilize this grafted framework of liberal democracy, but often carried 
out forms of governance containing pre-colonial African tribal practices, two forms of 
statehood often do not coincide. This generally led to a slow rejection of the transplanted 
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statehood, manifesting itself as state failure (Herbst “Responding to State” 130-133; Chabal 
67-70; Engelbert and Dunn 181-183). Thus, failing and failed states appear to be endemic 
throughout contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, with symptoms of poverty, civil conflict, and 
state repression culminating national social tensions that greatly contribute to the domestic 
paradigms that influence African societal relations.       
 
Witchcraft Paradigm  
An important social relation within and amongst African societies concerns that of witchcraft. 
This section therefore aims to establish the domestic context under which accusations of 
witchcraft are occurring. Witchcraft is defined as the use of mystical powers with either 
malevolent or benevolent intent. However, this research focusses mainly on those accused of 
malevolent forms of witchcraft, thus equating witches to antagonists who utilize these occult 
powers to bring harm upon others in “a matter of the most deadly seriousness” (Cohan 805; 
Camaroff and Camaroff 518-517; Adinkah 744). Societies of the sub-continent of Africa have 
an ancient history of witchcraft/occult practices and beliefs that studies across disciplines show 
are continuing to be upheld in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa as explanans for the 
hardships, struggles, and misfortune (death, illness, or poverty) that befalls them (Bruynell 400; 
Tebbe 187; Koning 160; Ashforth 5-6; Cohan 804). Given this ideological presence of 
witchcraft in daily African life, it can be deduced that contemporary African societies are 
operating within a ‘witchcraft paradigm’, meaning that societies are acting under a system of 
belief that justifies witchcraft as the source of their plights (Ashforth 5). This notion is 
supported by a research project conducted in 2010 by the PEW Research Center on Religion 
and Public Life in Sub-Saharan Africa. This report revealed that in half of the countries 
surveyed (19 in total), more than 40% of the population believed in witchcraft, reaching as 
high as 93% of the population in Tanzania (Liu 178). It is then, in this sense, logical that the 
overarching witchcraft paradigm throughout Africa is being utilized by societies to rationalize 
accusations of witchcraft as a defense mechanism against what is perceived as physical and 
non-physical threats to their wellbeing from child witches.   
  
Rational-Choice Theory and Scapegoating 
To avoid adopting a “heart of darkness” parochial discourse on Africa, this research paper 
instead utilizes the rational-choice theory to frame the role of reason behind the witchcraft 
paradigm in a rational repertoire. Therefore, within this framework it can be assumed that, of 
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those who accuse children of being witches, their “behavior is motivated by self-interest, utility 
maximization, or, more simply put, goal fulfillment” (Petracca 289). Additional to this notion 
of self-interested goal fulfillment, some researchers claim that witch-hunts have evolved as a 
means of rationalizing and regaining control over instances of conflict, loss, or social 
transgressions and punishing those seemingly responsible (Forsyth 337; Agrawal and Mehra 
136). By implementing this discourse, this research effectively circumvents the Western 
inclination to presuppose the causal factor of the witchcraft paradigm to be a product of 
“superstition”, “underdevelopment”, or “disillusion” (Miguel 1158; UNICEF “Children” 9; 
Hanson and Ruggiero 7-8).   
 
This research paper furthermore adopts René Girard’s scapegoat theory in addition to rational-
choice theory to justify why vulnerable minorities in society are singled out as witches, 
particularly that of African urban children. A scapegoat is defined as an individual, or a 
minority group, that unjustifiably gets blamed, or persecuted, for the suffering in the lives of 
others, serving as a physical surrogate for the cause of their misfortunes (Adinkrah 750; Miguel 
1154; Brighi and Cerella 12). Thus, what appears to be a unanimous explanandum (the 
scapegoat mechanism of urban children) throughout academic disciplines can be attributed to 
mounting social, economic, and physical distresses “devolv[ing] onto a single victim” through 
the act of expulsion of innocent targets in a real as well as symbolic way (Brighi and Cerella 
12). To build onto this theoretical foundation, it is important to discuss the various social, 
economic, and political factors that influence shifts in witchcraft victimology.  
 
 
Section 2: Alternative Explanations 
Socio-Cultural and Socio-Economic Factors 
Firstly, African socio-cultural tales of sorcery throughout history have often portrayed children 
as the key perpetrators of witchcraft (Schnoebelen 5; 15; 22). Among these cultural 
implications, many studies have found that children that display odd behavioral traits (speaks 
as an adult for example), are born with disabilities or deformities, or precociousness in any 
form is often seen by many African cultures as a sign of an older malevolent soul residing 
within the child and dictating its peculiar behavior, thus deeming said child a witch (Adinkrah 
744; Schnoebelen 14; UNICEF “Children” 14). However, other studies argue that being a witch 
does not have to be something one is born with, it can be transferred from elderly witches (often 
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relatives) to children by special foods, drinks, or gifts containing a portion of their occult magic; 
ergo witch by association or contact (Snow 4; Adinkrah 745; UNICEF “Children” 19). 
According to these arguments, accusations of a child of being a witch are legitimate at any time 
since the power of witchcraft can be either inherent from birth or transferred by contact, 
rendering the ability to predict (and prevent) who is a potential victim highly improbable.  
 
Moreover, changing familial structures in Sub-Saharan Africa have been recognized by 
scholars to be a significant underlying cultural and economic factor in the victimization of 
urban children. A combination of an increase of orphaned children (due to rapid deaths from 
HIV/AIDS), parents sending their children to live with kin in large cities and urban areas for 
higher prospects, and household income shocks pulling children out of school and into the 
streets has contributed to the dramatic increase in children living in urban streets (Snow 3-4; 
Adinkrah 743; Miguel 1156). This influx of children into urban areas can therefore be seen to 
have created a trifecta of anxieties within these regions that has prompted the scapegoat 
solution of witch-hunts. First, activities associated with street children such as stealing, drugs, 
and prostitution are seen in many African cultures as taboo for children, marking urban children 
as feared deviants and henceforth potential witches (Snow 4). Second, the overwhelming 
presence of street children is a constant social reminder of the changing familial structure 
illustrated above, eliciting angst from patriarchal societies based on family and community 
relationships (Hanson and Ruggiero 10). Finally, children cast out into the streets as proclaimed 
witches living amidst non-witch children has created an atmosphere of “fear and insecurity 
concerning witchcraft and witches, creating an ideal climate for witch hunts” (Adinkrah 745). 
It can therefore be deduced that the socio-economic factor of poverty driving flocks of children 
away from their families and into urban streets combined with the socio-cultural factor of fear 
of these children and disdain for their symbolism of the deteriorating conditions of familial 
structures creates the perfect storm for scapegoating these urban ‘pariahs’ as witches.   
 
Additionally, urban areas have become more prone than rural villages to witchcraft accusations 
over the past few decades. Civilian accessible technological advances in twenty-first century 
Africa such as smartphones, laptops, and televisions have become widely associated with 
witchcraft dispersion. For example, Pype explains that the aforementioned witchcraft paradigm 
has adjusted to modern times, with electronic devices having become seen as the new tools, 
mediums, and carriers of occult practices and dispersion of belief systems (118-119; Itauma). 
Africans often believed that by migrating to the cities, they were distancing themselves from 
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the village witch and sorcerer and thus reducing the possibilities of harm (Geschiere 45). Yet, 
seeing how these electronic devices are more readily available in urban rather than rural 
settings, this new platform for occult practices has intensified the accusations of witchcraft in 
the heavily populated urban areas and has turned urban centers into witchcraft active zones, 
contributing to the dangers faced by urban street children.      
 
Political Factors 
When it comes to the political factors that influence the development of child witches there is 
a consensus amongst academics that the shift of victimization towards urban children was 
spurred by the “shocking” emergence of mass-armies of child soldiers, namely Laurent 
Kabila’s army during the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997 
(Snow 5). According to anthropological and sociological studies, the appearance of armies 
consisting of child soldiers drastically altered the perception of children in many African 
societies, their existence sowing the seeds of fear of their power (both physical and magical) 
that blossomed into a widespread sense that children were something to be feared, not protected 
(Snow 5; Hanson and Ruggiero 10; Cahn 421; Schnoebelen 15). One study in 2003 showed 
that in the Central African Republic (CAR), at least two-thirds of the children enlisted were 
voluntarily recruited (Cahn 419). Those recruited (not forcefully kidnapped) were urban street 
children that either did not adhere to the traditional familial structures, were living in cases of 
severe poverty, or were living in environments of violent conflict (419). Therefore, it is evident 
that the political actors (then as well as now) exploit the socio-cultural and socio-economic 
situations of urban regions to maximize their goals, illustrating a trinity of interdependent 
contributing factors of the shift in scapegoat surrogates to urban children. Additionally, the 
lack of juridical infrastructure due to the cataclysmic political/social/economic crises in regions 
such as the DRC and CAR at these times equated to a context of political non-accountability 
for the protection and preservation of the rights of the child (Snow 2; Cahn 419-421).  
 
Moreover, while some scholars believe that globalization has led to the modernization of those 
acting within the witchcraft paradigm (e.g. politicians, children, athletes being able to purchase 
magical powers), critics say that the link to globalization and modernization is inadequate to 
prove sufficient evolution (UNICEF 18). Regardless, evidence shows strong relations between 
esteemed pastors who can identify witches living among the innocent and African political 
leaders wishing to evade misfortune and willing to take advantage of a vulnerable minority 
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viewed as a burden by most (Snow 9). Politicians and preachers alike claim that Africans will 
not prosper “through an efficient education system, functioning infrastructure, equitable taxes, 
and other fruits of good government, but rather by driving off evil spirits”, creating an ideology 
that marginalizes the accountability of the State while legitimizing the targeting of urban 
children as the real threat to individual prosperity (7). Hence urban opportunities continue to 
create a situation where ‘children of risk’ become ‘children at risk’ of political exploitation 
through scapegoating (Hanson and Ruggiero 10).   
 
Section 3: Regime Types in Africa 
As mentioned previously, it was often thought to be common knowledge that the accusation of 
urban children as witches only took place in States of extreme political, social, and economic 
crises accompanying state failure and collapse. However, a new study by Snow in 2017 on 
Nigeria inadvertently found the existence of urban child witch-hunts in simply a weak – but 
not failed or collapsed – State, challenging the preconceived idea regarding the necessity of 
regime failure for the shift in victimology to urban children to take place (1; 2; 5; 11). Yet this 
inconsistency poses the new question of: to what degree does regime durability and regime 
type influence the scapegoating of urban children as witches? To briefly clarify, when 
discussing regimes this research refers to the basic notion of the prevailing system of rule or 
governance of the government in power within a region (Tebbe 185-86). First when looking at 
a State, it is necessary to discern the type of governing regime in question. Despite the 
proliferation of hybrid regime types in African states, the limitations of this thesis has caused 
this research to narrow its scope to that of the three main regime types present today: liberal 
democracies, anocracies, and authoritarian regimes. 
 
Democracy 
To first look at democracies, the aforementioned concept of a ‘liberal democracy’ is what is 
referred to when discussing democracies. In the constitutional language of many 
‘democratized’ African nations, potential harm from the occult is perceived as a security threat 
to the individual person and therefore Africans believe that protection should be offered by the 
State (Tebbe 224). Yet, Western models of the liberal democratic State that were grafted into 
Africa after independence tend to marginalize the domestic importance of the witchcraft 
paradigm – which in some instances has led to scapegoating urban children as a social 
compromise between democratic norms and domestic traditional practices and beliefs (224-
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225). However, democracies tend to possess the stable infrastructure needed to monitor and 
control the human rights conditions of children and elderly women as well as feeling the 
international pressure to adhere to Western norms, conventions, and values systems that often 
reprimand witch-hunts (Cahn 454). Additionally, Tebbe states that the willingness to overtly 
discuss and address issues regarding the occult and its effects on society is a more prominent 
characteristic of democratic African states, while Akin and Ade add that democracies are 
claimed to resonate the utmost commitment from the masses who promote legitimate stability 
(Tebbe 202-203; Akin and Ade 71). This consequently leads to the prioritizing of democratic 
practices over witchcraft practices in true liberal democracies. Therefore, democracies are 
viewed as being the most stable regimes since their desire to adhere to conditions for legitimacy 
produces a State that is more predictable, developed, and durable (Cahn 455; Sottilotta 2; Tebbe 
188).  
 
Anocracies 
Secondly, anocracies, or “semi-democracies”, appear to be more common throughout African 
regimes in the form of patrimonialism. Patrimonialistic societies are those ruled by a system 
of governance based on reciprocity and rent-seeking behaviors in the pursuit of power, wealth, 
and influence through informal networks of patron/client relationships (Wai 32). Moreover, 
anocracies are regimes where democratic practices are held for international legitimacy 
purposes, but rampant corruption and rights violations negate these democratic characteristics 
in practice (34). According to research by Koning, patrimonialistic societies appear to also 
have a more prominent predisposition towards witchcraft (159). With failure to abide by the 
rules of reciprocity in providing protection from the occult comes public resentment that holds 
the potential to threaten the incumbent regime (Koning 170). The occurrence of urban child-
witch accusations is thus more likely to be tolerated or understood by both civilian and 
government agents. Additionally, despite the presence of an infrastructural system, frequent 
State corruption renders its juridical, political, and public services incapable of adequately 
countering issues of occult violence against children or the elderly (Cohan 807; 823-825). 
However, with regards to regime durability, Arriola claims that the employment of patronage 
enables leaders to utilize State resources to facilitate intra-elite accommodation that in turn 
achieves a degree of regime durability, since elite conflict is a large stimulus to instability 
(1340-1341). With patronage reinforcing stability amongst elites, but corrupt practices 
undermining all means of infrastructure necessary to pacify violent occult accusations, 
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anocracies are stated to be fragile regimes that achieve semi-stability by means of effective 
durability.  
 
Authoritarian 
Finally, authoritarian regimes are a strongly centralized governing power that concentrates 
political authority within a power or organization that is not constitutionally accountable to the 
people (Griffiths et al. 18-19). Additionally, Chang et al. describes authoritarian regimes as 
“single-party, military, and personalistic” (6). As is the case with anocracies, patron-client 
reciprocity (or ‘big-man’ politics) is also often a dominant characteristic in African 
authoritarian regimes, where informal accountability and practices dominate (7). Moreover, 
authoritarian regimes often retract from its responsibilities to the public domain consequently 
failing to provide basic services and adequate infrastructure (Titeca and Herdt 213). The regime 
is considered then to be an archetypical ‘failed state’ (213). Furthermore, these regimes often 
operate in a state of existential crisis/conflict, and tend to act under the context of drastically 
altered perceptions of urban children as mentioned previously when discussing child soldiers. 
Authoritarian regimes function under the pretext of  non-accountability to the people, putting 
regime survival and prosperity as the main priority, consequently willing to put children at risk 
to do so (Cahn 419). This change in how children are perceived alongside the augmented 
demography of urban children has in the recent past led to the increased persecution of urban 
children over other minorities amongst authoritarian regimes (Hanson and Ruggiero 10). Many 
Africans under authoritarian regimes also turn to scapegoating to relieve themselves of daily 
plights of poverty, political violence, and a “phantasmal vulnerability” felt from evil-doers 
within the community (Tebbe 224-225). Thus it has been illustrated that despite the difference 
in regime type and levels of durability in all three instances, the presence of using urban 
children as scapegoats for occult insecurities appears to remain a constant probable 
phenomenon throughout each regime type. Therefore, this research paper aims to concretely 
assess how regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology in 
African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents.  
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
This chapter further elaborates on the specifications of the research design that has been carried 
out for this thesis. First to be discussed is the design type, followed by the variables under 
analysis, then the sources used, before finally discussing the method of data collection, coding, 
and processing.  
 
Design Type  
Since there are multiple types of regimes and levels of durability that need to be analyzed, this 
research design has been structured to incorporate multiple case studies. The research design 
selected for this thesis is therefore a between-case multi-criterial analysis that takes a small-N 
approach to the case studies and criteria chosen. This means that the research possesses a 
qualitative foundation while independently analyzing a small selection of case studies (a total 
of four) and criteria (a total of three main criteria to determine regime type and durability) 
(Mahoney 387; George and Bennett 105). Each case study will fulfill one of the regime types 
on the spectrum previously illustrated alongside its null hypothesis in accordance to the 
existing theory that only failing/collapsed states victimize urban children. The first case study 
is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and will serve as a control case study, meaning a 
case study that fits the current theory and hypothesis of the presence of a failed/collapsed 
authoritarian state being a necessary component for the victimization of urban children (George 
and Bennett 180). The second case study is the Central African Republic, hypothesized to be a 
failing/collapsed authoritarian state that according to the theory has a null hypothesis that the 
victimization of urban children is present (“Comparative Analysis” 2017). The third case study 
is Angola, hypothesized to be a weak and semi-democratic state with a null hypothesis that the 
victimization of urban children is not present due to its status as weak and not failing (2017). 
Finally, the fourth case study is Ghana, hypothesized to be a stable democracy where the null 
hypothesis is that victimization of urban children is not present (2107). By analyzing each case 
study against the hypothesis of regime type and that only failing/collapsed states victimize 
urban children as witches, the validity of this preconceived theory is tested, ultimately 
answering the overall research question of how regime type and regime durability influence 
the recent shift in victimology across the African continent. 
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Variables 
For the subsequent research, the dependent variable (or outcome) is the scapegoating of urban 
children as witches. The independent variables, which are the multiple criteria under analysis 
to determine regime type and regime durability, include the performance of state legitimacy, 
public services, and human rights and the rule of law (George and Bennett 102; “Indicators”). 
If a State fulfills all three criteria by possessing state legitimacy, having established and 
functioning public services, and upholds human rights and the rule of law, then the case is  
classified as a democracy. If only partial criteria are fulfilled, then the case is classified as an 
anocracy, or semi-democracy. Finally, if a no criteria are fulfilled then the case is classified as 
a failed or collapsed authoritarian state. These variables chosen can be criticized for being 
predominantly Western concepts of state performance, however, since these indicators are the 
most frequently used in international indexes, censuses, and surveys they provide the most 
current, accurate, and reliable information and therefore are utilized within this research. Due 
to the limitations of this thesis influencing feasibility of data collection and processing, the 
number of variables has been restricted to the previously mentioned three to ensure concrete 
and tangible results. Moreover, all case studies contain the constant variables (serving as 
parameters) of similar urban demographics (approximately 40% of total population), regional 
proximity (West/Central Sub-Saharan Africa), and religious diversity levels (50-70% 
Christian) (George and Bennett 102; “Angola”; “Central”; “Congo”; “Ghana”). By keeping 
these three variables constant, other exogenous influential actors have been further limited.  
 
Data Requirements 
When collecting, processing, and coding data, it is necessary to first establish a set of 
standardized questions to ask in each case study to ensure systematic data compilation that can 
be repeated or compared in other studies (George and Bennett 110). Therefore, for the purposes 
of this research, the main framework of questions will be categorized under two themes: regime 
type and durability, and urban children victims. The framework will consist of the following 
questions: 
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Regime Type and Durability  
1. What is the status of the state’s legitimacy? 
a) Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?  
b) Are there free, fair, and frequent elections? 
c) Is there state corruption and political violence? 
2. Are the public serves present and functioning? 
a) How is the public health? 
b) What are the enrollments rates of education systems? 
c) Is there adequate infrastructure? 
3. Are human rights upheld and the rule of law implemented? 
a) Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld? 
b) Is there an independent media source? 
c) Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system?  
 
Urban Children Victims 
4. How many children have been accused of being witches in this region? 
a) How many elderly women have been victimized?   
b) Has the amount of urban child victims changed over the past 17 years?  
c) Is there a clear pattern in frequency that correlates with changes in regime type 
and durability? 
 
Data analyzed for this research was thus compiled to answer this framework of standardized 
questions in the pursuit of answering the overall research question. Additionally, scholars have 
identified that the shift in victimology has been taking place since the beginning of the twenty-
first century (Schnoebelen 14; Snow 5; Koning 159). Therefore, due to the recent nature of the 
phenomenon, the majority of the data focuses on post- 2000 information, however earlier data 
is also taken into account since that information is necessary to be able to identify pre- and 
post- shift changes in both regime type as well as frequency of urban child witchcraft 
accusations. This therefore establishes a general 17-year timeline from which the variable data 
was collected.  
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Sources 
The data collected to answer the previously stated questions and conduct the overall research 
is predominantly qualitative, with only limited quantitative data used for determining how 
many elderly women and children have been accused of witchcraft in the past two decades. 
This is due to the fact that reliable and accurate statistics, censuses, and monitoring of the 
quantity of accusations and victims against both target groups is widely recognized as 
unavailable, unrepresentative of the total amount of accusations since most incidents go 
unreported, and often lacking legitimacy (Riedel “Failing State-Interventions” 8; OHCHR 
“Witches in the”). Therefore, due to these limitations on quantitative availability, qualitative 
data is the primary source for this research. Such sources include (amongst others) surveys, 
policy statements, government declarations, annual reports, academic journals, and index 
results.  
 
To avoid using biased data that maintained a fixed perspective or ideology, data was first 
collected from primary sources from both international and national sources. Publications by 
Western based organizations (e.g. the United Nations or Human Rights Watch) were utilized 
alongside those publicized by local government agencies and ministries of the DRC, CAR, 
Angola, and Ghana to ensure a holistic collection of data that would significantly reduce the 
possibility of biased results. For example, when collecting and coding data on the variable of 
state legitimacy in the DRC, documents containing information on election transparency were 
obtained from both the United Nations and CENI (the Independent National Electoral 
Commission of the DRC). These documents were then subsequently compared to check first, 
if the information given on the same topic was consistent, and second to ensure (especially if 
the information diverged) that both accounts would be present when coding the data to provide 
objective results. The focus on primary documents from a variety of sources additionally 
prevented the results from being the product of a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, where only 
evidence supporting the given theory was collected and coded thus producing findings that 
matched expectations instead of reality (Merton 195-196). When primary sources were 
unavailable, as was the case when searching for government publicized documents by the 
Central African Republic for example, secondary sources of mainly academic articles or other 
scholarly works were substituted. Additionally, secondary sources were also utilized as further 
supporting data in all cases.  
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Data: Collection, Coding, and Processing 
Once the sources were identified, the first step was to collect as much data as possible for each 
variable of each case to be able to produce an accurate portrayal of the entirety of information 
available. These collections of works for each variable were then assigned relevance as being 
evidence of a sub-variable for each main variable as presented previously under Data 
Requirements, resulting in sections 1a, 1b, 1c and so forth. For example, all the sources under 
state legitimacy that discussed elections were placed under the first variable in section 1b. This 
extraction of relevant data from these sources while “indexing or categorizing the text in order 
to establish a framework of thematic ideas” is referred to as coding (Gibbs). Sources coded for 
one section would occasionally overlap in other sections, for example, election based violence 
would fall under sections 1b and 1c. In these instances, the original coding of each source 
would remain the same, with the appropriate information being represented in all appropriate 
sections to allow for full representation of data. The extensively elaborated table of grid-panels 
containing all the coded data from the sources utilized can be found in the first appendix of this 
thesis. This eclectic body of sources provides the holistic approach that many have claimed IR 
research in this field has lacked. Once the sources had been coded under the appropriate 
sections of the table, the final step was to process the data. This step included assessing, 
interpreting, and summarizing the coded data to determine the findings of the research. The 
coming chapter illustrates these processed findings under ‘Results’. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
This chapter illustrates the results of the research carried out on the aforementioned case studies 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Angola, 
and Ghana. First, the results are given for each case study’s independent variables of state 
legitimacy, public services, and human rights and the rule of law. Second, the results of the 
frequency of accusations of witchcraft against urban child and elderly women will be 
discussed. Finally, a brief conclusory summary of the findings will be given as a closing 
statement in response to the question of how regime type and regime durability influence the 
recent shift in victimology in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents. All results 
were obtained from the sources provided in the codified table of data found in the first appendix 
of this thesis.  
 
3.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo  
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
In the DRC, the State in large part lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This is first 
apparent when analyzing the level of confidence that the Congolese people hold in the State 
government and its Members of Parliament (MPs). It is clear that the public does not trust or 
grant the State any form of credibility since little to nothing has been achieved amongst MPs 
since the DRC’s first ever successful elections in 2006. Since the promise of ‘trickle-down 
democracy’ has yet to be realized, the Congolese people are turning to informal economic and 
political systems for sought after immediate gains, effectively undermining the State and its 
institutions. This lack of rapport between MPs and their constituency and the sudden hyper-
development of capitalism has led to chronic criminal engagements within State forces and a 
preference for the informal on all accounts. The formal image of a functioning framework of 
democratic governance is nevertheless actively maintained as can be witnessed by the adoption 
of a new constitution in 2006 that intended to publicly mark the return of legitimate rule of 
law, executive power, parliament, and separate judiciary to the DRC. However, these intentions 
did not last long or amount to tangible changes.  
 
This can be seen in the unconstitutional postponement of elections in 2016, as illustrated by 
the work conducted by the Carter Center, displaying a dictatorial control on power. The DRC 
has only witnessed two election periods come to fruition throughout its independence, with its 
remaining history riddled with military coup d’états. The first, in 2006, was widely regarded 
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as free and fair which legitimately put the incumbent President Kabila in power. The second, 
in 2011, was declared as lacking credibility and exposed old habits of patronage networks and 
authoritarian procedures that called into question the DRC’s democratic commitment. 
President Kabila nevertheless emerged victorious to serve a second term. As illustrated by 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), the current refusal of President Kabila to transfer power after 
having served two terms in office openly threatens the framework of consolidated peace and 
democracy the DRC has strived to maintain.  
 
The overt disregard for constitutional rights and obligations in the present-day as well as during 
past election periods has led to political violence and conflict with the public. In 2006, despite 
the relatively peaceful elections, 23 or 24 (depending on the information source) people were 
killed by Congolese security forces after conflict broke out after the election results were 
announced. Again in 2016, ‘dozens’ of people were killed after protests calling for President 
Kabila to adhere to the constitutional mandate and step down. Moreover, apart from election 
violence, many characterize the Congolese State as governed by personal opportunism, 
equating the government to a predatory regime – typical of competitive authoritarianism to 
exploit its civilians for direct gains. Thus, the mélange of lack of public confidence, lack of 
electoral credibility and frequency, and extensive state corruption and oppressive violence 
against civilians significantly decreases the DRC’s state legitimacy in both national and 
international perspectives.  
 
Variable 2: Public Services  
When analyzing the public service domain in the DRC, it is apparent that public services are 
present and they are semi-functional – however it is not the State who has taken the 
responsibility for their operations, but community organizations instead. As a result of the of 
the State retreating from its public responsibilities, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
states that community households ultimately filled the vacuum by financing up to 70% ( 61% 
as stated by the DRC Ministry of Health) of the functioning of health zones while receiving no 
involvement in the management of said health services. According the DRC Ministry of Health 
(MoH), the primary source of finance for the Public Health Sector in 2014 was public 
households which contributed to 39% of the health sector, with the Public Health 
Administration contributing 37%. Additionally, the MoH states that since households are the 
primary financial mechanism, those who fall sick must spend past their capacity, resulting in 
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the impoverishment of that household. Hence, issues within public health include problems 
with MoH leadership, funding, human resources, coordination of donor interventions, and 
health supplies. Despite the increases in the share of government expenditure on public health 
to 15% in 2014, the majority of costs still remain household responsibilities.  
 
Moreover, due to the retraction of the State from claiming accountability, non-governmental 
organizations and predominantly religious networks have also assumed the obligation of 
providing and maintaining education services and organizing the sector. Yet despite the 
absence of State involvement, both the Ministry of Education (MoE) and UNESCO report that 
when compared to similarly less-developed African nations, it out-performs its neighbors with 
a lower percentage of children who have never been to school. The latest primary school 
enrollment rates from 2013 were at approximately 103% (due to students repeating a grade), 
and secondary enrollment rates were between 38.3% (MoE) and 52.1% (UNESCO). Literacy 
rates amongst adults as of 2016 reached 77%. While not completely absent from the funding 
of the education sector, the State as of 2015 spent between 3.4% (MoE) and 2.29% (World 
Bank) of its GDP on public education, gradually increasing its expenditure since 2010. These 
improvements in education are widely acknowledged, and with particular attention to the 
achievement in girl-child education where the gender parity in primary school has reached 
perfect equality. Yet, despite these improvements, a distinguishing feature of a failed State is 
when the government withdraws from the public domain and is unable to provide basic public 
services such as education and health.  
 
The infrastructure system in the DRC is one of the most challenged in the world, with the 
spending requirements for improvement amongst the highest in Africa. The usual approximate 
spending on infrastructure is 10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – normal for Sub-
Saharan African states – but the World Bank reports that the DRC will need to increase this 
amount to an improbable 75% of its GDP if it wishes to fulfill the recommendations of what 
its infrastructure ‘needs’. However, as PwC notes, the resource abundance of the DRC attracts 
significant Foreign Direct Investment for development funding, mainly from Chinese 
investors. Yet, despite these investments the DRC remains at the bottom of the Human 
Development Index with a score in 2015 of 176 out of 188 (equating to the 12th worst in the 
world). This score is reflective of the previous results illustrating that public services in the 
DRC are neither present, nor functioning in a democratic sense since the state revoked 
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responsibility and accountability for both the education and health sector effectively negating 
the existence of public services.  
 
Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
Despite the DRC’s transition to democracy in 2006, human rights and the rule of law have been 
continuously violated by State actors, mainly the National Police and National Intelligence 
Agency. Chronic violations of human rights in the DRC are widely seen to have underlying 
roots in poor access to basic rights, local power struggles, and corruption on all institutional 
levels. Despite the State’s willingness to improve the status of the situation and increase 
measures to adhere to (inter)national human rights treaties, the African Union’s Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights cites the recurring conflict in the East as serving as a habitual 
deterrent. Therefore, due to this lack of a framework of rights, the African Union recognizes 
that harassment and arbitrary arrests of journalists, sexual violence, and media censorship are 
common characteristics of the Kabila regime. Additionally, Freedom House and the United 
Nations have recorded instances of civilian casualties, media shut-downs and harassment, and 
internet/text blockades having become an increasingly frequent occurrence when tensions and 
conflict arise between civilian and state forces. According to HRW, post-election protests led 
to 24 civilian casualties in 2006, 42 deaths in 2015 when Kabila first announced his intention 
to violate his two-term limit, and 66 deaths in 2016 when elections were postponed in addition 
to three opposition headquarters being set on fire by National Police forces.  
 
Radio is the most accessible medium of information for the public, with more than 450 
broadcasting networks in the DRC. Yet, over the years Kabila’s regime has been increasing 
pressure to curb their independence. Whereas the Constitution of the DRC and national law 
explicitly provide freedoms of speech and press, these freedoms are seldomly upheld. Freedom 
House highlights that restrictive laws (for example defamation laws) also limit what the press 
can report and those who are critical or cover controversial topics are subject to harassment, 
threats, prosecution, or attacks. Furthermore, while improvements are being made by local 
journalists, they remain poorly trained, minutely paid, and face multiple restraints including 
corruption, arbitrary prosecutions, and persistent impunity of those committing rights 
violations. The media in all manifestations is therefore subject to constant oppression, content 
monitoring, and consequences for publishing criticisms.  
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A consistent problem that contributes to regular violations of human rights and the rule of law 
is the lack of accountability mechanisms for the main perpetrators of the Congolese security, 
police, and military forces. Historical neglect has deprived the DRC judiciary from adequate 
training, resources, and funding in an attempt to undermine its independence. However, reports 
by the African Union often emphasize that the DRC recognizes the issues with impunity and 
has recently been actively working to improve its judicial action against sexual violence to 
obtain justice for the victim. Yet the issue remains that the military of the DRC (FARDC) is 
the largest group of perpetrators of offences of sexual violence. HRW additionally notes that 
army commanders often either do not cease, cannot cease, or join in on the violations of human 
rights but subsequently deny responsibility for their brigade’s actions when confronted. 
Therefore, the political will to fight impunity and corruption is present, but highly insufficient. 
Political will is moreover frequently hindered by interferences in judicial matters by the 
executive or military, leading to further impunity. Slow progress is being made in military 
judicial systems, however the impunity of high-ranking authorities remains a problem due to 
Congolese law hindering the prosecution of such authority figures. For example, the appointed 
judge must be a higher rank than he/she who is being prosecuted, a situation that only happens 
on rare occasions. Notwithstanding that progress has been made with low-ranking officers, 
those with higher authority remain untouchable. Regardless of these challenges, survey polls 
conducted by Vinck et al. highlight that justice and accountability remain viewed as necessary 
components for consolidating peace by DRC civilians and to be able to address the violated 
state of human rights and the impunity-prone rule of law currently residing within the DRC.    
 
To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of the DRC was hypothesized to be a 
failed and collapsed authoritarian regime. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of State 
legitimacy, public services, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are all unfulfilled 
in the case of the DRC, effectively classifying this case as a failed and collapsed authoritarian 
regime in accordance with the predicted regime type.  
 
Child Versus Elderly Victims  
The amount of urban children victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women 
has changed over the past 17 and a half years in the DRC. A shift to children as opposed to 
elderly women as victims began in the 1990s and has taken root in the DRC with the number 
of cases having accelerated drastically over the decades. In 2009, reports by the UN Office of 
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the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that the abuse directed against 
children accused of witchcraft was only increasing, while reports of elderly women being 
targeted have decreased from public attention. This indicates that there has been a positive 
increase in the amount of child accusations and subsequent reports on the issue, with either a 
stagnant or decreasing amount of accusations against elderly women due to lack of reporting 
on this target group during the same time period. 
 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the number one cause of homelessness amongst 
youth populations is claimed by Save the Children to be accusations of witchcraft that result in 
the rejection of the child from the home. Whereas estimates of how many children have been 
accused of being witches in the DRC vary significantly from sources to source, the majority 
consensus puts the minimum number of urban child witches in the tens of thousands 
(approximately 20,000). This is not to state that elderly women are not also victims of 
witchcraft accusations in contemporary DRC, but the primary target group is identified by the 
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Save the Children, UNICEF, and SOS Children’s Villages 
International as being urban children. Elderly women in the DRC were widely regarded as 
primary targets before 1990. However, the shift in victimology in this instance occurred 
simultaneously alongside technological advances and shifts in narratives regarding childhood, 
making witchcraft abilities more easily transferrable to vulnerable peoples, in this case from 
the elderly to children. Children are less capable of defending themselves and legally retaliating 
against their attacker, increasing their vulnerability levels past that of elderly women.  
 
There appears to be little to no clear correlation or pattern between changes in regime 
durability/type and the shift in victimology. The DRC has witnessed only one regime since 
2001, that under President Kabila. The shift in victimology to the urban child witches took 
place in tandem with emergence of the Kabila regime, which at that point in time was 
considered democratic, legitimate, and with public confidence. The change occurred during a 
period of democratic hope by the removal of Mobutu’s authoritarian dictatorship. Despite the 
deterioration of state legitimacy, public services, and accordance with human rights and rule 
of law over the decades under the incumbent Kabila regime, the emergence and augmenting 
rate of accusations appears to be occurring independent of changes in regime type/stability. 
However, given this analysis, the null hypothesis of the shift in victimology to urban children 
being present can be accepted in accordance with the overall theory in question.  
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3.2 Central African Republic 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
Legitimacy of the State in the CAR from its citizens has been absent for decades. Since 
independence, the majority of the CAR’s political repertoire reveals a history of military rule, 
with soldiers coming to power by brute force. This has in turn led to a constant state of political 
instability, economic uncertainty, and civil distrust of the government. The Bozizé regime1 
displayed a chronic and persistent lack of political will to implement peace agreements, to 
maintain control over rebel fighters, and to establish proper Disarmament Demobilization and 
Rehabilitation programs for youth fighters. This negligence not only led to the dismissal of 
recognition for the regime by regional leaders, but has also damaged the CAR’s social fabric 
to the point where support was no longer viable and cyclical civil war prevailed. Another 
violent coup took place in 2013, replacing Bozizé with self-proclaimed leader, Djotodia. 
However, the increasing distance and resistance between the State and its citizens, and its 
ripple-effect of consequences, resulted in the relinquishment of power by Djotodia due to 
international pressures and the establishment of the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 
(RCPCA, 2017–2021). This Plan and resolution for peace was prepared by the CAR 
Government in collaboration with the United Nations. Three pillars support the peace plan, 
with the second being the renewal of a social contract between the State and its citizens, 
illustrating international recognition of the distinct need of the State to regain the confidence 
of its people.  
 
Despite the disregard for formal methods of power transition, semi-frequent general elections 
continued to be held in 2005 and again in 2011. Yet, these elections were widely regarded by 
Freedom House, United Nations, and European Union as significantly fraudulent, exclusionary 
of opposition parties, and lacking transparency, being deemed neither fair nor free. This 
dedication to maintaining the appearance of the CAR’s democratic framework displays the 
State’s need for international legitimacy, but the simultaneous disregard of democratic practice 
indicates that this framework only serves as a democratic shell, filled with an incentivized 
winner-takes-all political culture. Since Djotodia relinquished power and was exiled from the 
country in 2014, general elections were scheduled and held in December 2015, yet regardless 
                                                      
1 Bozizé took power in 2003 as a result of a violent coup-d’état, and ruled until 2013, when Djotodia took power 
in yet another violent coup, declaring himself leader.   
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of the perceived fair and free nature of these elections, the security, social, and economic 
situations remain volatile.  
   
As previously illustrated, corruption and political violence remain rampant. Since violent coups 
have taken the place of formal government methods of transition of power, past and present 
regimes have manufactured a State characterized by institutionalized corruption, omnipresent 
mistrust, and nepotism. Each coup, coup attempt, and unfulfilled promise of the State 
stimulates rebellions and subsequent systematic violence against civilians perpetrated by both 
rebel fighters and State security forces. Hence, humanitarian crises and swathes of human 
rights violations have proliferated through the nation, often supported indirectly by neighboring 
military forces and politically by certain Presidents of the Economic Community of Central 
African States’ member states. This support for undemocratic behavior in the CAR further 
condones undemocratic governance and consequential continued delegitimization of the State. 
Therefore, it can be deduced that State legitimacy in the CAR is severely lacking in both the 
national and international arenas due to the absence of a social contract, undemocratic practices 
of corrupt governance, and systematic political violence against civilians.  
 
Variable 2: Public Services  
The first indication of inadequacy of public services is apparent in the inexistence of a 
functioning Government website for the Central African Republic that provides the general 
public with information, reports, or other publications by their Ministries, Offices, and 
Commissions. Additional to this, personal enrichment has taken political priority over the 
delivery of public services, resulting in decades of neglect. The health system in the CAR is in 
a deteriorated (often referred to by the WHO as failing) state, owing to frequent looting of 
supplies, dislocation of human resources, and poor institutional governance. These problems 
are reflected in the status of public health. Documentation by the United Nations Development 
Program, WHO, and African Union portray the overall life expectancy to not exceed 45 years 
of age, with surveys showing that more than 30% of the population does not have access to 
safe drinking water/food/sanitation, and illustrations of the highest rate of HIV prevalence in 
its sub-region. It is recognized that the State has made progress (albeit inconsistent) since 1990 
in the indicators of the Human Development Index of life expectancy, mean years of schooling, 
and infant mortality rates. However, this progress when analyzed in proportion to the overall 
parlous state of the health system, the unabating implementation of a level 3 national 
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emergency, and decrease in Gross National Income per capita of 39% between 1990 and 2015 
render this progress substantially insufficient.  
 
Alongside the health system, the education system also presents strong inadequacies. Political 
violence and corruption has led to the incapacity to mobilize domestic financial resources, 
administrative bottlenecks with staff, and blocked supply corridors due to relentless highway 
robberies. When turning analytical attention to enrollment rates of primary school students, 
during the latest year of data collection by UNICEF (2014), the enrollment rate reached for 
both boys and girls was 95%. This percentage then decreases to 24% in lower secondary school. 
The Education and Policy Data Center (EPCD) often attributes this disparity in transition rates 
to secondary school to income inequality, where only wealthy families can afford to continue 
their child’s education. Additionally, the primary school completion rate by UNICEF for 2014 
was 45% of enrolled students, and similar statistics showed that 68% of men and women 
between the ages of 15-24 had not completed primary education. This also supports the 
findings by EPDC that literacy rates amongst males (15+ years) was 49-51%, and amongst 
females (15+ years) 24-27%. Moreover, donor funding for the education sector reached 74% 
by the end of 2014, when at the beginning of the year it was estimated that donor contributions 
would reach no more than 58%, projecting the inability (and perhaps lack of will) of the State 
to efficiently allocate the proper resources for education with a dependence on donor aid.  
 
The final sector under analysis of infrastructure also suffers from the consequences of chronic 
conflict, persistent instability, and a weakly institutionalized State. According to WHO and UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports, vandalism and looting 
of State and donor provisions remains a serious challenge, with extreme poverty driving 
citizens to commit these destructive crimes. Moreover, the frequent forceful changes in 
government administrations often compels those leaving office to destroy State owned 
documents, buildings, and property, leaving the new administration stripped of any and all 
provisions down to basic office supplies. The self-preservationist characteristics of CAR 
regimes has left the State constantly inheriting degraded institutions, infrastructure, and public 
service systems, incapable of repairing or even maintaining these structures. Thus, it can be 
deduced that public services and systems are neither effectively present, nor functioning in the 
CAR.    
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Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
Throughout the twenty-first century, State as well as non-State actors have violated human 
rights and the rule of law in the Central African Republic. During and post- coup d’état 
attempts, indiscriminate violence towards civilians would intensify into gross violations of 
human rights constituting torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, and recruitment of child soldiers. 
Yet, physical assaults are not the only rights violation, since the pillaging of villages during 
civil turbulence causes irreparable damage to personal properties. The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) states that this deprives citizens of their 
fundamental economic and social rights, causing internal displacement of peoples and 
furthermore denying them their right to live in dignity. By mid 2017, the OCHA, UNICEF, 
and World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that approximately a quarter (23%) of the 
population was either internally or externally displaced, with 50% in need of humanitarian 
assistance. Moreover, the United Nations publicized evidence in 2014 that suggested that both 
rebel and State forces violated international humanitarian law by engaging in crimes against 
humanity, demonstrating failure on all fronts to protect the citizens under the constitution of 
the Central African Republic.     
 
Additionally, civil rights to speech and information are habitually infringed upon; Freedom 
House has reported numerous cases of total media blackouts that lasted for days, curfews set 
on radio broadcasts, and ceasing of newspaper publications causing presses to fall silent. This 
does not entail, however, that laws and decrees protecting freedom of the media have not been 
present in regimes over the past two decades. The 2005 Constitution of the Central African 
Republic, the Press Law that granted freedom of expression, and organizations like the High 
Communications Council are all examples of where private and public media had equal 
representation. Yet, as consequence of constant political instability, such efforts have been 
erected and demolished with the relentless revolving door of Presidential Administrations over 
the past few decades. Harassment and intimidation of journalists who report critically on the 
incumbent regime is not uncommon, but the looting of radio stations and press locations is a 
more frequent occurrence than violence against journalists. 
 
The collapse of the judicial apparatus, rendering it existing but extremely fragile, signaled to 
many that impunity was a given and anything could be done to anyone without any lasting 
legal repercussions. The inability of the State to curtail incessant societal conflict, mob 
violence, and numerous prison breaks additionally fuels impunity and illustrates the collapsed 
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state of the judicial system as acknowledged by HRW, the OHCHR, and WHO. However, as 
part of the peace agreement reached in 2016 between the Government and the United Nations, 
the State did create a hybrid court (the Bangui Special Criminal Court) in an attempt to counter 
the rampant impunity and promote justice to serve the people of CAR. As opposed to zero 
criminal trials being held between 2009 and 2014, the month of August 26 - September 26 of 
2016 witnessed 55 cases brought to and held in court as observed by HRW. Additionally, the 
State also requested that the International Criminal Court look into violations and open 
investigations regarding crimes that took place since 2012. Whereas these progressions are a 
start, 55 cases is a diminutive number in proportion to the violations of human rights and the 
rule of law that occur on a daily basis, with the vast majority continuing to go unpunished. 
Therefore, the political, civil, and economic rights of the CAR’s citizens are not upheld with 
rampant impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes remaining a rife issue for State forces 
that has yet to be resolved.  
 
To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of the CAR was hypothesized to be a 
failed and collapsed authoritarian regime. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of state 
legitimacy, public services, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are all unfulfilled 
in the case of the CAR, effectively classifying this case as a failed and collapsed authoritarian 
regime in accordance with the predicted regime type.  
 
Child Versus Elderly Victims  
The amount of urban child victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has 
changed over the past 17 and a half years in the CAR. However, this change has been merely 
a slight increase in the number of urban children since approximately 2009, with the majority 
of victims being women. Whereas it is often noted in UNICEF reports that the CAR is an 
example of an African state where children are victims, children do not comprise the primary 
target group. Witchcraft in the CAR is regarded by the U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, UNHCR, and OHCHR to be a gendered human rights issue that effects 
mostly females who are disabled, poor, and elderly. Numerical data on the number of 
accusations against women or children is unavailable, since most reports disregard variances 
in victimology and provide only aggregate totals. However, numbers of accusations illustrated 
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per year in different reports equate the total to have accumulated to being at a minimum of in 
the thousands over the past 17 and a half years, with the majority being adult women2.  
 
There appears to be no clear pattern or correlation between changes in regime type/durability 
and changes the amount of urban child victims in the CAR. The CAR has witnessed a 
continuous cycle of instability and endless coup d’états for decades, with child-witch 
accusations emerging approximately around 2009, in the middle of Bozizé’s decade long rule 
that lacked any State capacity and capability, not an uncommon characteristic for CAR 
regimes. This emergence is neither large enough to classify as a shift in victimology from 
elderly women to urban children, nor has the amount of cases against urban children increased 
with the degradation of the political, social, and economic situation in the CAR since its 
emergence. Thus it can be deduced that there is no clear pattern or correlation between regime 
type/stability and the amount of urban child victims in the case of the CAR. This conclusion 
therefore rejects the null hypothesis which stated that the victimization of urban children over 
elderly women is present since the CAR is a failed/collapsed state, not in accordance with the 
theory in question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 For example, between 2010-2011 alone, 400 victims were reported by the UNHRC.  
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3.3 Republic of Angola 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
The deterioration of state legitimacy in Angola in combination with a restless population is 
what brought about regime change for the first time in 25 years, as of late 2017. Research 
conducted by the Christian Michelson Institute emphasized that the dos Santos regime held the 
belief that it won the elections in 1992 fairly and freely, thus granting it the right to rule 
indefinitely, regardless of shifts in popular opinion over time. To deflect attention from 
increasingly disaffected and restless civic societies, the post-Soviet trained President, dos 
Santos, often resorted to Stalin-inspired forms of propaganda to quiet the dissenting voices. 
Having been in power for decades, the robust dos Santos regime was widely recognized as a 
highly durable neopatrimonial regime, where the State’s rent-management architecture 
consistently reinforced the regime’s stability. Since 2002, the dos Santos regime began to 
consolidate its political power while exerting increasing control and authority over the entirety 
of its territory. However the centralization of power and handouts to those in favor of the single-
party regime took priority over legitimization through inclusive governance and State 
development. This failure to provide socio-economic prospects is what ultimately broke the 
durable dos Santos regime in 2017; having been in power for 25 years under personal-rule of 
neopatrimonialism, research by the International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) states 
that the dos Santos regime’s stagnated economy, dependence on oil, and lack of economic 
diversification frustrated the growing urban youth populations who continued to be 
marginalized.      
 
The limited version of democracy that did not influence the established role of regime power 
present in the dos Santos regime (that held regular general elections) was not threatened by a 
change in power at the hands of the people. The 2008 elections were largely deemed free and 
fair by independent observers, and the 2012 slightly more ambiguous. Yet, nevertheless the 
dos Santos regime emerged as the victor in both instances, further boosting the regime’s official 
legitimacy. The elections in 2017 witnessed a transfer of power, but still to within the same 
MLPA party, from dos Santos to his Vice President, João Lourenço. Despite accusations that 
the election was fraudulent, the decision by dos Santos to voluntarily step down was a 
deliberate move on behalf MLPA party to silence critics of the regime since criticisms largely 
targeted dos Santos himself, not the party he represented. The court eventually ruled the 2017 
elections results official. Therefore, the combination of holding frequent general elections, 
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peaceful transfers of power, and abiding by court proceedings on accusations of fraud supports 
that the State in Angola legitimately upholds a democratic framework, but the means of which 
this is accomplished is under neopatrimonial behavior and practices. 
 
While elections tend to abide by democratic standing, the means by which the government 
handles civic unrest is often reported by HRW, Christian Michelson Institute, and IFHR as 
utilizing excessive force, arbitrary arrests, and violent intimidation. Many instances of national 
security or police forces wearing civilian clothing have been reported to systematically threaten 
and attack anti-government protestors in public and their private residences. Additional to 
civilian oppression, corruption is an active characteristic of the Angolan State. Angola in 2015 
was rated at 161 out of 175 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, allocating it in the top twenty 
most corrupt in the world. The “missing millions” is another internationally known example, 
with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other Bretton Woods institutions all 
concerned about the mismanagement of oil/diamond revenue which has led millions of US$ to 
go unaccounted for. Yet, despite State corruption, oppression, and government centralization, 
the Angolan system of patronage has not turned predatory, which is often the case with oil-
producing states.  
 
Variable 2: Public Services  
Since the 27 year-long Angolan civil war ended in 2002, the health system and infrastructure 
has never quite recovered from the destruction and looting. Post-civil war health systems also 
witnessed large contributions from Angolan churches, particularly in rural areas. The 2015 
report by the WHO showed that 36% of the population lives without access to the basic public 
services of clean water, hygiene facilities, health systems, or education. The Ministry of Health 
(MoH) provides higher percentages however, with 58% of the population not having access to 
healthy drinking water, and 47% not having proper sanitation facilities. Both sources however 
confirm that life expectancy is 51 years of age, with 15-29% of children under the age of five 
being acutely malnourished. According to the MoH, weaknesses in the health system include 
untrained staff, poor management, weak supply of water and energy to health centers and the 
general public, and poor response to health detriments. These are confirmed by the WHO. The 
State additionally prioritizes resource extraction and the maintenance of legitimacy over public 
service delivery and adherence to a social contract with its citizens.  
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When analyzing the education sector, Angola is often viewed as a country with a low 
‘education for all’ status, ranking as the 9th lowest in 2012. However, the State has been making 
progress, as shown by the increase in gross enrollment in primary and secondary school in a 
two-year period, from 13.2% in 2014 to 97.5% in 2016. Additionally, according to the Angolan 
Ministry of Education (MoE), the primary school completion rates in 2011 (the most recent 
year of data collection) reached 57.1%, whereas the World Bank stated it to be 50%. This 
illustrates that Angola has yet to reach universal primary education, with the completion rates 
representative of below average scores for Sub-Saharan nations. Moreover, the rates of 
illiteracy amongst Angolans as of 2010 (again, most recent estimates) reached a general rate 
(15+ years) of 34% according to the MoE, and rates of 44% (male 80% and female 53%) in 
2014 according to the World Bank. Moreover, the State expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
on the education sector in 2010 was 3.5%, below the average of 3.8% for the region.  
 
The civil war in Angola severely damaged and deteriorated the majority of the transport 
infrastructure, with the last few decades witnessing large improvements in this sector, often 
financed by Chinese credit loans and investments. Yet, in the first decade of dos Santo’s 
regime, over 30% of total public investment went to rehabilitating transport infrastructure, 
making Angola the highest paying State on road infrastructure in Africa. Between 2009 and 
2011, the State began investing more into public service delivery and infrastructure, financing 
a ‘significant increase’ in the number of public service institutions. However, budget oversight 
for infrastructure projects is usually non-existent and the rebuilding of infrastructure was not 
carried out with the population’s needs taken into account. Moreover, Corporate Social 
Responsibility programs, which by law require corporations to re-invest a percentage of their 
profits into social service delivery projects, are largely in charge of rebuilding the education 
and health systems. Some attribute this significant contribution by corporations as being due 
to the ‘incompetence’ problem amongst Angolan authorities. Therefore, public services are 
only partially present and only partially functional, with significant improvement needed.   
 
Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
Human rights as enshrined within the constitution are upheld to a selective extent by the 
Angolan State, while the rule of law encompassed by an existing judicial system is often subject 
to government interference that consequently undermines its efficiency in practice. According 
to the African Union, Angola is a lawful democratic state, with a constitution for the benefit of 
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the people. However, research from the IFHR shows that State forces often deliberately hinder, 
disband, or restrict civil society organizations in fear of a retaliation en masse, a possibility 
frequently demonstrated through civilian anti-government protests. Regardless, Angola has 
publicly committed itself to almost all international human rights treaties and international 
legal instruments, additionally having signed the Maputo Protocol, which takes into account 
the effective realization of all civil, political, social, and economic rights of all Angolans 
enforced by the national legal system and international legal instruments. Nevertheless, despite 
these efforts, HRW reports that police brutality and excessive use of force remain familiar 
occurrences to many in urban settings where demands for bribes, extortion, and confiscations 
of property are a common event. Political violence continues to take place even if 
demonstrations and protests are properly reported to authorities beforehand, carried out by 
security forces dressed as civilians. Moreover, a lack of updated and disaggregated statistical 
data hampers the efforts of independent monitoring organizations to reform the social and 
economic rights practices of the State.  
 
The freedom of the press and speech are also valid rights under the Angolan constitution. 
However, the State employs several laws, stipulations, and strategies to circumvent full 
recognition of these rights. For example, an analysis by the Christian Michelson Institute 
revealed Angolan law restricts access to certain controversial information and events by 
deeming it classified information; in 2010 parliament passed a law allowing the arrest of 
anyone who insults the Republic of Angola; and buy-outs by the State of advertisers in local 
media and poor pay of journalists often influence the income of local journalists generally 
resulting in self-censorship. Freedom House, HRW, and IFHR claim that both State and private 
owned media sources are dependent on the regime, with the Internet having become a safe 
platform for expressing criticism of the regime, despite the limited reach outside of urban areas. 
Additionally, small independent media sources such as weeklies do exist, but their reach is 
limited, with only one major independent media source remaining open and circulating as of 
2015. However, those who partake in the harassment, threat, and restriction of freedoms of 
journalists often receive impunity for their violations of these rights.   
 
To ensure the fulfillment of the people’s rights, the African Union has commemorated and 
documented the establishment of a multitude of judicial organs that administer justice in 
adherence to the Angolan Democratic State and the Rule of Law. These organs include the 
Courts (sovereign bodies serving justice for the people), the Office of the Ombudsman for 
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Justice (an independent public institution that ensures that rights, state judiciary practices, and 
public administration operate within the law), and the Office of the Attorney General (a State 
body that upholds the law with jurisdictional power and represents the State). Whereas these 
judicial systems and structural reforms are committed to the promotion and protection of 
human rights to consolidate peace and democracy, the practicality of these commitments have 
yet to be upheld. According to IFHR this is due to insufficient material and human resources 
that hinder and delay the deliverance of justice, consequently resulting in instances of impunity. 
Thus, commitment to and the establishment of judicial bodies and institutions to uphold the 
rule of law and monitor human rights is present in Angola, however the means to implement 
these systems are ineffectively weak and underdeveloped. Ultimately, human rights and the 
rule of law are in not upheld in practice.   
 
To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of Angola was hypothesized to be a 
anocracy, or semi-democratic regime. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of State 
legitimacy is partially fulfilled, public services partially fulfilled, and adherence to human 
rights and the rule of law are unfulfilled in the case of Angola, effectively classifying this case 
as an anocracy, or semi-democratic regime in accordance with the predicted regime type.  
 
Child Versus Elderly Victims  
The amount of urban child victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has 
changed over the past 17 and a half years in Angola. Children began becoming victims of 
witchcraft in the late 1990s, with the increase in frequency over other target groups as early as 
2008 having been noted by UNICEF and OHCHR as having become a normalized part of 
societal discourse. Numerical approximations of how many urban children have been 
victimized by witchcraft accusations in Angola is unavailable, however the amount of street 
children in urban areas are estimated to be in the thousands, with the majority of these children 
according to SOS Children’s Villages International having been cast out of family homes due 
to witchcraft allegations. This shift in victimology has been described by the UNHCR as being 
epidemic, rampant, and a surge similar to what has been witnessed in the DRC. This 
phenomenon is most prevalent in urban capitals of various Angolan provinces, where street 
children are numerous. Urban children are said to be the main victims of such abuses, however 
elderly women are still regarded as the traditional victims and continue to be vulnerable targets, 
Church 
 48 
but to a lesser extent than urban children. A clear shift in victimology from elderly women to 
urban children has therefore been established.  
 
There appears to be no clear pattern or correlation between changes in regime type/durability 
and changes the amount of urban child victims in Angola. Since the early 1990s, when the dos 
Santos regime first took power until late 2017, the durable yet anocratic regime maintained a 
weak and fragile status, with shifts in victimology taking place regardless of consistency in 
regime type. This therefore equates to a lack of a clear pattern or correlation between regime 
type/stability and the amount of urban child victims in the case of Angola. The evidence 
provided therefore rejects the null hypothesis which stated that the victimization of urban 
children over elderly women is not present since Angola is classified as a semi-democracy. 
Due to the presence of a shift in victimology, this conclusion is not in accordance with the 
theory in question.  
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3.4 Republic of Ghana 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
Ghanaians perceive liberal democracy as the only acceptable form of governance and their 
dedication to democracy is what has largely contributed to its effective consolidation. Elites 
within the Ghanaian government have acknowledged that the most efficient and least costly 
manner of gaining political power is through democratic elections. A strong and dispersed 
dedication to maintaining peace and unity throughout Ghanaian society by regional leaders and 
religious figures has consequently fortified democratic behavior amongst civil society and 
government forces alike. Yet, since political power and all of its accompanying benefits are 
only obtainable through general elections, this has resulted in a proliferation of non-democratic 
practices such as vote-buying, defamation campaigns, and money politics. Nevertheless, the 
confidence in democracy emanating from both external (the Courts) and internal (the Church) 
bodies is what has significantly contributed to Ghana’s political stability, durability, and 
ultimately the State’s legitimacy on various accounts.     
 
Ghana has had seven legitimate elections since the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 
1993, and three democratic changes from incumbent to opposition ruling party – therefore 
resulting in Ghana having successfully passed the two-turn test (TTT) of democracy, 
confirming Ghana’s democratic consolidation. According to Afrobarometer survey results, 
political parties have equal opportunities to pursue votes within a relatively equal playing field. 
This ensures that election debates are mainly issue-based, translating into free and fair 
elections. However, civilian exit polls illustrated doubt concerning ballot secrecy. This is 
because campaign-strategies include convincing citizens that their ballots are not anonymous, 
creating obligatory sentiments amongst the public to carry out the reciprocation of vote-buying. 
While this clouds the elections’ full transparency, an absence of legal accusations of 
fraudulence and the ability of civil society to holistically monitor the entire election attests to 
the confirmation that Ghana has witnessed successful free, fair, and transparent multi-party 
elections since 1993. 
 
Yet despite Ghana’s reputation as a democratic State, Afrobarometer results illustrate how 
accusations of narcotics trafficking, superfluous personal spending, and vote-buying have 
gained international attention and challenged its legitimacy. Additionally, the issue of 
corruption within the governing elites, judiciary, and bureaucracy of the acceptance of bribes 
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has increased the attention and monitoring of Ghana’s Government practices. However, anti-
corruption measures are often a large issue presented within campaign agendas, as was the case 
in the 2016 elections, where corruption and incompetency were overtly discussed. Post-
elections, the defeated party openly testified to the legitimacy, credibility, in integrity of the 
victor and opposition party with confidence that the new Ghanaian Administration could root 
out corruption in the future. Despite ideological divergences, often the values and principles 
underlying both major parties converge on the topic of combatting corruption. Therefore, it has 
been demonstrated that the State holds the confidence and legitimacy of both the Ghanaian 
people and the international community by means of legitimate elections and public dedication 
to anti-corruption campaigns.      
 
Variable 2: Public Services 
The Ghanaian State’s public services are present and functioning at a general capacity, with 
recognized room for improvement in reports by the Ghanaian Health Service. Public health 
services are most prominent and functional in urban areas, with peripheral rural provinces and 
urban-slum communities being marginalized and thus having fewer and poorer quality health 
facilities, and limited access to resources. The Ghana Health Service, UNICEF, and the United 
Nations recognize that the inefficiency of Ghana’s health sector is further hampered by the 
mal-distribution of resources and limited funding, brain drain in specialized health staff, and 
centralized decision making. Moreover, the disease profile of Ghana portrays the highest 
threats to be predominantly communicable diseases, pregnancy conditions, and under-
nutrition. Life expectancy at birth is 57.5 years of age, with the rate of mother-to-child 
transmissions of HIV/AIDS having declined significantly from 31% in 2009, to 7% in 2012, 
and remaining static at this level since. Where the Ghanaian Ministry of Health states that the 
allocation of funding to the health sector in 2014 (the most recent year of publications) has 
been admittedly lower than in previous statements, the overall commitment of the government 
to replenishing the depleted health sector has been increasing since 2010. Yet, other data 
provided by the World Bank and the UNHDP illustrates a decrease.   
 
However, the expenditure on the education sector as a percentage of GDP has been reported 
by both the Ghanaian Ministry of Education and the PwC to have been at 8.2%, higher than 
other developing countries such as Kenya or South Africa. Moreover, in 2016 the net 
enrollment rate for primary school was 87% for males, and 88% for females. UNICEF states 
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the rate of survival from primary to secondary school as estimated between 2008-2012 to have 
been 72.2% of enrolled students. Data from 2016 shows that the survival rate of 2016 to have 
been 62%, making net enrollment rates for secondary school in 2016 54% for both males and 
females. The percentage of the population without an education according the Ghana Health 
Service has been decreasing steadily since 2003, encompassing 9.4% of males and 19.1% of 
females as of 2014. Finally, the literacy rates for the most recent year of 2010 was (15+ years)  
78% for males and 65% for females.  
 
The provision of Ghanaian infrastructure and transport sectors, according to research by the 
Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC), are dominated by the State who holds a 
monopoly on rail and water transport. Additionally, Ghana is the main hub for international air 
traffic into the rest of Africa. Ghana’s investor attractiveness is significantly carried by the 
State’s political stability, economic liberalism, and civil liberties that signal to investors that 
their interests and rights will be protected. However, the GIPC acknowledges that issues in the 
security sector remain a problem, with robberies and vandalism on the rise, raising concerns of 
investors. Ghana is undergoing an economic transition from agriculture-based production to an 
industry based on service delivery. Thus, the weakness of Ghana’s customs’ infrastructure of 
timeliness in tracking and tracing need to be addressed. However, unlike many African states, 
PwC and UNDP reports illustrate how the infrastructure network in Ghana spans the entire 
nation (albeit with greatest concentration of improvement in the South/West). Consequently, 
in comparison with other low-income African states, Ghana maintains an advanced 
infrastructural platform, yet the closer Ghana reaches to obtaining a middle-income status, the 
more fragile and weak their current structure appears in comparison with the new standing. 
Nevertheless, for their current standing, public services provided by the State are present and 
functioning in all sectors of the health, education, and infrastructure systems.  
 
Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
Afrobarometer research has shown that Ghanaian citizens display strong support for adherence 
to the rule of law and the accompanying human rights laws, with no exemption for State 
officials. Yet despite this unwavering support, reports by PwC and Amnesty International state 
that violations of human rights continue in Ghana. Poorly protected property rights are a result 
of corruption, the shackling of mental health patients is due to lack of mental health facilities, 
and discrimination against the LGBTI community portrays the weaknesses in the State’s ability 
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to uphold human rights. However, the avid promotion and protection of civil liberties 
contributes to Ghana’s status as least corrupt in the region, with survey results expressing the 
views of the public that the government must obey the law, and therefore citizens must obey 
the government. While there are sporadic reports of police brutality, negligence, and 
corruption, there is little evidence that State forces regularly violate the civil, economic, and 
political rights of the Ghanaian people.   
 
There have been instances recorded by Freedom House, however, when State forces did limit 
the freedom of speech and information during election periods by confiscating journalists’ 
equipment, limiting coverage of certain events, and selective violence against journalists. 
Ghana is usually viewed as having the most free environment for journalists and the media 
within Africa; however an incident in 2015 involving the death of a journalist exposed the 
tensions around the upcoming 2016 elections, instigating State-led attempts at media 
censorship and violence against journalists for the first time since 2000. Moreover, there are 
hundreds of television and radio news stations, with the majority being either private, 
community, or university owned, supporting that there are a multitude of independent media 
sources in Ghana. Yet, as the Ghana Integrity Initiative acknowledges, from the three pillars of 
open governance – citizen-centric services, transparent government, and innovation facilitation 
– the second pillar of transparency performs the weakest because of an absence of a Freedom 
of Information Law. Therefore, it is apparent that the environment in Ghana is one of general 
respect for human rights and civil liberties, however, violence against citizens and violations 
of these rights can occur under situations of political tension.  
 
Alongside the strong support for human rights and the rule of law by Ghanaian citizens, 
additional Afrobarometer research shows that it has become engrained in the civic culture that 
the only legitimate ways of settling disputes is by the official avenues of the courts system. 
Mob-justice is widely rejected by the public and political vigilantes who target opposition party 
supporters should be held responsible for their crimes, regardless of their party allegiance. 
However, the Ghanaian Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection states that the 
current institutional framework is weak in effectively providing gender protection for harmful 
practices against women, and serving them justice when such practices occur. Nevertheless, 
after the incumbent NPP Administration’s first few months in power, 53% of the general public 
regarded the government as performing fairly/very well. However, there is a growing sentiment 
amongst Ghanaians that the rule of law, upheld as it should be, is applied unequally, with 
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increasing impunity for State officials and the wealthy upper-class. While the government has 
taken strides to combat unlawful influence of status, international actors such as the US 
Department of State claim that impunity remains a problem with high-profile officials. Thus, 
as demonstrated, the rule of law and the upholding of human rights is engrained in the civic, 
political, and economic cultures of Ghanaian society, however it is recognized by both that 
national and international community that improvements can be made in institutional practices.  
 
To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of the Republic of Ghana was 
hypothesized to be a democracy. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of State 
legitimacy, public services, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are all fulfilled 
in the case of the Republic of Ghana, effectively classifying this case as a democracy, in 
accordance with the predicted regime type. 
 
Child Versus Elderly Victims  
The amount of urban child victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has 
changed over the past 17 and a half years in Ghana. The amount of child witchcraft accusations 
has increased over the period of this analysis, however, elderly women remain the primary 
victims who are banished to ‘witch camps’ on the fringes of society. Approximations vary per 
source, however the general consensus verifies that for every estimated 1.5 women in the witch 
camps throughout Ghana, there is 1 child. These figures often are reflected in numbers of 800 
women and 500 children, or 1,000 women and 700 children, as portrayed in reports by SOS 
Children’s Villages International, United Kingdom Home Office, and ActionAid. However, 
this large population of children in these witch camps is often reported by UNICEF to be a 
result of either family members of elderly residents offering up a child as a care-giver, or 
sometimes when the child’s primary guardian was the accused and is banished alongside the 
elder. Thus the increasing amount of ostracized children is not a direct result of witchcraft 
accusations, but more of a parallel effect of the increase in accusations against elderly women. 
The victims therefore appear to be disproportionately elderly women in Ghana.  
 
There appears to be no clear pattern or correlation between changes in regime type/durability 
and changes the amount of urban child victims in Ghana. Ghana has witnessed several 
successful democratic turnovers of power, multiple Presidential administrations, and a durable 
democratic civic and political culture over the past 17 and a half years. Despite a stagnantly 
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stable regime, the rate of witchcraft accusations increased over this period against elderly 
women and consequently urban children. This therefore equates to a lack of a clear pattern or 
correlation between regime type/stability and the amount of urban child victims in the case of 
Ghana. The evidence provided is therefore in accordance with the null hypothesis which stated 
that the victimization of urban children over elderly women is not present since Ghana is 
classified as a democracy, a conclusion that is also in accordance with the theory in question.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
This chapter contains a closing discussion of the research presented in this thesis. Two sections 
are presented, with the first engaging in a critical examination of the methodology used as 
explained in the second chapter in tandem with speculations as to how said criticisms could 
have influenced the results provided. The second section determines this research’s 
contribution to the academic community and discusses how the conclusions drawn from this 
thesis can benefit both academic and policy realms in practice.  
 
Despite the efforts made to reduce exogenous influences on the results as outlined in the second 
chapter, there are however certain factors when carrying out the assigned methodology that 
inevitably contributed to the outcome of this research – namely data availability, coding 
selection process, and criteria selection. Starting first with data availability, whereas there was 
an abundance of information regarding the determined criteria for gauging regime type and 
stability, the data needed to determine the presence or absence of the dependent variable (shift 
in victimology) was significantly deficient. This is often due to underreporting of incidents and 
cases of accusations, limited and sporadic publications due to either security or resource issues, 
and a general lack of awareness of this issue hindering further academic and policy research. 
Despite that a large portion of the data was able to be obtained from legitimate sources, such 
as NGO field reports, United Nations statements, and annual government reports, the data 
continues to only represent limited and incomplete information, inescapably constraining the 
ability to produce exact outcomes. The overall unavailability of concrete, quantitative, and 
periodically reported data could have influenced the results by unavoidably formulating the 
conclusions as being founded on estimations, approximations, and inferences. 
 
Second, selection coding was utilized to efficiently allocate appropriate evidence, both 
supportive and contradictory to the theory under scrutiny, as a way of filtering and condensing 
the mass amount of data to assist in effective research processing. However, by means of 
extracting only partial data from available sources, it can be criticized that a selection bias has 
taken place in accordance with the ordinal characteristics under analysis. By focusing on a pre-
determined set of criteria, alternative information and evidence can be unintentionally 
disregarded and not properly represented. It could be additionally argued that the selective 
coding ignored alternative possible criteria of regime type and durability that would otherwise 
have resulted in differing classifications and subsequently in differing overall results. 
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Nevertheless, given the limitations of this thesis in comparison to the amount of data collected 
to ensure a comprehensive and unbiased accumulation of evidence, the possible absence and 
under-representation of data was unavoidable under the chosen design type. 
 
Thirdly, the criteria selected to classify a case study’s regime type and durability as discussed 
in the second chapter were mainly Western concepts of development, democracy, and 
durability. Despite the reasoning that these variables were used to parallel those widely utilized 
in academic and policy works (both Western and non), criticisms could nevertheless be made 
that keeping with this Western paradigm consequently influenced the resulting classification 
of regime type to ultimately corresponding with that which was predicted. African states span 
a wide and colorful spectrum of regime types, with hybrids being a common occurrence. 
Therefore, the adherence to a dichotomized spectrum of regime types and durability 
(democratic versus non, durable versus fragile) as has been done in this study could 
misrepresent the true typology of the regime in question in practice, further prompting criticism 
of the validity and accuracy of the conclusions drawn here.  Moreover, the amount of variables 
under analysis – four main variables, with each main variable containing three sub-variables, 
equating to a total of twelve variables per case study – could be criticized as being unfeasible 
and too extensive, causing superficial coverage of each variable. Hence, additional to the 
research completed here, a within-case study (a more in-depth analysis of a single case) of 
either the CAR or Angola3 is recommended to provide further valuable academic insight into 
cases where either witchcraft accusations of urban children are expected but did not occur, or 
where accusations were not expected but were present nevertheless.  
 
The findings presented in this thesis contribute not only to informing the academic arena on 
new developments on the issue, but simultaneously to informing the policy arena in 
International Relations (IR) as well. Starting with academia, this thesis’ main contribution is 
the falsification of the previously accepted theory that State failure and collapse was a 
necessary condition for the shift in witchcraft victimology from elderly women to urban 
children. Since the Central African Republic as a failed and collapsed authoritarian State did 
not possess a shift in victimology, and Angola as an anocratic semi-democracy did, it can be 
deduced that this theory is invalid. Moreover, the finding that regime type and durability does 
                                                      
3 The results of these cases refuted the theory in question, prompting further research into these two cases in 
particular.    
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not play a necessary role in the shift in victimology allows future scholarly work to refocus its 
analytical lens on conditions that practically influence this phenomenon. By tightening the 
parameters of applicable alternative influences (poverty, predacious religious practices, 
evolving narratives of children, etc.), further academic endeavors will be more capable of 
accurately identifying a concrete set of causal factors of the shift in witchcraft victimology. 
Therefore, this research is relevant to academia because its findings will not only improve the 
accuracy, scope, and focus of future research on this topic, but also indicates that further 
research must be done to discover the true necessary conditions that produce this phenomenon 
in order to fully understand its manifestation in African societies.     
      
These findings are also highly relevant for policy makers and IR in practice. Occult policies, 
legislation, and rehabilitation mechanisms that offer human rights protection against witchcraft 
abuses have remained an ineffective and unrealized issue within the political arena in the 
majority of African states. The findings of this thesis illustrate that this problem is not one 
restricted by regime type or bound to the territory under its control. Since this issue is not 
tethered to the characteristic of political (in)stability, the pursuance of democracy as a solution 
is no longer applicable, and therefore other means of combatting this phenomenon need to be 
considered. The parameter of failure once thought to contain this surge in occult abuses 
narrowed the scope of the search for this phenomenon, but since the scope has now been 
expanded to incorporate potentially any state, widespread preventative measures and 
awareness campaigns are more important than ever to stop the abuse and neglect.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In conclusion, a phenomenon has emerged that threatens the lives of future African generations 
every day. A shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations from elderly women to urban 
children began to appear in the 1990s, captivating academic attention. Throughout the years of 
research, a theory developed stating that only collapsed or failed states engulfed by existential 
crisis or conflict bore witness to this phenomenon, making a failed/collapsed regime a 
necessary component to its existence. However, in early 2017, a study by Steve Snow on 
Nigerian ‘witch-busters’ (religious leaders who identify and reveal witches living within 
society) uncovered a contradiction to this theory. Nigeria, a weak but not failed state, was 
witnessing its own shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations. This provoked the scholarly 
need to test this dominant theory which subsequently prompted the question under analysis in 
this thesis of how regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology 
in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents.  
 
The results of the case studies chosen concluded in a variety of outcomes, not all of which were 
in accordance with the main theory in question. Out of the four case studies examined, two 
were in accordance with the existing theory: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Republic of Ghana. The results of the DRC case study classified its State as a failed/collapsed 
authoritarian regime, where a shift in victimology was present. The results of the Ghanaian 
case study classified its State as a liberal democracy with an absence of a shift in victimology. 
Yet, two case studies rejected the existing theory, with the Central African Republic classified 
as a failed/collapsed authoritarian state with an absence of a shift in victimology, and Angola 
being an anocratic semi-democracy with a shift in victimology present. Since not only one, but 
two cases analyzed rejected the previously assumed theory, it is evident that these results 
ultimately refute the validity of the theory that this research aimed to test. Therefore, it can be 
definitively concluded that a collapsed and failed regime is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for the shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations from elderly women to urban 
children.    
 
The research conducted here and the resulting theoretical falsification consequently call into 
question for the first time the presumptions of what the academic community thought it 
understood about the basic parameters of witchcraft accusations in African societies. This 
research therefore contributes to the academia on African witchcraft victimology by taking 
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away the false rudimentary framework that has inadvertently misguided the majority of 
contemporary research on this subject regarding the simple questions of when (durability of 
the regime) and where (type of regime) shifts in witchcraft victimology occur. With this more 
accurate perception that regime type and durability in reality hold a non-influential status, 
future research will no longer be conducted within these factors of limitation and can dedicate 
further efforts to identifying more explicit factors conducive to shifts in witchcraft victimology. 
In conclusion, the innovations and results drawn from the aforementioned analysis ultimately 
produce a need for scholars to re-analyze and rethink what has already been researched, with 
the knowledge that African witchcraft belief systems and practices are neither determined nor 
bound by the incumbent regime and the territory under its domain.  
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1. Appendix: Table of Independent Variables 
 
This appendix contains the collected and coded data for each case study that was analyzed 
and processed to conduct this research. First, the three main criteria and sub-criteria of 
regime type/durability (or independent variables) for each case study are presented in 
individual tables. Second, a table wherein data regarding child versus elderly women 
witchcraft accusations is presented for each case study. 
1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  
(Hypothesized Regime Type: Failed/Collapsed) 
Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is present. 
 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy  
 
1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?  
- “The Congolese narratives argue that the West does not want the Congo to be democratic and 
independent, and that western partners seek to maintain control over the country through trade, war 
and aid.” (de Goede 108).  
 
- “By pointing to the West as the cause for the failures of the Congolese attempts to democratise and 
stabilise the country, the Congolese present themselves as being without agency as well.” (de Goede 
108).  
 
- “The outer framework of democracy is being constructed, but the inner workings of these 
institutions that depend on political subjectivities are being left untouched.” (de Goede 109).  
- “The concept of a shell institution is therefore unfortunate, because it easily leads us to think of 
these newly formed state institutions as being empty shells, a framework on paper, a building, a 
budget, but little substance.” (de Goede 110).   
- “Below the institu- tional level of these empty shells reside local agencies that shape hybridity. This 
is a site of struggle, a site of resistance, and a site of consumption.” (de Goede 110).  
- “The framing of voter-MP relations in paternalistic terms and the subsequential emphasis on 
clientelist practices of accountability stresses a tension between formal and informal practices of 
accountability.” (de Goede 125). 
- “…it is not merely political elites that prefer a weakly institutionalised state, civil society and the 
population in general often actively evade and undermine the state too.” (de Goede 126).  
- “The implicit argument of these studies is that the choice to opt for the informal instead of the 
formal is due to the failure of the formal.” (de Goede 126).   
- “The centralisation of governance and the bureaucracy of the process paralyses a response from the 
authorities concerned, and the net effect is that lit- tle to nothing is being achieved through the formal 
procedures of MPs constitu- ency work.” (de Goede 128). 
- “The failing practice of formalised constituency work and the inability to actu- ally bring MPs and 
their electorate together in a meaningful discussion shows there is a lack of formalised rapport 
between MPs and their constituency.” (de Goede 128). 
- “Instead of seeking to be better informed, or to better inform the public about parliamentary actions, 
and instead of striving to make formal procedures respond better to the needs of the general public, 
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both electorate and MPs prefer to resort to the informal, thus continuing these informal practices in 
parallel to the new and ill-functioning practices of democratic governance and democratic 
representation.” (de Goede 128-129).  
- “These informal practices then substi- tute the formal procedures because they deliver what the 
formal practices fail to deliver… The formal proce- dures are nevertheless nominally maintained to 
keep up the infrastructural and institutional framework of democratic governance.” (de Goede 129). 
- “But mutual preference does not lie in the improvement of formal relations and state-society 
relations, nor in the improvement of formal procedures and practices, or in state building.” (de Goede 
129). 
- “What both MPs and electorate pursue is an informal and personal relation of direct redistribution 
and direct po- litical gain.” (de Goede 129). 
- “What we see here are local convivial agencies that avoid formal democratic procedures to maintain 
informal practices within the framework of democratic governance and democratic representation.” 
(de Goede 129).  
- “In other words, they expected that democracy would mean more redistribu- tion, the trickling down 
of wealth to their communities. However, they complain that they see little of their MPs after the 
election campaign, and that little to noth- ing is being delivered.” (de Goede 130).   
- “In the Congo it is generally assumed that MPs are more concerned with their own interests than 
with those of their electorate or the general population. MPs themselves are aware that they can 
indeed not live up to the expectations of peo- ple.” (de Goede 131).  
- “…citizens may be as little interested in the institutionalisation of governance, each for their own 
reasons, as elites are.” (de Goede 136).  
- “Moreover, the institutions designed to safe- guard [the 2011 voter] integrity, notably the CENI 
and the Supreme Court, lack credibility in the eyes of many Congolese.” (The Carter Center 67). 
- “We suggest, however, that its more recent problems and crim- inal activity are much more a 
product of the behaviour of the DRC’s neighbours and of transna- tional organisations than of any 
problem endemic to the Congo itself.” (Mullins and Rothe 97). [this quote illustrates that the 
people’s lack of confidence in the government is due partially to the colonial legacies and partially to 
the hyper-development of capitalism that led to chronic criminal engagements] 
- “‘The state is dying but not yet dead' and 'the state is so present, but so useless' are also commonly 
heard refrains. These popular sentiments, inexorably expressed in all of the country's languages by 
the poor and the well-to-do, have been described by development experts and political scientists as 
state failure.” (Trefon 9).  
- “The adoption of the new Constitution, December 2005 and the organization of presidential and 
legislative elections in 2006, crowns the process of democratization and the return of the DRC to the 
rule of law with an executive power, a parliament and a separate judiciary.” [originally in French] 
(World Health Organization 4).  
- “In 2016, authorities failed to hold constitutionally mandated elections set for November, and 
President Joseph Kabila overstayed his term in office. The developments prompted violent protests, 
and the consequent suppression of human rights groups, citizens’ movements, and journalists.” 
(Freedom House 2017).  
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1b. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections? 
- “But it is nevertheless an extreme case, with no other African democ- racy coming even close this 
level of fragmentation.” (de Goede 138).  
- “The country now appears to be ruled by what is in effect a dominant party that is perhaps instable 
internally, but that controls power in an according to some almost dictatorial manner.” (de Goede 
139).  
- “…the use of the family analogy in the case of the AMP does not concern the population and its 
relation to their political leaders, but the formation of a ruling coalition from a fragmented political 
sphere under the leadership of the President as the political father-chief… i.e. President Kabila.” (de 
Goede 144).  
- “…the 2011 elec- toral process was very controversial. It created more problems than it was able to 
contrib- ute towards the consolidation of peace and democracy in the country; it actually represented 
a movement backward in comparison to the achievements of the 2006– 2007 elections.” (Koko 535).  
- “[political elites] shared intransigence with regard to a possible adjustment of the electoral calendar 
related more to their refusal to own up to their responsibilities (in this case, failures) than to a genuine 
commitment to giving the country and its people an opportunity to have free and fair second post-
transitional elections that could contribute towards the consolidation of peace and democracy.” (Koko 
535). 
- “The flawed 2011 electoral process thus brought back the contentious issue of the very legitimacy of 
the ruling elite (albeit with a lesser degree of gravity), the question con- sidered to be at the root of 
the country’s crisis.” (Koko 535). 
- “While the delayed elections and rumours of a third term for President Joseph Kabila undermined 
those processes, the pol- itical agreement signed on 31 December 2016 between Congolese socio-
political stake- holders to hold elections for a new president before the end of 2017 is one hopeful 
indicator that the DRC may yet find its way without a return to conflict.” (Koko 537).   
- “…despite the success of free and fair elec- tions in 2006, patronage networks and authoritarian 
procedures, rather than democratic institutions based on the rule of law, characterize the regime.” 
(Matti 44).   
- “Administered by an indepen- dent electoral commission established by the transition government, 
the elections [of 2006] were declared to be free and fair.” (Matti 46).  
- “The electoral commission had said last month that the presidential vote could not take place until 
April 2019 at the earliest, and the opposition had warned that the population would “take matters into 
its own hands”. (Ligodi and Mwarabu 2017). 
- “Supporters of Bemba set re to the Supreme Court in late November as they protested [the 2006] 
election results, alleging fraud in the counting process.” (Social Education Staff 26).  
- “Forty-five acts of election-related violence were documented by the United Nations in advance of 
the Nov. 28, 2011, elections. These incidents were linked directly to the elections and targeted 
political parties, espe- cially parties among the opposition; journalists; and human rights defenders.” 
(The Carter Center 46).  
- “The Carter Center released a statement on Dec. 10 concluding that these results lacked credibility 
because of significant problems reported by observers during tabulation. Problems ranged from 
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general disorganization and related loss of results to the tampering of results forms by voting center 
officials.” (The Carter Center 55).   
- “Despite the mounting pressure, Kabila has shown no sign that he is preparing to step down or allow 
for a peaceful, democratic transition.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 15).  
1c. Is there state corruption and political violence? 
- “contrary to the expectations of the Congolese and aid donors alike, Congo’s decentralization has 
produced a distinct worsening of the quality of its governance.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6).  
- “Congolese decentralization reforms have been accompanied by an increase in predatory extraction, 
provincial centralization of power, unbridled lack of accountability, and widespread rent seeking by 
provincial elites.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6).  
- “[decentralisation reforms] dis- counted the coexistence of formal and informal ruling institutions, 
and the immunity of the latter to decentralization’s accountability and transparency mechanisms, 
allowing for the continuation of top-down extractive gover- nance.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6).  
 - “Second… Congolese decentralization was predicated upon an erroneous diagnosis of Congo’s 
previous gover- nance failures… without identifying the generalized nature of the instrumentalization 
of sovereignty by officeholders at all levels of the state.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6-7).   
 
- “Among its failures, decentralization has (1) increased the degree to which the state extracts the 
resources and incomes of its citizens; (2) fostered provincial centralization at the expense of local 
governments; (3) produced largely unaccountable provinces gov- erning with little transparency; and 
(4) served the material interests of pro- vincial administrators instead of those of citizens.” (Engelbert 
and Mungongo 9).  
 
“Indeed, as De Goede observed as early as 2007, ‘[t]he challenge for the Congo is to undergo a 
process of democratisation with leaders [who] prefer a non-peaceful and non-democratic political-
economy’, leaders who have few incentives to transform the existing corrupt and criminalised pol- 
itical system into a democratic one.” (Koko 536). 
- “While the [2006] elections were generally peaceful, the afternoon of the presidential runoff saw an 
outbreak of violence between Bemba’s militia and Kabila’s Presidential Guard… The resultant 
confrontation left 23 people dead and 43 wounded.” (Matti 46).  
- “The regime clearly fits the conditions of a competitive authoritarian regime: while meaningful 
competition exists, this is violated to such an extent that the political playing field becomes heavily 
tilted in favor of the incumbent.” (Matti 49).  
- “Dozens died in protests against Kabila’s refusal to step down at the end of his constitutional 
mandate last December.” (Ligodi and Mwarabu 2017). 
- “According to Human Rights Watch, at least 24 civil- ians were killed, and many others were 
injured by Congolese security forces in the weeks following the announcement of election results.” 
(The Carter Center 46).   
- “In the meantime, [in 2008] the government has negotiated an agreement with DflD, which has 
volunteered to pay the insurance of all primary school pupils. However, the Ministerial letter remains 
silent about this, and conse- quently some government agents continue to collect insurance fees in 
schools.” (Titeca and de Herdt 227).   
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- “The only certainty is that personal opportunism governs [public administrators’] actions. It is for 
this reason that administrative service providers in Congo are perceived as unmanageable, 
undisciplined, mercenary, corrupt and, quite simply, useless.” (Trefon 13). 
- “The resource rich country is also facing serious economic challenges, due in part to widespread 
corruption, a reluctance to invest in a country amid a political crisis and with an uncertain future, and 
lack of transparency of Congolese government finances, including the state mining company.” 
(Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 13).  
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Variable 2: Public Services 
 
2a. How is the public health? 
- “This article has shown how the retreat of the state has not led to a vacuum, but rather to the 
filling of this public arena by a range of other actors, who play a crucial role in the provision of 
public services. Non-state actors, and particularly religious networks, stepped in to provide 
educational services and continued organizing the sector.” (Titeca and de Herdt 230).  
- “Left to fend for themselves, public servants are, likewise, worried about how they will cope after 
retirement … based on what they can see from their predecessors, those that have no family to 
depend upon fear they will either become beggars or die.” (Trefon 17).  
 
- “The number of Health Zones increased from 306 in 1985 to 515 in 2003.” [translated from 
French] (World Health Organization 6). 
 
- “However, the functioning of the health system remains hampered by a number of problems with 
the leadership of the Ministry of Health, the funding system, the community participation, human 
resources, supply system essential drugs, and the coordination of donor interventions.” [translated 
from French] (World Health Organization 6). 
 
- “Although contributing up to 70% to the financing of recurrent functioning of the health zones, 
the community is not involved in the management of health services.” [translated from French] 
(World Health Organization 6). 
 
- “This table shows that curative care in Hospitals and Health Centers has been financed in 
the aggregate at USD 625,662,749, or 44% of current expenditure, of which 15% came from 
the Public Administration, 10% from businesses, 61% from households and 14% Rest of the 
world.” [Translated from French] (Ministry of Public Health 40). 
 
- “With regard to the purchase of pharmaceutical products, the funding was 
184,157,332 USD or 13% of current health expenditure of which 97% was financed by 
households and 3% by the Government.” [Translated from French] (Ministry of Public 
Health 40). 
 
- “More than 60% of the structures hospitals belonged to the private sector (private sector 
denominational and business).” [translated from French] (World Health Organization 8). 
 
- “With the progressive disengagement of the state, a private for-profit sector, has developed these 
recent years” [translated from French] (World Health Organization 8). 
 
- “Demographic Survey Reports Infant-Juvenile Mortality Index, 142 Deaths per thousand live 
births” [translated from French] (World Health Organization 9). 
 
- “International donor support for programs health and HIV / AIDS, including humanitarian 
projects, was estimated at 117 millions of dollars (US $ 2.3 / inhabitant), in 2003, and has steadily 
increased, reaching a estimated at $ 302 million (US $ 4.3 / inhabitant) in 2006. Projections for 
years 2008, 2009 and 2010 show a trend towards the reduction of ODA and are $ 251,249 million 
and $ 226 million respectively.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization 12). 
 
- “In 2008, there is a reduction in terms of both absolute than relative. Indeed, the amount allocated 
to the health sector is about 70 million of dollars. This sum represents only 2.5% of the [State] 
budget.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization 12). 
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- “Despite some progress made in the development of the DRC's health system, great challenges 
remain and constitute a handicap to a better performance of the health system.” [translated from 
French] (World Health Organization 33).  
 
- “Its share of public expenditure reached 16 % in 2014 as against 8% in 2000 and 4% in 1990, thus 
demonstrating the growing priority attached to education by the DRC government. The 
health sector has also been a focus of keen attention by the government which is making efforts to 
achieve the commitments made by African Heads of State in Abuja to allocate (15% of their 
national budgets).” (ACHPR 10). 
 
- “The direct payment scheme for households is the main mechanism for financing of Services and 
Health Care in the DRC in 2014. Its resources have contributed health financing of USD 
553,245,808, or 39% of the DCS. This leads households to spend often beyond their capacity 
resulting in the impoverishment of the population that falls ill.” [Translated from French] 
(Ministry of Public Health 36).  
 
2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems? 
- “… in comparison with many other African or less-developed countries, the DRC has a much 
lower percentage of people who have never been to school … it certainly per- forms better than 
average in terms of this indicator of education.” (Titeca and de Herdt 221).  
-[Note that data for statistics are not available for each year, making data slightly sporadic and 
difficult for comparison between actors, however the most recent reports and figures are utilized] 
The Education and Training Sector Strategy report of 2015 produced by the DRC’s four Ministries 
of Education claims that the enrollment rates for primary school grew from 90% in 2007 and 107% 
in 2014 (the latest year of data collection for the sector) with female enrollment rates from 44.8% 
to 47.3% (“Stratégie sectorielle” 22).   
- UNESCO Institute for Statistics presented similar statistics for 2008 being at 102% and 
later rising in 2012 to 104% (UNESCO 2017).  
- Additionally, the enrollment rates for secondary school were approximately 38.3% in 2012/2013 
(with enrollment of girls between 30-40% of total percentage) (“Stratégie sectorielle” 26). 
- The UNESCO Institute for Statistics shows that as of 2013 the gross enrollment rates for 
secondary school was at 52.12% (2017). 
- The World Bank produced date for tertiary enrollment rates of 2012 at 7% (4% of females and 
9% of males) (The World Bank), whereas the UNESCO Institute for Statistics shows the gross rate 
of enrollment to be 9.97% for 2012 (2017). 
- Adult literacy rate, 15+ years, (%) as of 2016 was 77% (66% of females and 89% of males) (The 
World Bank).  
- However the Freedom House states “Given its low literacy rates and deep poverty, the 
population [of the DRC] relies largely on radio broadcasts to receive news.  
- The “Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure (%)” in 2010 was 29% (The 
World Bank). [the latest estimates on expenditure spending] 
- “The Constitution of the DRC stipulates in Articles 43 and 44 that every individual shall have the 
right to school education which is provided through national education and provides for a specific 
programme for the eradication of illiteracy considered as a national duty. It specifies in Article 45 
that education is free and that every individual shall have access to national educational 
establishments according to their capacities without any discrimination as to their place of origin, 
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race, religion, sex, political or philosophical opinions, physical, mental or sensory state. These 
constitutional provisions establish the principle of equality of opportunities, free access and non-
discrimination in the area of education and training.” (ACHPR 34).  
- “Among the strides chalked in the country, mention should be made of the improvement in the 
area of girl-child education where the parity index is almost consistent (perfect equality) at the 
primary school level.” (ACHPR 71).  
2c. Is there adequate infrastructure? 
- “An archetypical characteristic of 'failed states' is their retreat from the public domain and more 
particularly their inability to provide basic public services.” (Titeca and de Herdt 213). 
 
 - “… the state has to a large extent retreated from its basic functions … Education is one of them: 
by the year 2000, public financing of education in the DRC had virtually ceased.” (Titeca and de 
Herdt 214).  
 
- “Real expenditure per pupil dropped from US$159 in 1982 to and finally to around $4 in 2002 
(Table 1). Teachers' salaries dropped from $68 to $27 per month between 1982 and 1987, reaching 
an absolute minimum of $12.90 in 2002 (Titeca and de Herdt  221). 
 
- “Despite the collapse in public financing, between 1987 and 2007 the total number of pupils 
doubled.” (Titeca and de Herdt 221). 
- “… by the end of the twentieth century, the eduction sector in DRC could indeed be called 
'privatized', both because most schools were run by non-state actors and because most of the 
finance came from parents themselves.” (Titeca and de Herdt 223).  
- “not only does the ‘Convention’ of 1977 signal that one of the crucial assets to organize the sector 
… is in the hands of the churches, but from the mid-1980s onwards the state's material 
contributions to the sector also evaporated and were soon deemed insufficient even to guarantee the 
most basic tasks related to the function of keeping overall oversight and ‘organizing’ the sector.” 
(Titeca and de Herdt 223-224).   
- Despite that the DRC Constitution states: “Education is free in public institutions for the various 
teaching orders” and “The State and other public authorities have the obligation to create and to 
ensure the proper functioning of public institutions to education and instruction of youth” and “The 
state and other public authorities have the duty to create preconditions and public institutions that 
guarantee children's education” most fees are paid by parents and infrastructure organized and 
administrated by the Church (D.R.C. Const. art. VI and VII).  
- “To ensure that every citizen has access to education and to guarantee quality education, 
the State established a network of primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions. 
Initiatives by the private sector come to support this network to the extent that the 
educational sector is in the hands of State authorities which control all the institutions and 
determine the operational rules.” (“Stratégie sectorielle” 33). 
- The total percentage of GDP spent on education in the DRC in 2010 was 1.5%, 2011 was 2.0%, 
2012 was 1.8%, 2013 was 2.0%, 2014 was 2.0%, and 2015 was 3.4% according to the DRC’s 
official 2016 report from the Education and Training Sector Strategy (“Stratégie sectorielle” 33).  
- These figures are higher than what the World Bank data shows for select years of available 
data for the DRC within this timeline, with the WB showing the years 2010 as 1.6%, 2013 as 
2.245%, and 2015 a 2.291% (“Government Expenditure”).  
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- According to the DRC’s National Agency for the Promotion of Investment’s latest data release in 
2016, “we can see slow growth in investments of the Investment Code sector against a sharp 
increase in investment in the mining sector. Mining investments are made in the DRC by more than 
80% by subsidiaries or branches of foreign companies” (“Volume of Foreign” 2016).  
- the same data also reveals that the total annual FDI for the DRC reached a peak in 2012 
($USD 6.5 billion), but since has drastically decreased each year to a total in 2015 of $USD 
1.8 billion, this is problem considering that the opening sentence on the report reveals that 
“The economic growth of a Nation depends directly on the degree of investment achieved.” 
(“Volume of Foreign” 2016).  
- According to the DR Congo’s National Agency for the Promotion of Investment the rate of 
unemployment for the DRC has been on the decline since 2011 when the rate was 51.4% until 2015 
with a rate of 43% (“Economic and Social” 2016).  
- “However, weaknesses continue to characterize the mobilization of domestic revenue (public 
revenue excluding grants of 13.9% on average in percentage of GDP against 21.1% for Sub-
Saharan Africa), the level of reserves (2 months’ autonomy for 5.2 for Africa), access to job market 
(especially for youth and women), the quality of infrastructure.” (“Economic and Social” 2016).   
- “The Democratic Republic of Congo has immense potential but remains a risky investment 
location. Main hurdles include pervasive poverty, political turmoil, security issues, vast land area 
and inadequate infrastructure.” (PwC 31). Opening sentence for the PwC’s report on DRC 
infrastructure.  
- “Over 90% of exports are in the form of extracted commodities. This fragility was exposed in 
2009 when a crash in commodity prices coincided with an escalation in conflict in the eastern 
region, revealing the country’s dependence on external demand and financial flows.” (PwC 32). 
- “High political risk has severely undermined prospects for diversified growth, while protection of 
property rights is hampered by dysfunctional public administration. Furthermore, enforcement of 
the complex legal code is selective.” (Pwc 32).  
- “The DRC has a low HIV/Aids infection rate as years of war and little infrastructure development 
have restricted human movement and the spread of the virus.” (PwC 33).  
- “The Government has ambitious plans. While less than 10% of the population has access to 
electricity today, the Government has set an ambitious target to provide electricity to 60% of the 
population by 2025. The first step in achieving this goal is the construction of the Grand Inga dam, 
which will produce about 40 000MW at a cost of US$80 billion.” (PwC 33). 
- “The USD 73 million grant, approved by the World Bank in 2014, was cancelled on July 
25th 2016 … The withdrawal of the World Bank clearly shows the deficits of the project and 
should be a warning for other investors.” (BankTrack 2017).  
- “last year [2016] the World Bank said it had suspended funding after the presidency took 
control of the project, raising transparency concerns..” (Reuters 2017).  
 
- “The DRC is one of the most infrastructurally challenged countries in the world. Ground 
transportation has always been difficult and the country’s vast geography, low population density, 
extensive forests, and criss-crossing rivers further complicate the development of infrastructure 
networks.” (PwC 34).  
 
- However “Since 2006, there has been a large upswing in external financing commitments from 
OECD and non-OECD partners. For example, a major new financing agreement signed with 
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China promises US$3 billion, primarily for road and urban infrastructure projects.” (PwC 
34).  
 
- “Recently, the [domestic company] acquired nine locomotives to revive the rail sector in the 
southern region. In addition, the company is planning a new acquisition of 47 locomotives by 2015 
under World Bank funding.” (PwC 36).  
 
- “The country has secured major development funding as well as an infrastructure-for-minerals 
deal with China. Private enterprise is also playing a role, with mining companies also investing in 
roads.” (PwC 36).  
 
- “Congo (Democratic Republic of the)’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.435— which put the country in 
the low human development category—positioning it at 176 out of 188 countries and territories.” 
(UNDP 2).  
 
- However, the DRC’s indicator scores have gradually improved over the past 25 years in the 
categories of:  
Life expectancy at birth (1990: 49 years and 2015 was 59.1)  
Expected years of schooling (1990: 6.8 years and 2015 was 9.8)  
Mean years of schooling (1990: 2.3 and 2015 was 6.1) 
HDI value (1990: 0.356 and 2015 was 0.435)  
(UNDP 3).  
 
- “This total spending requirement is high in absolute terms and even more so relative to GDP 
(figure 10). At close to $5.2 billion, in absolute terms, the spending need for infrastructure is 
among the highest in Africa. Relative to the size of the DRC’s economy, the spending amounts to a 
staggering 75 percent of 2006 GDP. This is by far the highest burden of infrastructure spending for 
any African country, and is substantially higher than the average of low-income, fragile states. 
Investment alone would absorb around 57 percent of GDP. To put this in perspective, one of the 
highest levels of infrastructure investment observed in recent economic history has been in China 
which dedicated 15 percent of GDP to infrastructure investment during the mid-2000s.” (Foster and 
Benitez 23). 
 
- “Notwithstanding the incomplete data, it is clear that as of 2006 the DRC’s spending on 
infrastructure covered little more than 10 percent of its needs … The relatively modest figure of 
$700 million a year nonetheless represents a substantial 10 percent share of the country’s 2006 
GDP.” (Foster and Benitez 24).   
 
- “Although spending looks small relative to the country’s infrastructure needs, when 
expressed as a percentage of GDP it is actually close to the average spending on 
infrastructure that is observed across Sub-Saharan Africa. The problem, however, is that the 
DRC’s infrastructure needs are substantially greater than those of other African countries.” 
(Foster and Benitez 24-25).  
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Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
 
3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld? 
- “Due to the repression of opposition figures, the lack of power invested in the judiciary, and the 
targeting of media freedom, the Kabila regimes do not meet the minimal requirements for 
democracy.” (Matti 42).  
 
- “After Etienne Tshisekedi’s self-proclamation as president, security forces surrounded his 
residence in Limite, Kinshasa. Since December 2011, he has been under de facto house arrest.” 
(The Carter Center 47).  
 
- “In addition, since 2000, the United Nations Mission in the DRC, MONUC headed by a Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations United Nations, works for the 
gradual restoration of peace and the rule of law in the country.” [translated from French] (World 
Health Organization 20).   
 
- “The DRC’s immense natural resources have fuelled conflict rather than development. Human 
rights abuses and banditry deter economic activity…” (PwC 33).  
 
- “In January, violent protests erupted in several cities in response to a draft electoral bill that 
would likely have delayed elections and allowed Kabila to overstay his second term. Amid a police 
crackdown that left at least 42 people dead, the government shut down several radio and television 
outlets. In the protests’ wake, authorities also cut text messaging services and internet access until 
early February, and blocked access to social media sites until early March.” (Freedom House 
2016). 
 
- “The National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and National Police (PNC) are the principal 
perpetrators of such harassment and interference, with at least 22 documented cases in 2015.” 
(Freedom House 2016). 
 
- “Intimidation from the authorities in the form of arbitrary arrests and detention is not uncommon 
in the DRC. Journalists are often held without charge, at times beyond the 48-hour limit on 
warrantless detention stipulated by Congolese law.” (Freedom House 2016).  
 
- “Acts of sexual violence continue to be one of the characteristics of the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, particularly in the East of the country.” (ACHPR 7).  
 
- “The DR-Congo is making significant efforts to implement the rights guaranteed by the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, its action is confronted with a number of 
difficulties related basically to the recurrence of armed conflicts in the East of the country.” 
(ACHPR 7). 
 
- “In future, the Government intends to popularize the various formulated and ratified legal 
instruments, including the Maputo Protocol, through real communication with all segments of the 
population, given the fact that numerous studies have shown that one of the major obstacles to the 
promotion of the rights of women in the DRC is truly the poor knowledge of the laws and concepts 
relating to gender.” (ACHPR 72).  
 
- “Journalists and media outlets face censorship and harassment from government officials, 
members of the security forces, and nonstate actors, though the little- used internet remains 
unrestricted.” (Freedom House 2015).  
 
- “A number of journalists were arbitrarily detained while covering protests in Kinshasa at which 
participants called for President Joseph Kabila to step down, as constitutionally mandated, at the 
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end of his second term. There were also reports of media workers being beaten by security forces 
during the demonstrations, during which dozens of protesters were killed.” (Freedom House 2017). 
 
- “In August 2016, the electoral commission announced that planned presidential elections would 
be postponed, sparking outrage among Kabila’s political opponents and civil society groups. The 
subsequent government crackdown exacerbated already repressive conditions for journalists; severe 
pressure to limit critical coverage of the political situation and the activities of the opposition left 
little space in which to conduct normal journalistic activities.” (Freedom House 2017).  
 
- “However, a more discriminating look at DRC’s conflict landscape reveals a series of intertwined 
causes that have been poorly considered and remain irresolute: ethnic identity, disputes over land, 
traditional author- ity, local power, poor access to basic rights and corruption at all institutional 
levels.” (García-Mingo 216).  
 
- “With their programmes, there aim is to inform Congolese women about their rights and 
strategies to protect themselves. AFEM-SK is also devoted to lobbying for women’s rights and 
training rural women in political participation, media literacy and peace- building processes.” 
(García-Mingo 216).  
 
- “Apart from their physical bodies, identity, self and personhood are strategic targets of war – but 
they are also the locus of political will. Even though many Congolese women have been insulted, 
tortured, raped, injured and threat- ened, they have not rested in silence.” (García-Mingo 220). 
 
- “The deadliest crackdown was during the week of September 19, 2016, when many Congolese 
took to the streets to protest the electoral commission’s failure to announce presidential elections, 
90 days before the end of Kabila’s second term, as required by the constitution. Security forces 
responded with excessive force, killing at least 66 people and setting at least three opposition party 
headquarters on fire.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 10).  
 
- “Hundreds of opposition leaders and supporters, human rights and pro-democracy youth activists, 
and peaceful protesters were arbitrarily arrested and detained [in 2016]. Many were held in secret 
detention for weeks or months, without charge and without access to their families or lawyer. 
Others were put on trial on trumped up charges. In July, unidentified armed men shot and nearly 
killed a judge in Lubumbashi who refused to hand down a ruling against opposition leader and 
presidential aspirant Moïse Katumbi.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 11).  
 
- “Authorities have also prevented international and Congolese journalists from doing their work, 
including by arresting them, denying access, or confiscating their equipment and deleting footage 
… The following month, the Rueters correspondent was unable to renew his Congolese visa … 
Human Rights Watch senior researcher in Congo was also barred from the country in August 2016 
(Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 12).  
 
- “The mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1925 
(2010).” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a Glance”).   
 
- “MONUSCO’s priorities are therefore structured around the support to the political process 
(including support to the 31 December 2016 political agreement), towards the holding of 
elections; and support to the protection of civilians and human rights.” (United Nations 
“MONUSCO at a Glance”).   
 
- “Human Rights 
Main perpetrators 
• State agents: 61% (including 1.176 victims of extrajudicial killings) 
• Armed groups: 39%” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a Glance”).   
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- “Challenges for Human Rights 
- Lack of accountability mechanisms for members of the Congolese defense and security forces 
- Lack of confidence in State institutions 
- Deficiencies of the judicial system 
- Non-execution of sentences 
- Little or no compensation to victims 
- Delay in the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms 
- Insufficient enforcement of Laws against sexual violence.” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a 
Glance”).   
 
3b. Is there an independent media source? 
- “In power, the Kabila government has applied subtle pressure to curb the constitutionally 
embedded freedom of expression and freedom of press upon which Congolese media independence 
is built.” (Matti 46).  
 
- “Intimidation and arrest have been used to hinder criticism of the Kabila regime; there have been 
a number of cases of assault, murder, and threatened rape.” (Matti 48).   
 
- “Although the constitution and various laws provide for freedoms of speech, information, and the 
press, these guarantees are seldom enforced.” (Freedom House 2016). 
 
- “Press freedom remained severely restricted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 
2015.” (Freedom House 2016). 
 
- “The only independent radio network with nationwide reach, Radio Okapi, is funded by the 
United Nations and Switzerland-based Fondation Hirondelle.” (Freedom House 2016). 
 
- “Conditions for the press in the Democratic Republic of Congo remained poor in 2014. A 
journalist was killed for the first time in more than six years, and restrictive laws were frequently 
used to prosecute journalists in connection with their work.” (Freedom House 2015). 
 
- “Press freedom is severely restricted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Journalists and 
media outlets who challenge powerful figures or cover protests and other controversial events run 
the risk of prosecution, harassment, and attack, including by members of the security services.” 
(Freedom House 2017).  
 
-“Despite the improvement of the Congolese media scene, local jour- nalists are badly trained and 
poorly paid. Media have to face economic constraints, corruption, lack of training, and persistant 
impunity of war crimes.” (García-Mingo 219).  
 
- “As noted in Reporters Without Borders’ 2015 Report, the DRC government has shown a 
growing fond- ness for censorship. Many media have been closed and several journal- ists 
arbitrarily arrested, and the Burundian journalist Egide Mwemero has been detained arbitrarily 
since October 2015.” (García-Mingo 219). 
- “For our case study that is focused on radio broadcasting, it is important to bear in mind that radio 
is the most widespread medium and their use has greatly increased. There were twenty radio 
stations in the DRC in 1996, but the number today is 450.” (García-Mingo 219). 
- “The value of community radio stations to promote peace and development in Congo is 
recognized in the Charter of Community Radio Stations, which states that community radio stations 
should be free and independent, serve and respond to the needs of the community, respect human 
dignity, reject all forms of discrimination, be non-profit, help the state while still being 
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independent, be transparent in its organization, planning and financing, and show solidarity with 
other community radios and institutions of the DRC.” (García-Mingo 219-220). 
- “In a country with limited means of telecommunication, radio programs were, unsurprisingly, the 
primary source of information for the respondents. 
• Fifty-four percent of respondents listened to the radio on a daily basis. 
• For 67 percent, it was the primary source of information, followed by family and the com- munity 
in general (23%). 
• Most respondents trusted the radio moderately (27%), a lot (26%), or extremely (5%), although 
fewer believed journalists were moderately free (24%), very free (16%), or extremely free (3%) to 
report on social and political issues.” (Vinck et al. 63).  
3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system? 
- “Because of historical neglect, the infrastructure of the judicial system has collapsed with judges 
and other legal practitioners lacking resources including basic legal texts … In 2004 the administra- 
tion devoted a mere 0.6 percent of the total budget to the needs of the judicial system.” (Matti 47).  
 
- “Unlike the direct infringement of press freedom, the govern- ment works to undermine the 
independence of the judiciary indirectly through depriving it of adequate funding.” (Matti 48).  
 
- “The government’s control over the courts hinders impartial adjudication of cases against 
journalists, and verdicts often reflect political biases.” (Freedom House 2016).  
 
- “Thus, disciplinary and judicial measures have been enforced on regular basis against perpetrators 
of sexual violence … Furthermore, prospective candidates for enlistment into the security agencies 
are properly subjected to background checks in order to disqualify persons who have committed 
serious human rights violations and offences against international humanitarian law.” (ACHPR 8).  
 
- “The DR-Congo has a national strategy to fight against sexual and gender-based violence 
(SNVBG) comprising five components. The component “fighting against impunity” is intended to 
develop the capacity of the judicial apparatus and to design a criminal policy on sexual violence 
with a focus on victims’ rights, improve access to justice, provide reparation for victims through 
justice delivery and ensure the effective implementation of the 2000 laws on sexual violence.” 
(ACHPR 8).  
 
- “Since its creation in 2003, the FARDC has been one of the main perpetrators of documented 
sexual violence in Congo. Army commanders have frequently failed to stop sexual violence and 
punish those responsible. These crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law, and 
some constitute war crimes … the sheer size of the Congolese army and its deployment throughout 
the country make it the single largest group of perpetrators. FARDC soldiers continue to commit 
gang rapes, rapes involving injury and death, and abductions of women and girls.” (Human Rights 
Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 21).  
 
- “Senior officers and commanders in the Congolese army who did have authority over the soldiers 
and who were responsible for having put them in Kabare with no provisions and food, abdicated 
responsibility for the unruly brigade.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 32).  
 
- “Armed group leaders and other officers responsible for grave abuses were integrated into the 
FARDC without any vetting, thereby promoting those with known track records of human rights 
abuses, including rape, into senior command positions. Attempts to prevent and punish sexual 
violence by members of the Congolese army as part of security sector reform have been 
insufficient. The government has also lacked the political will to fight corruption. Embezzlement of 
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the vast sums of money set aside for the process has undermined the effort. When corruption has 
been uncovered—as was the case for General Sungiglanga Kisempia, the former chief of staff of 
the Congolese army—the government has failed to arrest and prosecute those responsible.” 
(Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 40-41).  
 
- “The military justice system has made some—limited—progress in bringing ordinary soldiers to 
account for their sexual crimes.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 45). 
 
- “But military justice has entirely failed to address the criminal responsibility of high-
ranking officers, including their command responsibility. The most senior officer held to 
account for crimes of sexual violence in the Kivus has been a captain— no major, lieutenant 
colonel, colonel, or general has been prosecuted.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who 
Rape” 45). 
 
- “As a result of the efforts to strengthen the judiciary and the 2006 sexual violence law, the 
military justice system is now dealing with a higher number of sexual violence cases; the same is 
true for the civilian courts.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 46).  
 
- “Progress in the military justice system has been somewhat slower than in the civilian 
judiciary, but still noticeable compared to 2003, when one rape conviction of a low-ranking 
soldier in Bukavu was seen as exceptional.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape”  
46).  
 
- “Despite these important advances, the military justice system remains a weak institution. To 
date, only a small fraction of the total number of acts of sexual violence committed by soldiers has 
been prosecuted and … No senior military figure has been prosecuted for sexual crimes, and 
command responsibility is rarely the subject of investigations by military prosecutors.” (Human 
Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 47).  
 
- “Congolese law hinders the prosecution of senior officers, as the sitting judge in a court martial 
must have a higher rank than the defendant. As a result of this law, many judges cannot try higher-
ranking officers; they would have to transfer the case to a different court where the judge has a 
higher rank, which seems only to happen rarely.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 48).  
 
- “The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, after 
a visit to Congo in April 2007, concluded that interference by the executive and the army in judicial 
proceedings was “very common” and that Congo’s judicial system was “rarely effective... with 
human rights violations generally go[ing] unpunished.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who 
Rape” 48-49).  
 
-“An overwhelming majority of respondents surveyed in eastern Congo believed accountability is 
necessary to achieve peace (82%), with four out of  five respondents (85%) affirming the 
importance of holding those who committed grave crimes accountable.” (Vinck et al. 61).  
 
- “Most respondents believe that among those who should be held accountable are militia 
leaders (56%), militias more generally (44%), Rwanda or the Rwandan government (36%), 
Uganda or the Ugandan government (23%), the Congolese government (17%) and the Con- 
golese National Army (13%). 
 
- Most respondents wanted to see those who committed grave crimes punished (69%), put in 
jail (34%), or tried by a court of justice (25%). Few respondents supported forgiving 
perpetra- tors of these crimes (7%) or giving them amnesty (6%).” (Vinck et al. 61). 
 
- “In sum, although justice was a relatively remote priority for respondents, they nonetheless saw 
accountability as necessary to achieve a lasting peace.” (Vinck et al. 63).  
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1.2 Central African Republic (CAR) 
(Hypothesized Regime Type: Failed/Collapsed) 
Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is present.  
 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
 
1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?  
- “In March 2013 a coalition of rebel groups – Séléka – led a violent coup in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), ousting the former President François Bozizé from ten years in power and 
instating the new President Michel Djotodia.” (Herbert et al. 2). [The work by Herbert et al. was a 
primary source written and published by the European Union] 
 
- “Michel Djotodia (from UFDR) is currently the leader of Séléka, and now is the self-proclaimed 
President of CAR.” (Herbert et al. 4).  
 
- “However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the agreement (ICG 2013), and 
regional powers did not prevent the Séléka coalition from seizing power thereafter. This is 
attributed to Bozizé’s reluctance to implement the agreement, and also to regional players losing 
confidence in Bozizé.” (Herbert et al. 6). 
 
- “Widespread road banditry has led to the displacement of population in Northern CAR and to 
refugee flows from Northern CAR to refugee camps in the South of Chad.” (Herbert et al. 9). 
 
- “The conflict and coup precipitated a humanitarian and economic crisis, and increased CAR’s 
already fragile dependence on the international community.” (Herbert et al. 10).  
 
- “A key objective of the 2008 Inclusive Political Dialogue (herein referred to as ‘the Dialogue’) 
was to start a process and design a plan of action to implement the 2008 peace agreement … 
Negotiations were held between the government, the rebel groups and the mediator to decide on the 
composition of the Preparatory Committee, one year in advance. The conference was more 
inclusive with rebel group members taking part in the Preparatory Committee, and as final 
participants.” (Herbert et al. 12).  
 
- “During the Dialogue, Bozizé agreed to form an inclusive consensus government, hold free and 
transparent elections, install a follow up committee, and create a truth and reconciliation 
commission. The follow up committee was to be composed of the former and current presidents 
Patassé, Kolingba and Bozizé. Surprisingly, civilians and armed oppositions were not included in 
this committee (Mehler 2009; ICG 2008). This meant that former presidents who presided over the 
country during serious and systematic human rights violations would be in charge of following up 
on the implementation of the peace process.” (Herbert et al. 13).  
 
- “Bozizé became increasingly isolated and ‘paranoid’ (ICG 2013), losing support from his allies, 
the population at large, and, significantly, from his two prime sources of support – the Chadian 
President Débe, and the international community.” (Herbert et al. 13-14).  
 
- “The promises made during the National Dialogues, the peace agreements and through the DDR 
project, raised the expectations of the rebel groups and of the population at large. President 
Bozizé’s failure to comply with various aspects of the 2007 peace agreement is widely cited as a 
key factor supporting the most recent coup, as claimed by the group Séléka itself.” (Herbert et al. 
19).   
 
- “The country is also politically unstable, corruption and highway robbery are rife and the 
economic climate is uncertain, attracting little foreign investment.” (Kah 41). 
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 - “The disarmament of the fighters had been planned since the agreements of Libreville in 2007 
and 2008, but this was never implemented due to the lack of political will of the Bozizé regime.” 
(Kah 49).  
- “From 2013, child soldiers roam the streets and communities have lived in distrust and revenge 
because of past grievances” (Kah 54).  
- “In a country where the state has faced serious challenges in extending its authority even to cover 
the capital Bangui, and where coups have been the order of the day for many years, the situation 
descended into internal conflict in 2013, pitting Muslims (Seleka) against Christian (anti-Balaka) 
populations.” (Karlsrud 47-48).  
- “Although there is no large-scale fighting and only little open warfare, one can rightly say that 
few regions of the CAR are really secure and that in fact the majority of the territory is in a 
permanent state of insecurity.” (Spittaels and Hilgert 41). 
- “The neglect of these armed groups, the failure to implement recommendations emanating from 
the political dialogue, and the failure of different DDR programmes that did not offer alternatives 
to young fighters are some of the factors that prompted the relapse of the country into civil war.” 
(Vlavonou 320). 
- “President Djotodia’s lack of control over the Séléka fighters led to his dismissal by regional 
leaders … They lost all legitimacy with the public and the support of international actors.” 
(Vlavonou 322).  
- “Several factors pushed the Séléka coalition to relinquish power. It encountered resistance from 
the local population but it was also a fragile coalition led by a weak leadership.” (Vlavonou 324). 
- “The National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA, 2017–2021) prepared by the 
Government with the United Nations and donor counterparts prioritizes three pillars: 
i) peace, security and reconciliation; 
ii) renewing the social contract between the state and its citizens; and 
iii) ensuring economic recovery and the revitalization of the productive sectors of the Central 
African Republic” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 5). 
- “For most of the time since the independence gained in 1960, the Central African Republic was 
ruled by soldiers who came to power by force of arms. Frequent and violent regime changes 
contributed to the institutionalization of corruption and nepotism, and violations and abuses of 
human rights, including repression of freedom of expression of political opinions and ideas. 
Successive governments neglected or simply failed to deliver services to the citizenry in an 
insatiable pursuit of personal enrichment. Political leaders, as well as their families and cronies, 
were involved in embezzlement of public funds, mismanagement of public corporations and illegal 
exploitation of precious minerals and other natural resources, while the vast majority of the people 
lived in abject poverty.” (OHCHR 9). 
1b. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections? 
- “In 2007, HRW reported that the previous decade had seen at least ten coup attempts; there have 
been many more during the last six years. Coups have typically been supported by external powers 
– with Chad and France key countries playing active roles in supporting military coups in CAR.” 
(Herbert et al. 7).  
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- “State fragility in CAR has incentivised a ‘winner-takes-all’ political culture … systematic 
impunity for human rights violators, especially those in the state security forces, means that citizen 
trust in the state is low.” (Herbert et al. 7-8).  
 
- “In 2005, Bozizé stood in the presidential elections, but Patassé was excluded from standing. This 
trigged widespread discontent and rebellion among Patassé’s followers. Some heavyweights of 
Patassé’s political class were included in Bozizé’s government, but the general Patassé camp 
remained excluded.” (Herbert et al. 12). 
 
- “Numerous rebel movements also claim to put local and national grie- vances on the agenda; 
these are heard and therefore seem to address the issues better than [political] parties.” (Mehler 
116). 
 
- “Parties and rebel movements therefore compete to a certain extent, but political parties lose out 
in the course of war and in peace processes, not least because they are no longer regarded as the 
main actors by international mediators.” ( Mehler 116).  
 
- “It is doubtful whether rebel movements do any better than parties at representing group inter- 
ests. They may get more or less voluntary popular support at times, but they cannot be held 
accountable by the local population they claim to defend; elected members of parliament at least 
face the destiny of not being re-elected.” (Mehler 135). 
 
- “Perceived as illegitimate from the start, Bozizé‘s presidency was marked by violence which 
catalysed the formation of the largely Muslim rebel coalition Séléka.” (Pailey et al. 6). 
 
- “Amidst mounting international pressure and diplomatic negotiations, Djotodia resigned on 14 
January 2014 and was exiled.” (Pailey et al. 7). 
 
- “The last coup, staged in March 2013 by the Séléka coalition rebel group, unfortunately pushed 
the country into greater chaos than had any previous coups. The Séléka rebels launched an 
offensive on the capital, Bangui, on 22 March 2013, setting up a new regime with self-proclaimed 
President Michel Djotodia. The coup sparked extensive looting and the destruction of public and 
private property in Bangui. A few months later, the new leader had been forced to resign from 
power after losing control over his rebel group, pitching the country into a renewed cycle of 
violence.” (Vlavonou 319).  
 
- “The CAR has often experienced a violent change of governments. The CAR has had several 
rebellions and coups since its independence (in 1960), sometimes with the help of France or 
neighbouring countries like Chad; however, none of the previous coups or rebellions in the country 
ushered in violence of the magnitude or protraction currently seen.” (Vlavonou 319). 
 
- “Another Inclusive Political Dialogue was held from 8 to 20 December 2008 in Bangui, as an 
attempt to overcome the CAR’s recurrent instability. However, the inclusive government was never 
established, the 2011 elections were marked, according to observers, by significant fraud, most 
essential reforms included in the political dialogue were never implemented and, because of the 
combined efforts and power of rebel groups, DDR programmes have never seen the light of the 
day.” (Vlavonou 319-320).  
 
- “Additionally, pending [2015] elections have resulted in continued insecurity and violence in 
some areas and this may continue especially if all stakeholders are not satisfied with election 
results. While it is hoped that the elections will lead to greater stability and a cessation of violence, 
other possible outcomes and the potential impact on [education] programme implementation should 
be considered.” (UNICEF 17). 
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- “When presidential and legislative elections originally scheduled for August 2015 were 
postponed, severe inter-militias and inter-communal violence erupted in Bangui and other strategic 
cities. The Transitional Authorities, along with the international community, set up a new electoral 
calendar which includes Presidential elections at the end of December 2015. Against this 
background, escalated violence and subsequent population displacement are expected around 
election time, further restricting movements on supply routes.” (World Food Programme “Regional 
optimization” 3). 
 
- “Although the French Sangaris force and the United Nations peacekeeping mission … have made 
progress in restoring security since 2014, and a new president and national assembly were elected 
in March 2016, the security situation remains volatile.” (World Food Programme “Central African 
Republic” 3).  
 
1c. Is there state corruption and political violence? 
- “The CAR state is weakly institutionalised with poor security and high vulnerability to rebellion 
and coup. In this way, the state fails to protect the security and welfare of civilians from violence 
and poverty.” (Herbert et al. 7).  
 
- “From 2004 to 2008, CAR was dominated by a wave of conflict and attempted coups. Systematic 
violence against civilians was perpetrated by the state security forces, and by rebels and road 
bandits, particularly in the north-east” (Herbert et al. 12).  
 
- “The period around the delayed 2011 elections saw more violence. NGO Amnesty claims that 
as much as two thirds of the country was beyond the control of the government, with thousands 
forced to flee due to armed attacks.” (Herbert et al. 13).  
 
- “The similarities of the 2003 and the 2013 coups are stark. Both involved violent coups, 
unleashing humanitarian and economic crises and a wave of human rights violations. Séléka 
combatants were also involved in massive looting in Bangui as well as in most CAR cities. Both 
coups were supported militarily by Chadian forces and politically by ECCAS Presidents.” (Herbert 
et al. 15).  
 
- “The same elite who become government ministers today are rebels tomorrow fighting against the 
government and the state and going free. It is also difficult to explain the impunity with which 
successive governments privatise the state and its resources to members of their ethnic group or to 
a few privileged ones to the extent that, after their defeat, the next government is held hostage by 
ethnic loyalties and previously privileged groups.” (Kah 50).  
 
- “The country experienced a fairly successful democratic transition in the early 1990s, but a 
mixture of basic state fragility and mismanagement led to widespread violence only a few years 
later.” (Mehler119). 
 
- “The CAR is an example of a transition that was perverted by the undemocratic behaviour of 
democratically elected rulers (similar to Congo-Brazzaville). President Patasse ́’s governance style 
in- cluded widespread mismanagement, self-enrichment, the buying of MPs and the exclusion of 
formerly privileged groups. These activities formed the background for mutinies (1996/7), coup 
attempts (2001/2), and the successful rebellion (2003).” (Mehler 122).  
 
- “The CAR thus faces a continued crisis of represen- tation, and both peace and democracy have 
suffered from the recent de- valuation of political parties and the militarisation of politics. Security 
concerns are also among the main reasons cited for a repeated delay in organising elections due in 
2009 and not fixed yet by October 2010. The CAR seems on a path towards complete informality 
in representing social interests.” (Mehler 135). 
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- “The most recent crisis began in 2013 with the Séléka power grab, which “marked a fundamental 
reversal of CAR’s traditional political landscape” with a minority Muslim population taking over 
the mantle of power for the first time since independence. Largely politicised by ethno-religious 
differences involving two major factions – the predominantly Muslim Séléka coalition of rebels 
and majority Christian militias calling themselves Anti-Balaka – the crisis very quickly morphed 
into sectarian violence with both sides enlisting foreign mercenies from countries such as Chad and 
Sudan.” (Pailey et al. vi).  
 
- “Therefore, increased violence in the CAR is a function of “political opportunism and an 
omnipresent feeling of mistrust of the foreigner, set against a background of poverty and lack of 
opportunities” where ‘foreigness’ has been exploited for political gains.” (Pailey et al. 8). 
 
- “Unfortunately, in their race to power, Séléka – composed predominantly of Muslim men from 
the CAR, Chad and Sudan – abandoned their political claims. They looted, raped, robbed, killed, 
and destroyed public and private property and facilities, particularly Christian churches.” 
(Vlavonou 321). 
 
- “Instead of addressing the serious issues arising within the coalition, on 13 September 2013 
Interim President Djotodia opted to dissolve the Séléka group that had helped him to power … 
After the formal dissolution of the coalition, the security situation in the country spun out of control 
and retaliations against members of the coalition began.” (Vlavonou 322). 
 
- “In the Central African Republic, for example, the former president, François Bozizé, used the 
ICC to physically remove a political foe: Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. He used the court as an international legal lasso.” (Hillebrecht and Straus 176).  
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Variable 2: Public Services  
(CAR Government websites provided no information or publications on this matter. 
Publications from the Ministry of Health or Education were not found, thus consequently all 
information was obtained from Western sources.)  
 
2a. How is the public health? 
- “The health situation in the Central African Republic has deteriorated as a result of the multiple 
crises affecting the country. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Central African Republic, together 
with seriously worsening living conditions and the parlous state of the health system (owing to 
pillaging and staff dislocation) are some of factors that explain the worsening rates of neonatal, 
infant and maternal mortality.” (World Health Organization “Country Cooperation”). 
 
- “To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, the Central African Republic must address the 
following challenges:  
. 1)  poor governance;   
. 2)  high maternal mortality (882 per 100 000 live births in 2015) and morality in  children 
under 5 (130.1 per 1000);   
. 3)  the high prevalence of communicable diseases, specifically malaria and diarrhoeal 
diseases, and of noncommunicable diseases such as high blood  pressure and diabetes;   
. 4)  the failing health system, specifically in terms of governance, supply of  medicines 
(major gaps), facilities and human resources; and   
. 5)  health-sector financing, which remains strongly dependent on external aid and  is 
poorly coordinated, thereby limiting its efficiency and effectiveness.” (World Health 
Organization “Country Cooperation”). 
 
- “Support is being provided to the Central African Republic in the following areas: ... 
strengthening institutional governance and making technical assistance available through the 
Ministry of Health, operationalizing health districts, strengthening capacity to manage the district 
and regional health teams, and organizing the monitoring and evaluation of service delivery in 
health facilities at health-district level … strengthening institutional governance and making 
technical assistance available through the Ministry of Health, operationalizing health districts, 
strengthening capacity to manage the district and regional health teams, and organizing the 
monitoring and evaluation of service delivery in health facilities at health-district level.” (World 
Health Organization “Country Cooperation”). 
- “More than 30% of the population is food insecure and does not have access drinking water, 
hygiene and sanitation.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s 
Cooperation Strategy” 4).  
- “L3 emergency level (IASC Level 3 Emergency) was declared in December 2013 and continued 
at three times until mid-June 2015.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization 
“WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 4). 
- “The CAR has made progress, albeit inconsistently, in the area of reduction of under-five 
mortality (0 to 5 years) … estimates also show that the infant mortality rate (risk of death of a child 
aged 0 to 1 year) decreased by 17% from 115 ‰ in 1990 to 96 ‰ in 2015. Between 2012 and 2015, 
under-five mortality increased by 7.8%, from 129 ‰ in 2012 to 139 ‰ in 2015. For the same 
period, the Infant mortality increased by 5.5%, from 91 ‰ in 2012 to 96 ‰ in 2015.” [translated 
from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 16). 
- “Since the beginning of this millennium, the prevalence of malaria remains stationary in the 
population of children aged 0 to 5 years. This prevalence increased from 32% in 2012 to 25.7% in 
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2014 … The lowest prevalence (22%) was recorded in children. In hospitals, malaria continues to 
be one of the most important causes of consultation, hospitalization and death.” [translated from 
French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 17). 
- “In 2015, HIV prevalence was estimated at 4.1%, but remains the highest of the sub-region in the 
age group 15 to 49 years. This estimate shows a decline of 2% in 10 years compared to MICS3 data 
coupled to HIV serology. The rate of new HIV infections is also in drop.” [translated from French] 
(World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 18).  
- “Between 1990 and 2015, Central African Republic’s HDI value increased from 0.320 to 0.352, 
an increase of 10.1 percent. Table A reviews Central African Republic’s progress in each of the 
HDI indicators. Between 1990 and 2015, Central African Republic’s life expectancy at birth 
increased by 2.5 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.1 years and expected years of 
schooling increased by 1.9 years. Central African Republic’s GNI per capita decreased by about 
38.9 percent between 1990 and 2015.” (UNDP 2). 
- “The 4.4 million inhabitants have a life expectancy of 45 years.” (African Union 6).   
2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems? 
- “The escalation of inter-community violence in Bangui that began 26 September 2015 and 
resulted in insecurity throughout the country impacted the launch of the official school year on 21 
September.” (UNICEF 7).  
 
- “UNCEF placed orders for textbooks and school materials to ensure materials would be available 
for distribution as part of the Back to School Campaign in September 2015. Unfortunately, 
distribution was temporarily suspended due to an escalation of violence four days after the official 
launch of the academic year, resulting in a disruption of the return to school and a blocked supply 
corridor due to border closures.” (UNICEF 8). 
 
- “Government budget constraints and administrative bottlenecks such as government reshuffling, 
including a change of the Minister of Education (there have been three Ministers over the past year) 
and key staff members, and continuing insecurity have delayed the start of training.” (UNICEF 8).  
 
- “Additionally, in November 2015, UNICEF, the MoE and the Education Cluster conducted an 
informal survey to assess the number of schools open after the increased insecurity slowed the 
return to school. This survey revealed that on average, approximately 74% of schools surveyed 
were functioning … which is a dramatic increase from the previous year when it was estimated that 
only 35% of schools were open.” (UNICEF 9). 
 
- “The pupil to classroom ratio in the targeted provinces is estimated at 87:1.” (UNICEF 9). 
 
- “It is expected that … the ratio of pupils per textbook will substantially decrease from the current 
national ratio of ten students per textbook to approximately two students per French and 
Mathematics textbook.” (UNICEF 10). 
 
- “As part of this process, PCAs valued at US$7.9 million dollars were signed with both 
international and national partners, which were identified in close cooperation with the MoE 
through a transparent and participative selection.” (UNICEF 16). 
 
- “the education sector in CAR is heavily centralized at the national level. Key decisions are made 
in Bangui and disseminated in a slow and untimely manner which can lead to poorly implemented 
policies and programmes. Education authorities in areas outside of Bangui often feel that their 
voice is not heard or the realities on the ground are not considered at the national level. Teacher 
salaries are paid in Bangui which results in high teacher absenteeism in classes for days or even 
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weeks during the school year, which significantly impacts the quality of teaching and learning.” 
(UNICEF 17). 
 
- “The Central African state’s capacity to mobilize domestic financial resources is under extreme 
duress due to the ongoing crises …In January 2015, based on the most optimistic scenario 
described in the transition plan, only 58% of the overall amount was to be covered by donor 
contributions. However, throughout the year, the donor component has increased from 58% to 
74%.” (UNICEF 21). 
 
- “… it is notable that approximately 25% of youth have no formal education and 42% of youth 
have attained at most incomplete primary education, meaning that in total 68% of 15-24 year olds 
have not completed primary education in Central African Republic.” [data set of 2012] (EPDC 
2014).  
- “… Figure 4 shows that approximately 37% of boys of primary school age are out of school 
compared to 47% of girls of the same age.” [data set of 2006] (EPDC 2014). 
- “Nearly 66% of female youth of secondary school age are out of school compared to 42% of male 
youth of the same age. For youth of secondary school age, the biggest disparity can be seen 
between the poorest and the richest youth.” [data set of 2006] (EPDC 2014).  
- “In Central African Republic, the gross enrollment rate in primary education is 95% for both girls 
and boys combined. This decreases to 24% in lower secondary, with a student transition rate to 
secondary school of 52%.” (EPDC 2014). 
- “the primary completion rate is 45% … suggest[ing] that the country has yet to achieve universal 
primary education.” (EPDC 2014). [this does not match the previously stated percentage of 68% 
having not completed primary school?] 
- Male literacy rates of 15+ years is between 49-51% ; for females of the same age categories is 
between 24-27% (EPDC 2014).  
2c. Is there adequate infrastructure? 
- “Many CSOs emerged in 2003, spurred by the coup and the incapacity of the state to respond to 
the basic needs of the population in terms of agriculture and social services.” (Herbert et al. 5).  
 
- “In the domain of infrastructure, the road network of the country is not regularly maintained and 
some communities suffer a chronic shortage of drinking water.” (Kah 41).  
 
- “Although the country is scarcely populated, it is tormented by a multitude of armed actors. These 
belligerents use their weapons for a diversity of reasons but they have one thing in common: each 
of them would be a weak opponent for any well-organised state, but then this is exactly what the 
country lacks.” (Spittaels and Hilgert 3). 
 
- “The coupeurs attack transports and travellers using the Central African Republic’s dilapidated 
roads.” (Spittaels and Hilgert 15). 
 
- “Because of the chronic instability, neither economic transformation nor democratic political 
transition has been realised. The World Bank suspended its budget support in late 2010 and, despite 
having substantial natural resources, the CAR has not managed to reduce poverty.” (Vlavonou 
319). 
 
- “State institutions are weak and the conditions of extreme poverty that prevail in rural areas are 
not favourable to reinsertion, especially when opportunities to live by the gun are numerous.” 
(Vlavonou 324).  
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- “the transitional national government remains fragile: 2 successive governments in 2014. State 
institutions must be strengthened at the national and provincial levels, and overcome many 
challenges related to good governance because the latter are at the origin of many ills such as 
insecurity, corruption and malfunction of public services.”[translated from French] (World Health 
Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 4-5).  
 
- “Absence / dismantling of state services (health, education, water, security, justice) : the 
absence of state services and institutions in the most regions remains a barrier to people's access to
 basis and the establishment of the rule of law. The dysfunction of the registers Registration 
Restricts Birth Registration and Carding national identity, which could, in the long run, increase the 
number of stateless.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation 
Strategy” 5). 
 
- “This situation has been exacerbated by the current military-political crisis which has 
led to massive destruction of infrastructure and looting of equipment and office furniture, 
biomedical equipment and other equipment, including much has been provided by development 
partners. 80% of rolling stock allocated to health facilities in the hinterland has been affected by 
acts of vandalism.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation 
Strategy” 12). 
 
- “Two thirds of CAR’s population has no access to health care, mostly due to lack of medication. 
80% of the country’s health workers are estimated to be displaced; 50% of 117 assessed health 
facilities have been looted.” (OCHA 4).  
 
- “Around 97% of the road network is not paved and subject to degradation during the rainy season 
from May to November.” (OCHA 10). 
 
- “The security situation can and does change rapidly as was demonstrated in September and 
October 2015 when renewed violence in Bangui and other hotspots resulted in mass population 
displacement, disruption of school openings and destruction of infrastructure.” (UNICEF 17). 
 
- “Central African Republic’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.352— which put the country in the low 
human development category—positioning it at 188 out of 188 countries and territories.” (UNDP 
2).  
 
- “Transporting goods from and to the CAR is extremely costly and slow … basic goods are 
considerably more expensive in the CAR than in the nonlandlocked neighboring countries.” 
(Domínguez-Torres and Foster 9).  
 - “The condition of the classified paved road network is below the level of comparable peer 
countries: 62 percent is in good or fair condition in the CAR versus 80 percent in fragile 
states … This divergence in the quality of paved and unpaved roads can be partially 
explained by the fact that 75 percent of the resources of the Road Fund—most for routine 
maintenance—are directed to the primary network, which is almost totally paved” 
(Domínguez-Torres and Foster 11). 
- “After years of decline, the CAR’s air transport traffic and connectivity are recovering … Despite 
the recent turnaround, capacity and connectivity remain low in relative terms due to poor 
infrastructure and small market size. Of the 42 airport platforms, only four runaways are paved.” 
(Domínguez-Torres and Foster 16-18). 
- “The water potential, however, is worrisome, as the volume of water in these basins has declined 
steadily from year to year. The quality of surface water is also deteriorating, especially that from 
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the rivers, springs, ponds, and traditional wells that provide drinking water to around 70 percent of 
the population.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 18).  
- “If one considers that only 10 percent of the water coming from wells and boreholes is safe, only 
14 percent of the rural population has access to safe water versus 61 percent in urban areas.” 
(Domínguez-Torres and Foster 20). 
- “Years of sociopolitical crisis in the CAR have left the power infrastructure in an embryonic state. 
Total installed capacity in the CAR is 39 MW, one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. But the 
limited infrastructure available is decaying due to scarce maintenance and needs to be completed 
refurbished. Half of the assets are more than 30 years old.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 24).  
- “The limited availability of power translates into poor access to electricity. As of 2009 only 
1 percent of the CAR’s population had access to electricity compared to 33 percent in low-
income countries.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 25). 
- “On average a staggering 50 percent of the generated power in the system has been lost every 
year since 2006. Around 35 percent of the power is lost due to nontechnical factors such as theft.” 
(Domínguez-Torres and Foster 26).  
- “The CAR’s infrastructure spending needs, at 17.5 percent of GDP (using 2009 GDP), are among 
the average level for Central African countries and lower than comparable fragile states.” 
(Domínguez-Torres and Foster 35). 
- “The physical state of the country’s judicial system is disastrous. As the Seleka moved out of the 
northeast in December 2012, its fighters stripped regional courts of furniture and fixtures, burned 
or destroyed court documents and stole court vehicles. Today, judicial staff lack vehicles and basic 
office supplies. They are irregularly paid and payments outside of Bangui are not possible because 
the banking system has collapsed.” (Human Rights Watch 75). 
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Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
 
3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld? 
- “Post-coup, Séléka rule was marked by gross human rights violations against Christians and 
Muslims, although Christians were disproportionately targeted.” (Pailey et al. 6). 
 
- “As Djotodia’s power and influence waned, anti-Séléka sentiments gained traction leading to the 
formation in September 2013 of Christian Anti-Balaka militias – previously private security groups 
of villagers comprising farmers equipped with machetes and handmade shotguns – who targeted 
not only Séléka but also Muslim civilians and pastoralists who were accused – rightly or wrongly – 
of being Séléka loyalists and allies.” (Pailey et al. 6). 
 
- “Anti-Balaka gained the upper hand by taking over Séléka-controlled territory and targeting 
Muslims in a violent “spree of rape, torture, and extrajudicial executions” that international human 
rights organisations declared the ethnic cleansing of Muslims.” (Pailey et al. 7).  
 
- “The coupeurs de route (‘road-cutters’) or zaraguinas are bands of road bandits … Coupeurs de 
route often make use of extreme violence. Not solely do they loot the convoys they attack, they 
sometimes kill their victims and they regularly take hostages for ransom.” (Pailey et al. 15). 
 
- “On 24 March 2013, the Séléka rebel coalition led by Michel Djotodia seized power in the CAR. 
This episode occasioned a general state of lawlessness, including incidences of looting, extortion, 
arbitrary arrests, torture and summary executions. The situation has continued to deteriorate…” 
(Vlavonou 320). 
 
- “The centralisation of power in the capital city and the neglect of the hinterland have formed part 
of the reason why people take up arms, in a context where one fights to have access to political and 
economic resources.” (Vlavonou 324). 
 
- “Michel Djotodia’s disbanded coalition has committed human rights violations on civilians and 
has provoked retaliation from vigilante groups. The so-called anti-balaka are themselves 
committing human rights violations and targeting Muslims.” (Vlavonou 324).  
 
- “Armed conflicts : despite the cessation of hostilities agreement negotiated at Brazzaville, armed 
groups and factions of certain groups continue to to carry out attacks on the civilian population, 
including displaced. Serious violations of human rights are reported in all areas where there are 
clashes, cycles of attacks and retaliation between groups forging alliances and counter alliances 
for the control of natural resources, political positioning, control of the territory, etc.” [translated 
from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 5).  
 
- “In the Central African Republic, women play a very important role in family economics and 
agricultural production. However, the context sociocultural is also marked by a high prevalence of 
mutilation female genitalia, early marriages and women's exposure to violence, especially in areas 
affected by armed conflict where the sexual assault was massive and spared neither minor nor older 
women, with serious consequences for all plans: psychological, economic and social.” [translated 
from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 22). 
 
- “9 of 10 communities throughout the affected areas in Bangui and north-western CAR reported 
security incidents during the last 3 months; 32% of respondents participating in a Protection Cluster 
survey reported a risk of rape while fetching wood or water.” (OCHA 4). 
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- “Renewed fighting between various armed groups since September 2016 has caused new 
population displacements; 23 percent of the population remains displaced as of August 2017.” 
(World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 1).  
- “In 2013, a coup involving intense sectarian violence led to 1.2 million people being displaced 
and a 36 percent collapse in GDP, which intensified gender and age inequalities. Conflict and 
displacement resulted in over 60,000 cases of gender-based violence in 2015, including 29,000 
cases of sexual violence.” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 3).  
- “In all, [by mid 2017] about 23 percent of the population is displaced either within or outside the 
country. Fifty percent of the population was in need of humanitarian assistance.” (World Food 
Programme “Central African Republic” 3). 
- “Moreover, on 3 June 2015, the authorities promulgated a law creating a Special Criminal Court 
to investigate, prosecute and try crimes resulting from serious violations of human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, notably war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, 
committed since 1 January 2003.” (OHCHR 20-21).   
- “… criminal penalties remain for incitement to ethnic or religious hatred and for the publication 
or broadcast of false information that could “disturb the peace.” In 2006, the government generally 
respected these new laws—a noticeable improvement from the previous year, when the security 
forces arrested, detained, and threatened journalists.” (Freedom House 2007). [2006 was the only 
year that held a ‘partly free’ status] 
- “After Michel Djotodia, the Séléka leader, was installed as president that month, the security 
situation deteriorated and human rights abuses increased.” (Freedom House 2014).  
- “In September and October, the editors of three Bangui-based dailies were extrajudicially 
detained and interrogated for publishing stories that were critical of CEDAD’s activities. Two of 
the three papers subsequently issued retractions, and Nouradine warned media outlets that 
journalists accused of publishing “mendacious allegations” against the state would be jailed.” 
(Freedom House 2014).  
- “More extreme forms of censorship also occurred. With the deployment of French troops in early 
December, the country experienced a total news blackout for several days, as broadcasts were 
halted and the presses fell silent. An escalation in the violence in late December brought a second, 
partial blackout, as virtually all newspapers in the capital ceased publication on December 20. Most 
print media had not resumed operations by year’s end, and a general curfew forced radio stations to 
end broadcasts by 6:00 p.m.” (Freedom House 2014).  
- “ … also commends the courageous efforts of MINSUCA in promoting civilian protection against 
the abuses being perpetrated by the armed and self-defense groups, in conformity with its 
mandate.” (Kodjo).  
- “Many civilians had their property pillaged and homes destroyed, and were thus deprived of their 
economic, social and other fundamental human rights. Hundreds of thousands were internally 
displaced, while others fled to neighbouring countries. Civilians were too often denied access to 
humanitarian assistance and the ability to live in dignity.” (OHCHR 9). 
- “However, as of December 2012, the figures for Child recruitment and other abuses have 
increased sharply. In 2013, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported in his report that 
both Seleka and Anti-Balaka were recruiting and using systematically children and felt that this 
concerned "Several thousand children". In addition, many incidents were not documented and 
reported due to lack of access and limited control capabilities of the protection agencies of the 
child. Before the conflict, UNICEF estimated in 2000 18 the number child soldiers in CAR. In 
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September 2015, the agency believed that up to 10,000 had been recruited from armed groups.” 
(Child Soldiers International 20). [translated from French] 
- “It is important to note that the Central African Armed Forces / FACA as such did not recruit 
children during the crisis because they were dissolved following the seizure of power by the 
Seleka.” (Child Soldiers International 20). [translated from French] 
- “Successive constitutions have had little impact on the country’s politics … This has prevented 
the emergence of effective constraints against abuses of power by political leaders, including united 
action by citizens when their rights are transgressed.” (du Plessis, Jansen, and Siebrits 20-21).  
- “A preliminary report of the commission, which was submitted to the United Nations in June 
2014, found that ample evidence exists to prove that individuals from both sides of the conflict 
have perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity, 
as well as war crimes’ (Muna 2014:26). Evidently, the constitution had failed to protect the citizens 
of the CAR. This confirms the very limited value of such documents when governments and 
citizens refuse to adhere to their stipulations.” (du Plessis, Jansen, and Siebrits 22).  
3b. Is there an independent media source? 
- “Several independent newspapers publish sporadically and are critical of government policies and 
official corruption. However, broadcast media are dominated by the state and offer little coverage 
of opposition activities.” (Freedom House 2003).  
 
- “Central African Republic’s rating improved from Not Free to Partly Free as a result of positive 
change in the environment for the media following the government’s adherence to, and 
enforcement of, the new Press Law and constitution passed in 2005 respecting freedom of 
expression and decriminalizing libel.” (Freedom House 2007).  
 
- “The same month, President Bozize dissolved the executive board of the newly created High 
Communications Council in what appeared to be an attempt to strengthen the government’s control 
of the media regulatory body. However, in July the president agreed to pass a new decree 
mandating parity between representatives of the private and public media within the council, a 
move supported by local journalists’ organizations.” (Freedom House 2007).  
 
- “Private newspapers, including five dailies published in French, once offered generally competing 
views on politics; after the Séléka takeover, however, the diversity of the CAR’s media landscape 
became decidedly more muted.” (Freedom House 2014).  
 
- “The state owns Radio Centrafrique and a television broadcaster, both of which have 
traditionally reflected predominantly progovernment views. However, alternatives—
including Radio Ndeke Luka, international broadcasters such as RFI and Voice of America, 
and a number of community radio stations—are available.” (Freedom House 2014).  
 
- “Persistent insecurity in Central African Republic makes reporting very difficult. Journalists self-
censor in order to avoid intimidation and harassment, as well as legal cases filed in response critical 
reporting.” (Freedom House 2017).  
 
- “Intercommunal clashes took place during the year, and while some stations were looted or 
otherwise saw operations disrupted, no journalists were killed. In October, attackers looted a radio 
station in Kaga Bandoro amid a deadly attack on the town by Séléka militants.” (Freedom House 
2017).  
 
- “Separately, in February, security agents confiscated journalist Prudence Yamete’s video recorder 
as she was covering activities at a polling station in the capital during the year’s general elections” 
(Freedom House 2017).  
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- “Christophe Gazam Betty, the communication minister appointed after the Seleka takeover, 
banned the media from talking about Seleka’s actions, notifying them that every report needed 
authorisation by his office and reminding the state media that they were required to support 
government policy under an existing decree.” (International Media Support 8).  
 
- “As in much of sub-Saharan Africa, radio is the most popular and most important medium. There 
are four types of stations: state-run, independent/private, confessional/religious, and community 
totalling some 20-30 stations in total … Most of these stations began in 2007- 2008 with state radio 
and Radio Ndeke Luka the only stations available prior to that.” (International Media Support 11).  
 
 - There are only several independent media broadcast sources (radio being the primary source of 
information given the illiteracy rates) that exist in the CAR, mostly created by either INGOs or 
NGOs; the majority have “ … not been independent vis-à-vis the government.” (International 
Media Support 14).  
 
3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system? 
- “The new government inherited a broken justice system, unable to investigate and prosecute those 
responsible for grave crimes.” (Human Rights Watch 75). 
 
- “Moreover, as mentioned above, the composition of the coalition was not homogenous (Chadian 
soldiers, bandits, etc.), which meant that the rebels were not constrained by any official 
governmental regulations and, in their position of power, they felt that they could do whatever they 
wanted to whomever they wanted, transforming the CAR into a lawless state that they could no 
longer govern.” (Vlavonou 322).  
 
- “the collapse of the apparatus judicial system - existing but extremely precarious - across the 
country reign a general feeling of impunity. The shortage of trained staff, the lack of protection of 
court officials, weak institutions, pressures and corruption are all factors that hinder actions in 
justice.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 5-
6). 
 
- “Faced with an overwhelming number of serious violations committed within the territory of the 
Central African Republic, the response of successive governments has often been highly inadequate 
and impunity has prevailed. This impunity has been a major factor fuelling the cyclical armed 
conflicts.” (OHCHR 20). 
 
- “However, in recent years, the authorities of the Central African Republic have taken some 
important steps in the fight against impunity. In particular, they requested the ICC to open an 
investigation into the crimes committed in the Central African Republic since 1 August 2012, in 
addition to the investigation that they had also solicited on crimes committed in 2002 and 2003.” 
(OHCHR 20).  
 
- “Notwithstanding the adoption of the national DDRR strategy in October 2016 and recent 
progress on security sector reform, including the adoption of the national security policy, 
significant challenges remain. An immediate priority should be the development of a 
nationally owned vetting process that includes human rights background checks, including in 
the context of integration of demobilized armed group elements.” (OHCHR 21).  
 
- “Also expresses deep concern about the devastating consequences of these violent actions on the 
fragile stabilization process in the country, and the cohesion between the communities within the 
CAR and the already dire humanitarian situation in the country.” (Kodjo).  
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- “Welcomes the establishment of the Bangui Special Criminal Court, which is expected to promote 
justice for the people of the CAR and fight impunity in the country, as part of the promotion of 
healing and national reconciliation in the CAR.” (Kodjo).  
 
- “The extensive violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law 
continued unabated throughout the country, in a climate of near total impunity.” (OHCHR 16). 
 
- “The armed conflict provided an environment in which perpetrators of sexual and gender-based 
violence enjoyed unbridled impunity as a result of dysfunctional or collapsed institutions.” 
(OHCHR 17).  
 
- “This link with conflict may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator (often affiliated with a 
State or non-State armed group), the profile of the victim (who is frequently a member of a 
persecuted political, ethnic or religious minority), the climate of impunity, which is generally 
associated with the collapse of the State…” (OHCHR 206). 
 
- “The perpetrators of sexual violence still enjoy almost total impunity in a country where judicial, 
security and political institutions have been, even at the best of times, ill-equipped to deal with an 
avalanche of conflict-related sexual violence.” (OHCHR 208).  
 
- “In Bangui, the State often failed to adequately curtail societal and mob violence, notably after 
January 2014, when the ex-Séléka retreated from the capital. As the violence by anti-Balaka groups 
spread, civilians became increasingly involved in attacks and mob violence reached unprecedented 
levels, with Muslims being killed and their bodies mutilated in broad daylight in the city centre, in 
total impunity. The whole period was also marked by numerous prison breaks, which the State was 
unable to prevent.” (OHCHR 246).  
 
- “As stated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “hybrid courts can have 
a positive impact on the domestic justice system of post-conflict States so as to ensure a lasting 
legacy for the rule of law and respect for human rights”. However, this requires an unfailing 
commitment on the part of the national authorities and adequate support from international partners 
so that the Special Criminal Court can contribute to build the capacity of the overall national 
judicial system…” (OHCHR 293). [It has yet to do so] 
 
- “The conflict in the Central African Republic has been marked by near-total impunity for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity by various parties, leaving civilians across the country without 
justice for the many atrocities they have endured.” (Human Rights Watch 75).  
 
- “Rather than facing justice, the perpetrators of atrocities are too often rewarded for their 
unlawful conduct with promotions, including in the government and army – what some refer 
to as “the impunity bonus” (prime à l’impunité).” (Human Rights Watch 75).  
 
- “No criminal trials were held between 2009 and 2014, demonstrating how the judicial system 
struggled before the Seleka coup … in a country marked by widespread sexual violence, there have 
been only three trials for rape since 2015 … A second criminal court session ran from August 26 to 
September 26, 2016, with 55 cases heard including charges such as murder, rape, pillage, 
conspiracy to commit a crime and illegal possession of weapons. While a start, these 55 cases will 
not begin to address the serious and widespread crimes that have been committed over the past 
three years.” (Human Rights Watch 76).   
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1.3 Republic of Angola  
(Hypothesized Regime Type: Anocratic) 
Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is not present.  
 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
 
1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?  
- “For dos Santos and his allies, parliamentary opposition is not the major concern. Rather, the 
MPLA fears popular mobilization, especially in Luanda’s vast shantytowns. Public-spirited critics 
of the regime hope that the civic route will prevail and point to the inclusive ideas articulated by 
those activists now under arrest.” (de Oliveira).  
 
- “In addition, there is a relatively closed, authoritarian, and self-confident political elite in Angola, 
which believes it possesses political legitimacy by having won the liberation struggle, by having 
won “the imperialist incursion and civil war imposed on it by UNITA, apartheid South Africa and 
the USA”, as well as having won the elections in 1992. It believes it has the right to rule the 
country, without the interference of contending social forces, organised as civil society 
organisations, opposition parties or otherwise.” (Amundsen and Abreu 2).  
 
- “In sum, the Government’s approaches to civil society organisations are blurred, to put it mildly. 
There is a tradition of supervision, restriction and control (demonstrated among other things 
through the proposed new legislation on associations), but there is also a willingness to let NGOs 
implement some forms of service delivery and poverty alleviation (social projects within the 
parameters of government regulation). And, in some ministries there is a more accommodating and 
open attitude towards NGOs.” (Amundsen and Abreu 8). 
 
- “The tendency of by some ministries and government agencies to control the NGOs is not 
general. Some ministers and MPLA party members are directly hostile to civil society and their 
activities, but others are rather open to civil society organisations and their engagement.” 
(Amundsen and Abreu 44). 
 
- “To deflect attention from a grow- ing chorus of disaffected citizens, President José Eduardo dos 
Santos, a Soviet- trained oil engineer who has been in power for 41 years, uses propaganda 
reminiscent of Russia’s Stalinist period.” (de Morias 47).  
 
- “With Dos Santos having been put forward as the symbol of peace and stability, anyone who 
dares to criticise him is branded as ei- ther ungrateful or an enemy of peace and stability. These 
accusations are commonly used to discredit critical voices.” (de Morias 47). 
 
- “With Dos Santos set to retire in September, the state media is frenetically building a per- sonality 
cult around his anointed successor, the Soviet-educated João Lourenço.” (de Morias 48). 
 
- “Nevertheless, in the age of the internet, Dos Santos is losing control over the flow of 
information. His personality cult may yet find itself on shaky ground. De Carvalho’s comments 
inspired a torrent of memes against him and about the air Angolans breathe. Humour has become a 
power- ful tool of subversion, easily disseminated through everyday interactions.” (de Morias 48). 
 
- “Despite this restriction on freedom of expression, the internet and social media have become 
important alternative vehicles of expressing dissenting opinions. Since early 2011, a non-partisan 
youth movement inspired by the Arab Spring and organized via social media has organized a series 
of protests against rampant corruption, widespread poverty, lack of access to social services and the 
increasing restriction of freedom of expression under President Dos Santos’ rule.” (Human Rights 
Watch 5). 
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- “Human Rights Watch research indicates that the purported police investigations had failed to 
result in any prosecutions of those implicated in violence against protesters. This was despite 
victims having filed numerous complaints with the police regarding excessive use of force at 
demonstrations, death threats via phone and text messages, abductions, and raids on private 
residences to beat protesters and ransack documents. On the contrary, victims and independent 
observers of acts of violence during anti-government rallies told Human Rights Watch that police 
agents deliberately remained passive towards the aggressors and failed to provide protection to 
peaceful protesters.” (Human Rights Watch 12). 
 
- “The MPLA state's dependence on the Western-controlled coastal oil industry, as well as the 
party's urban bias, also contributed towards the sidelining of the countryside by policymakers.” (de 
Oliveira 290).  
 
- “In this context, overt coercion is rarer than weary acceptance or even support for the MPLA, 
with party membership having increased from about 60,000 to 4 million between 1990 and 2004, in 
a country of some 16 million people (de Oliveira 293).  
 
- “Despite this impressive trajectory, Angola struggles to translate high oil rents into improved 
socioeconomic prospects for a large part of the population.” (Niño and le Billon 86). 
 
- “Although such failures could have caused the demise of the MPLA, economic and political 
reasons converge to explain this regime’s durability. The rent man- agement architecture in Angola 
is designed to reinforce the stability of the regime. Local content provisions in the oil sector as well 
as an array of other nonoil service provision contracts are leveraged to reward companies owned by 
groups and individuals with links to the regime, leading to domestic accumula- tion by empowering 
allies, co-opting potential contenders, and marginalizing opponents.” (Niño and le Billon 86). 
 
- “Since 2002 the Angolan regime has moved on from the challenges of sur- vival based on military 
strength and petroleum revenues. The Angolan state now exerts its authority over its entire 
territory, though with centralized political con- trol, with MPLA legitimacy and resource extraction 
in mind, rather than with a public service delivery and social contract ethos.” (Niño and le Billon 
87). 
 
- “The strength of the Angolan state, however, remains (precariously) based in the centralized 
control and lim- ited handouts of a party-state, rather than on the legitimacy of inclusive govern- 
ance or the effectiveness of a developmental state.” (Niño and le Billon 87). 
 
- “Strong oil revenues and access to diverse sources of (oil-backed) finance have resulted in a high 
degree of autonomy and self-confidence for the Angolan state. Reinforced by a vast security 
apparatus, undisputed authority resulting from its military victory over UNITA and the historical 
dividend of having been the lead- ing independence party, the MPLA-led Angolan state can be 
described as robust from a durability and authority perspective. Several factors, however, severely 
test this apparent robustness, including an aging ruler controlling a highly cen- tralized 
neopatrimonial regime; the frustrated aspirations of the urban youth; and a combination of oil 
dependence, stagnant economic diversification, and rising indebtedness.” (Niño and le Billon 92). 
 
- “Resources were concentrated on a so-called ‘national bourgeoisie’ of mostly urban party 
loyalists, to the detriment of the majority of Angolans.” (Pearce et al. 146).  
 
- “In the wake of the Arab Spring in early 2011 … severe repression on the part of the regime 
prevented them from gathering more than a couple of thousand demonstrators in the streets of the 
capital, the revús extended the boundaries of Angola’s public space and were a further expression 
of social discontentment and regime fatigue.” (Pearce et al. 147).  
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- “As was discussed earlier, however, it is unlikely that the oil companies will fund programmes 
that aim to empower civil society, or even to build one, as it is almost entirely absent from the 
political scene in Angola. The companies do not want to go against the interests of the government, 
their partner in business.” (Tallio 403).  
 
- “Ms. Pillay [the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] referred here to the growing 
discontent observed within the Angolan youth, who did not hesitate to take the streets since early 
2011 to demand social justice, good governance and fair redistribution of the benefits of the 
exploitation of natural resources.” (Masuku et al. 9).  
 
1b. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections? 
- “While engaging with a limited version of democracy that does not tamper with the established 
mode of exercising power (mirrored in the increasing pluralism within the MPLA itself), the 
MPLA has deepened the 'confusion between party, state and administration'” (de Oliveira 293). 
 
- “The regime's landslide electoral victory in 2008 — 82 % of the votes in a peaceful election 
deemed fair by observers - was followed by a new, markedly presidentialist constitution in early 
2010, according to which the president will be indirectly elected by the National Assembly. This 
allows President dos Santos a further decade in power.” (de Oliveira 293). 
 
- “The MPLA was able to survive and come out of the challenging years of the 1990s as a 
prosperous and unchal- lenged ruling party, whose official legitimacy was boosted through two 
rounds of elections, in 2008 and to a lesser extent in 2012.” (Niño and le Billon 87). 
 
- “Dos Santos’s stepping down constituted a major challenge to the MPLA’s critics, since much of 
the political and civic opposition to the regime had centred its discourse on the president and his 
direct allies.” (Pearce et al. 150). 
 
- “Elections were held on Wednesday 23 August 2017. Five parties even- tually ran against the 
ruling MPLA.” (Pearce et al. 151).  
 
- “The electoral campaigning remained biased in favour of the incumbent party, as had been 
the case in 2008 and 2012.” (Pearce et al. 151).  
 
- “On 3 September the leaders of the four established opposition parties— UNITA, CASA-CE, 
FNLA and PRS—issued a joint statement rejecting the provisional results announced by the CNE 
on the grounds that the elections had been conducted in an unconstitutional manner” (Pearce et al. 
152).  
 
- “It alleged ‘the disappearance of ballot boxes, the emer- gence of new ballot boxes, the 
disappearance of votes,’ and the illegal par- ticipation in the counting process of individuals who 
were not accredited to do so.” (Pearce et al. 153). 
 
- “The four opposition parties contested the result in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that 
due process had not been followed in the count, but on 8 September the court rejected the suit and 
declared the results official.” (Pearce et al. 153).  
 
- “This unexpected reversal, which came after three weeks of combative rhetoric on the part of both 
leaders, prompted sharp criticism from civil society and in online media that the opposition lea- 
ders had effectively legitimized a fraudulent election by backtracking on their earlier resolve to 
boycott parliament.” (Pearce et al. 154).  
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1c. Is there state corruption and political violence? 
- “… the grievances of many Angolans, until recently manageable, have come into the open. Keen 
in recent years on putting up a more technocratic face, the MPLA regime has responded by 
massively increasing repression.” (de Oliveira). 
 
- “About a month earlier, a tussle between police and followers of a Christian sect in Huambo 
Province led to violence on a massive scale. The event is still shrouded in mystery: Luanda has 
refused to allow an independent investigation of the incident, despite international demands 
(including from the UN) that it do so. But the account offered by the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola, the main opposition party, suggests that as many as 1,080 people were 
murdered after members of the sect killed between four and nine police officers.” (de Oliveira). 
 
- “The MPLA is a formidable machine that is still relatively cohesive: Angola’s security sector 
expenditure is larger than that of Nigeria and South Africa combined, and the armed forces, 
intelligence services, and police remain loyal to the president.” (de Oliveira). 
 
- ““The missing millions” is a familiar concept for informed Angolans, and also the World Bank, 
IMF and other international actors have raised concern about the problems of management of 
government revenues in Angola. Some observers are claiming that all state income is accounted for 
and made transparent through the National Bank and the budget process, but others are arguing that 
large parts of the Government’s income, in particular from the oil and diamonds sector, are still un-  
accounted for.” (Amundsen and Abreu 11). 
- “… civil society organisations can exercise some pressure on the Angolan government by 
repeatedly asking for information, figures and analyses, assess the accuracy of information 
and make inquiries about discrepancies.” (Amundsen and Abreu 12). 
 
- “The government has responded to those protests – despite their relatively small scale – with 
excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, obstruction and intimidation of journalists and 
other observers. Increasingly the security forces have used unnecessary lethal force against 
protesters and organizers.” (Human Rights Watch 5).  
 
- “The main perpetrators of violence during protests have been groups of armed individuals, who 
act with complete impunity, and appear to be security agents in civilian clothes. Since March 2012, 
the threats and armed attacks against protest leaders by these plainclothes security agents – who are 
known in Angola as “caenches” (“muscle men”) or “militia”– have increased and appear to be 
systematic. They included attacks against protesters in their private residences, abductions, and 
possible enforced disappearances.” (Human Rights Watch 5). 
 
- “In addition to the unresolved Cabinda conflict, the armed forces and the police have been used in 
the violent deportation of tens of thousands of illegal migrants, mostly from the DRC … allow[ing] 
the government to demonstrate its ruthlessness when challenged.” (de Oliveira 293-294).  
 
- “the state simply does not have the manpower to cope with the expansion of statist tasks implied 
in the ambitious reconstruction blueprint. Incompetence, and not just corruption, is an important 
part of the story.” (de Oliveira 295).  
 
- “Even at the 2002—4 height of international criticism of oil sector corruption in Angola, the 
enthusiasm of foreign oil investors, as well as their home governments, never wavered. Angola’s 
woes remained a niche concern in the mainstream media. Yet there was enough momentary unease 
with the quality of Angola's governance to create a quasi-consensus amongst prominent Western 
states and the Bretton Woods institutions that a donors' conference should be postponed until the 
Angolan government could explain the whereabouts of missing oil revenues and commit itself to 
implementing some of the reforms put forward by the IMF.” (de Oliveira 300).  
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- “However, it is noteworthy that Angola’s system of patronage has not been predatory or 
incompatible with the emergence of an efficient and productive sector, which has been the case in 
many other oil- producing countries.” (Niño and le Billon 87). 
 
- “Lourenço’s assertiveness emerged sooner than expected … within less than two months, 
Lourenço had dealt major and seemingly irreversible blows to the Dos Santos circle.” (Pearce et al. 
157).  
- “He closed down GRECIMA, a propaganda bureau at the presidency that for years had 
funnelled tens of millions of dollars in contracts to a company, Semba Comunicação, owned 
by two of Dos Santos’s children.” (Pearce et al. 158) 
 
- “He quickly replaced Dos Santos’s central bank governor by a respected former central 
banker and used the pretext of a Swiss criminal investigation to fire the Dos Santos-linked 
presidential economic adviser, ushering in a politically robust replacement who will de facto 
oversee the economic and finance ministries from the presidency.” (Pearce et al. 158) 
 
- “In Angola, such moves are unprecedented and have been enthusiastic- ally welcomed by 
numerous constituencies … This support was apparent not just from traditionally critical 
corners of society but also from inside the MPLA, where the desire for renewal and the 
offloading of responsibilities for the country’s dismal situation was partly associated with 
cutting the interests of the Dos Santos circle down to size. However, three obstacles were 
said to stand in the way of Lourenço’s reforms.” (Pearce et al. 158). 
 
- “The situation is paradoxical and is likely to stay that way: Angola ranks 161st out of 175 
countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index and the redistribution of wealth is almost non-
existent: though GNI per capita is US$5,170, the country ranks 149th in the Human Development 
Index” (Tallio 404).  
 
- “Human Rights Watch and other organizations have documented the immense scale of corruption 
and financial mismanagement in Angola since the civil war; at the same time, millions of 
impoverished Angolans have been deprived of access to basic social services.” (Human Rights 
Watch 7).  
 
- “According to most of the interlocutors met by the Observatory delegation, corruption is an 
alarming scourge in Angola, and is highly evident within the public administration – government, 
judiciary, police – and the private sector – in particular within the extractive industries.” (Masuku 
et al. 9). 
 
- “As seen above, endemic corruption is another scourge of the justice system in Angola, which is 
the reflection of a more generalised phenomenon observed within various spheres of the soci- ety. 
Corruption within the judiciary contributes to the lack of confidence in this sector and, in a context 
where access to legal aid remains the exception, discourages victims of human rights violations 
from addressing their grievances before national Courts.” (Masuku et al. 12).  
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Variable 2: Public Services 
 
2a. How is the public health? 
- “About 36% of the population currently lives below the poverty line and has limited access basic 
public services (water, sanitation, energy, health, education and housing).” (World Health 
Organization 12).  
 
- “Childhood diseases account for most infant and child mortality…” (World Health Organization 
14). 
 
- “Chronic malnutrition affects about 15.6% of Angolan under-five children. It is considered a 
secondary cause of mortality in two out of every three deaths within this age group.” (World Health 
Organization 15).  
 
- “Communicable diseases still account for more than 50% of deaths recorded within the 
population. The situation is worsened by the high prevalence of malnutrition among under-five 
children and the exponential increase in recorded cases of chronic non communicable diseases” 
(World Health Organization 15).  
 
- “Increased mortality from road accidents is a cause for concern. It is now the second cause of 
death in the country, aggravated in large part by alcohol and drug abuse, which also fuel the 
increase in cases of violence (especially domestic violence) in the country.” (World Health 
Organization 15-16).  
 
- “Angola 2025: The main objectives of this strategy are to eliminate hunger and extreme poverty 
and reduce development disparities between the various regions of the country. The major 
guidelines of this national strategy include: public policies to eradicate hunger and reduce poverty 
as a degrading social ill, and the control of disease and illiteracy as barriers to socio-economic 
development. These are determinants that have a clear impact on the health status of the population 
and, consequently, on the socioeconomic development of nations” (World Health Organization 16).  
 
- “Over the last five years, the neonatal mortality rate declined to 42/1000 live births; the infant 
mortality rate was 116/1000 live births while under-five mortality was 195 /1000 live births” 
(World Health Organization 20).  
 
- “Immunisation coverage also improved, rising steadily from 81% in 2009 to 93% for Penta 3 in 
2013, and from 79% to 91% for measles during the same period (World Health Organization 20).  
 
- “According to the survey on malaria indicators conducted in 2011, prevalence fell from 21% in 
2006, to 13% in 2011, representing a 30% decline” (World Health Organization 20).  
 
- “The efforts made by the Government of Angola have facilitated the implementation of strategies 
to eradicate poliomyelitis. The country has not recorded any case of polio since July 2011. 
Similarly, leprosy has been eliminated as a national public health problem since 2005, and there has 
been a reduction in the maternal, infant and child mortality rates. Furthermore, immunization has 
improved with a steady increase in coverage.” (World Health Organization 25-26).  
 
- “With regard to the attainment of MDG 6, the Government invested heavily in HIV, malaria and 
tuberculosis, and also in mobilizing the Angolan Armed Forces for public health activities, 
particularly HIV prevention through a successful country-wide prevention programme.” (World 
Health Organization 26).  
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- “The child population (under five years of age) is 20% of the total population. The population less 
than 15 years of age is about 47% and 49% in urban and rural areas, respectively.” [translated from 
Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 22).  
 
- “The average life expectancy at birth in Angola is currently estimated at 52 years and 51 for men 
and 53 for women.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 22).  
 
- Corroborated by the WHO that states the life expectancy to be 51 (World Health 
Organization 26).   
 
- “Nationally, only 42% of the population use an appropriate source of drinking water.” [translated 
from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 24). 
 
- “With regard to sanitation, only 53% of the aggregates have some type of toilet in home. The 
proportion of families with a toilet at home is higher in urban areas (74%).” [translated from 
Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 24). 
 
- “The Nutritional Survey in 2007, revealed that 8.2% of children under five years suffered from 
acute malnutrition and 29.2% had a moderate chronic malnutrition situation.” [translated from 
Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 24). 
 
- “The prevalence of HIV infection in Angola is estimated at 1.98% in the population 
sexually active.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 29). 
 
- “1. Limited number of skilled professionals; 
2. Weaknesses in the management of services; 
3. Weak supply of water and energy, to health facilities and population;  
4. Poor sanitation of the environment; 
 5. Poor response to the social determinants of health.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of 
Health 75). 
 
- “Churches played a core role in health provision, especially in rural areas … The health centres 
run by religious organisations became an integral part of the health landscape in Angola.” (Tallio 
392). 
 
- “In the aftermath of the war, the health system in Angola had to recover from destruction 
and neglect. Sixty-five per cent of the infrastructure had been destroyed, and much 
equipment was either broken or stolen; what remained was ill-maintained and could provide 
only a very low quality of health care.” (Tallio 395).  
 
- “In 2007, government expenditure on health reached 5 per cent of total government 
expenditure, far below the southern African average (10.3 per cent) and the African average 
(9 per cent)” (Tallio 396). 
 
- “Public sector health care expenditure has suffered a reduction, partly due to the international 
financial crisis which has had a negative impact on the country. The 2009 budget appropriation has 
been reduced by 30%, rendering unviable the fulfillment of some of the intermediate goals which 
had been set for that year. Initially estimated at 8.38%, the health budget dropped to 6.39%. The 
overall health budget dropped from 3.2% to 2.38%. The table below provides a breakdown of 
budget appropriations between 2004 and 2009.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 39). 
 
2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems? 
- “In the education sector, UNESCO rates Angola as a country with a low Education for All 
Development Index (EDI), placing it in the 111th position out of 120 countries in its 2012 
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Education-for-All rankings, with a value of 0.685 and a gender-specific EFA index of 0.734” 
(World Health Organization 12).  
 
- “As for literacy and education, statistics show that over 76% of households in the urban 
environment and 55% in rural areas, have access to the school within a radius of 2 km from their 
residence. About 29% of children They have to travel daily over 2km to attend school. In general, 
34% of the population [in] Angola is still illiterate. In rural areas, this proportion reaches more than 
70% of the population, double the that takes place in urban areas.” [translated from Portuguese] 
(Ministry of Education 23). 
 
- “With regard to education, net attendance rate in education is 76% nationally. At girls enter 
school with the correct age (55%) and a higher percentage than boys (49%), which contributes to a 
higher incidence of primary education for girls. Consequently, 62% of women complete primary, 
compared to 50% of men.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Education 23).  
 
- In 2011, the net enrollment rate for primary education was 84% (male 95% and female 73%) (The 
World Bank “Education Statistics”). 
 
- Primary completion rate for the same year was overall 50% (male 63% and female 36%). 
(The World Bank “Education Statistics”).  
 
- According to the Angola Ministry of Education, the completion rate was 57.1% (Ministry 
of Education 38). 
 
- In 2010, net secondary enrollment rates were 12% (male 14% and female 11%). (The World Bank 
“Education Statistics”). 
 
- As of 2014, the adult literacy rates, 15+ years (%) were overall 66% (male 80% and female 53%). 
(The World Bank “Education Statistics”).  
 
- The government’s expenditure on education as % of GDP in 2010 was 3.5 , below average for 
Sub-Saharan Africa of 3.836% in 2010 (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).  
 
- And in 2010 as total government expenditure (%) was 8.7% (The World Bank “Education 
Statistics”).  
 
- The repetition of a grade from primary school was rated by the World Bank at 13% (2014 
“National Education”) and the Ministry of Education at 21% (2010).  
 
- “The gross enrolment rate in primary and secondary schools rose from 13.19 per cent in 2014 to 
97.5 per cent in 2016.” (UNCRC 11).  
 
2c. Is there adequate infrastructure? 
- “There was no institutional continuity in the civil service, courts, or the armed forces; bar the oil 
industry, all sectors of the fairly diversified late colonial economy perished immediately or were 
soon suffocated by socialist planning.” (de Oliveira 290). 
 
- “Defence expenditure actually increased 2.5 times between 2005 and 2009, at first sight a dubious 
allocation of resources… the maintenance of one of the largest and most competent armies in sub-
Saharan Africa is explained by the fact that it had become central to the exercise of power in 
Angola and the broader region” (de Oliveira 292). 
 
- “The government's sensibility and the population's needs were aligned on this early emphasis, 
which resulted in unambiguous successes such as the rebuilding of much of the coastal and 
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highlands road networks. But general reconstruction ex- penditure (as well as that for the 2010 
Africa Cup which Angola hosted) has taken place through questionable procurement processes and 
in the absence of budgetary oversight. Quality control was non-existent, and construction 
companies appointed on account of their insider status rather than on the basis of merit or cost 
effectiveness.” (de Oliveira 294).  
 
- “However, average Angolans have not been the target of much government expentiure since 
2002.” (de Oliveira 295).  
 
- “… the health budget increased considerably, from 153 million kwanzas in 2009 to 346 million in 
2014. It also shows a significant increase in the execution of the general State budget (GSB) from 
65% in 2009 to 91% in 2013, stemming from the growing absorption capacity of the health sector.” 
(World Health Organization 8).  
 
- “However, persistent problems, such as the poor quality and limited supply of human 
resources needed for the implementation and management of programmes, as well as the 
non-transfer of financial resources to the primary level, could undermine the steady 
improvement of execution capacity.” (World Health Organization 8). 
 
- “The following results were achieved in each sector during the 2009-2011 period[:] 
• There was a huge increase in the student enrolment in non- university establishments 
(15%); an improvement in the gross enrolment ratio (29% in 3 years); an increase in the 
number of classrooms (9%); rapid growth in higher education student enrolment (68%) and 
teaching staff (21%); and a surge in the number of internal scholarships (200%) and 
external scholarships (21%)” (World Health Organization 5).  
• “There has been a significant increase in the number of rehabilitated and newly-built health 
posts and centres, and in activities relating to continuing education, supervision of health 
units, monitoring of activities and presentation of results” (World Health Organization 6). 
 
- “The health system in Angola is based on the Primary Health Care and Hospital Assistance 
Programme, which covers health services from the community level right up to a more complex 
level.” (World Health Organization 22). 
 
- “The health needs and problems currently encountered by the NHS relate mainly to: (i) 
insufficient coverage and poor maintenance of health centres; (ii) poor referral and counter-
referral system between the three levels of the NHS; (iii) limited human resources and health 
technicians, in quality and quantity, and poor distribution of personnel in rural and peri-
urban areas; (iv) weaknesses in the health management system, including the information, 
logistics and communications systems; (v) scarcity of financial resources and poor financing 
model; and (vi) limited access to safe drinking water, sanitation and energy.” (World Health 
Organization 22). 
 
- “The country is still experiencing a quantitative and qualitative shortage of human resources in 
health.” (World Health Organization 51).  
 
- “The network delivery of health care from the National Health Service consists of 2,356 units 
health, and 1,650 health centers, 331 health centers, 43 maternal and child health centers, 165 
hospitals local, provincial hospitals 25, 20 central hospitals and 83 non-typeable units” [translated 
from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 33). 
 
- “There is an asymmetric distribution of human resources in Angola, with an excessive focus on 
large urban centers. With the initiative of expanding the training of doctors, by creating 
Church 
 106 
five new Schools of Public Medicine in Cabinda, Malanje, Benguela, Huambo and Huila, will be 
enhanced the profile of human resources in Angola.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of 
Health 33). 
 
- “Angola’s transport infrastructure suffered extensive damage during the civil war years, with 
destruction and neglect leading to the closure of most of the road and rail networks. However, over 
the last decade, the Angolan authorities have undertaken huge investments in the rehabilitation of 
the road, railway, port and air infrastructure, most of it financed by Chinese loans and credit lines 
that are transforming the country’s infrastructure.” (Dionisio 1).  
 
- “Specifically, the level of public spending for roads and bridges has amounted to US$12.7 billion 
in the last decade, or over 30 per cent of total public investments. Angolan authorities also expect 
to spend US$22.6 billion during 2013‐2025 in the construction of new roads and the rehabilitation 
and maintenance of existing ones. This makes the country one of the highest spenders on road 
infrastructure in Africa.” (Dionisio 1).  
 
- “Angola has three railway systems run by public companies which … is extremely important as a 
means to reach the interior of the country, as the inland towns and cities have been cut off from the 
developments that have been taking place in the coastal regions for many years.” (Dionisio 2). 
 
- “In particular, the Port of Luanda is the main route for international trade, handling over 80 per 
cent of Angola’s imports. It is also the main center for ongoing food product import operations, the 
energy industry and general‐cargo and container operations. As a major transit port not only for 
Angolan goods but also for the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Luanda is one of the fastest‐growing 
ports in Africa. This growth created handling constraints leading to port congestion for both general 
cargo and container traffic.” (Dionisio 2). 
 
- “Angola’s main international airport is located in Luanda and is served by several international 
and regional airlines … The international terminal of the Luanda airport was renovated in 2010 
before the African Cup of Nations, which was hosted by Angola.” (Dionisio 2).  
 
- “Angola’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.533— which put the country in the low human development 
category— positioning it at 150 out of 188 countries and territories.” (UNDP 2).  
- “Between 2000 and 2015, Angola’s HDI value increased from 0.391 to 0.533, an increase of 36.4 
percent.” (UNDP 2).  
 
- “Between 1990 and 2015, Angola’s life expectancy at birth increased by 11.5 years, mean years 
of schooling increased by 0.6 years and expected years of schooling increased by 7.6 years.” 
(UNDP 2).  
- “Due to a lack of relevant data, the MPI [Multidimensional Poverty Index] has not been 
calculated for this country.” (UNDP 5). 
- “Infrastructure needs to be (re)built: roads, schools, health centres, as well as the educational and 
health systems, and private companies are largely in charge of this process, in particular 
implementing entire areas of public health through corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programmes.” (Tallio 389).  
- “Named ‘angolanizacao’ (Angolanisation), and started in 1982, it aims at strengthening the 
national economy, with the oil sector as trendsetter. Most of the components are standard: the 
hiring of Angolans, vocational training programmes, preference for purchasing national goods and 
services, and so on. One aspect is of particular interest for our research: the obligation by law to re-
invest a portion of profits in social projects.” (Tallio 392).  
Church 
 107 
- “Every enterprise has to spend annually US$1 million for every 100,000 bpd produced. 
Esso, for example, spends US$15 million per year, including US$6.5 million as their 
angolanizac$a ̃o obligation.” (Tallio 392).  
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Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
 
3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld? 
- “In addition to the historical and structural factors described above that are inhibiting to civil 
society organisations in Angola, there is also a deliberate government policy of restricting the room 
for manoeuvre and the possible political impact of civil society organisations.” (Amundsen and 
Abreu 6). 
 
- “Angola is a lawful democratic State, resting on the will of the people, the Constitution and the 
law, the separation of powers and interdependence of functions, national unity, freedom of 
expression and a pluralist political system, and on a representative and participatory democracy.” 
(ACHPR “Implementation of the” 5).  
 
- “Under the implementation of the recommendations relating to the ratification of 
international legal instruments on human rights, Angola has demonstrated its commitment to 
adhere to almost all international treaties” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and 
Seventh” 11).  
 
-  The implementation of the Charter and the Maputo Protocol takes place under the 
execution of public policies, taking into account the commitments made at national and 
international level, to create necessary conditions for the effective realization of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of all Angolans, enshrined in the Angolan legal system and 
international legal instruments of Human rights.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth 
and Seventh” 15). 
 
- “The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights published in 2014, 2000 
copies of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights which is being distributed and 
disseminated in seminars and other activities of the Intersectoral Commission for the Preparation of 
National Reports on Human Rights (CIERNDH) and under the Provincial Committees on Human 
Rights.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 15). 
 
- “To address overcrowding in prisons and improve living conditions of the prison population, the 
Angolan state has been implementing a set of combined measures, legislative, judicial and 
administrative level…” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 20). 
 
- “In all the country's prisons inmates have guaranteed three daily meals, medical care and 
treatment that in addition to the network of prison hospitals, health centers and medical posts of 
establishments is complemented by public hospitals.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR 
“Sixth and Seventh” 20). 
 
- “The restrictions referred to in Article 19 of the Covenant requires, like other legal frameworks 
that the offender (journalist or not) answer a criminal case for defamation, insults or slander in 
accordance with paragraph 3 and 4 of Article 40 of the CRA and 407 ° and 410 Articles of the 
Criminal Code, plus the ability to account for disciplinary and civil proceedings.” [translated from 
Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 25). 
 
- “We think that the imposed restriction is intended to protect the particular interest of 
offended, then I do not understand how there can be interest of the state to violate or restrict 
the right to freedom of expression.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and 
Seventh” 25). 
 
- “Despite these many health problems, services, particularly reproductive health services, are 
seldom available to girls. The lack of accessible health facilities, and lack of money for transport, 
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medical treatment and drugs has meant that the health status of survivors of sexual violence is often 
poor.” (Denov 826). 
 
- “…in Angola, when entering and attacking a settlement, older women and women with young 
children were left behind while men were captured and killed and children aged ten and above were 
targeted and abducted.” (Denov 817).  
 
- “The lack of updated and reliable social statistics and disaggregated data has undermined 
independent monitoring of Angola’s policies and practices affecting social and economic rights, 
and efforts at reform.” (Human Rights Watch 11). 
 
- “Most street traders Human Rights Watch interviewed in Luanda live in informal settlements, in 
neighborhoods that lack basic services, such as access to running water, electricity and basic 
sanitation. Seventy-five percent of Luanda’s population today lives in informal and peri-urban 
settlements (musseques) with little or no legal protection of tenure, which makes them vulnerable to 
forced evictions.” (Human Rights Watch 12).  
 
- “Street traders in Luanda experience daily roundups by police and fiscais who routinely use 
excessive force and subject traders to humiliating and degrading treatment. They also regularly 
confiscate goods and extort bribes. Such violence and public humiliation, often inflicted in view of 
numerous witnesses, includes beatings with batons and other objects, kicking, slapping, and 
punching, resulting in injuries including bruises, swollen arms, legs and faces.” (Human Rights 
Watch 18). 
 
- “Many street vendors told Human Rights Watch that pregnant women, girls and women carrying 
small babies on their back are rarely spared from beatings. The fact that pregnant women and those 
carrying their babies are usually slower in running away during a crackdown makes them more 
vulnerable to beatings. There were unconfirmed accounts of pregnant street vendors having 
miscarriages as a result of beatings.” (Human Rights Watch 19). 
 
- “Despite the adoption, in 2010, of a Constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms 
and despite the establishment of institutions mandated to promote and protect them, the socio-
political context in Angola is still marked by political and economic patronage, marginalisation of 
the opposition, lack of transparency and accountability, widespread poverty, inequalities, endemic 
corruption, impunity and the volatile situation in the Cabinda province. In such a context, human 
rights defenders advocating for the respect of the rule of law, good governance and accountability, 
are facing various forms of hindrances.” (Masuku et al. 7).  
 
- “Widespread poverty, huge disparities, demolitions, forced evictions and corruption in Angola 
have been denounced by several international human rights agencies, including the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee and the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights” (Masuku et al. 9).  
 
- “Despite an apparent willingness of the Angolan authorities to uphold their human rights commit- 
ments and obligations, human rights defenders operating in this country are facing various forms of 
hindrances to their effective capacity of action, resulting in particular not only from the weaknesses 
of the legal and institutional human rights framework, but also from the lack of political will to 
permit dissenting voices.” (Masuku et al. 15).  
- “While most of the demonstrations were announced in advance to relevant authorities, in 
accordance with the law, demonstrators met by the Observatory reported having witnessed or 
having been severely beaten by police forces and brought to police stations injured. Demonstrators 
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also reported the presence of armed men in plain clothes who were allegedly helping the police to 
attack demonstrators.” (Masuku et al. 30).  
- “The repression increased in 2012, in the pre-electoral context.” (Masuku et al. 30). 
- The Angolan Government and the United Nations report back to each other on the status of 
women/child/human rights on a regular basis with recommendations, improvements, and questions 
with the Angolan Ministry of Human Rights and official Angolan Government websites providing 
links to this information on the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights website: 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=Sp&CountryID=5>.  
  
3b. Is there an independent media source? 
- “Although the Angolan law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, at times the 
government restricted these rights in practice and media and journalists practices self-censorship. 
Both radio and print media have criticized the government openly and at times harshly, and there 
has been an increased media attention on the upcoming elections, corruption, economic 
mismanagement, and opposition politics. Even when the government continues to limit access by 
independent journalists to certain events and officials, in particular through the law that permits the 
government to classify information, there have in contrast to earlier years been no reports lately 
that journalists have been investigated, harassed or imprisoned.” (Amundsen and Abreu 30).  
 
- “The private media are self-censored (except for a few weekly opposition magazines that are 
publishing editorials and comments of a very political nature, including accusations of individual 
ministers and other elite persons). The private media are indeed un-professional and sales-oriented 
(publishing gossip and scandals with little substantiation and research). Foreign journalists must 
receive authorization from the Ministry of the Interior to meet government officials or to travel 
within the country.” (Amundsen and Abreu 30). 
 
- “The media landscape is mostly dominated by state-owned media. Angola only has one daily 
newspaper, the state-owned Jornal de Angola, also known as “the Pravda” for its rabid defence of 
the regime. The private media sector is dominated by outlets owned by ministers, generals and 
other high-rank- ing MPLA officials, thus making the internet the only forum for freedom of 
expression in the country.” (de Morias 48).  
 
- “Nevertheless, frequent threats of criminal defamation lawsuits by senior officials have 
considerably contributed to self-censorship.” (Human Rights Watch 11).  
 
- “Journalists have been regularly arrested, detained, and questioned by the authorities while trying 
to cover the protests in Luanda and elsewhere over the past year [2012].” (Human Rights Watch 9).   
 
- “The growth of print media outlets (and from late 2008, TV Zimbo) is an important development 
in this regard even if their quality is often disappointing. However, the salient characteristic of this 
period is not the MPLA’s acceptance of dissenting views, but rather its consistent penetration of 
civil society organisations and professional associations, often dependent on the largesse of 
presidential foundations, achieving de facto political control while extolling their pluralism.” (de 
Oliveira 293). 
 
- “… both state and private media are controlled by the regime…” (Pearce et al. 152).  
 
- “Today, human rights defenders and journalists remain vulnerable. They continue to work in an 
environment where they face regular judicial and administrative harassment, threats and various 
forms of restrictions to their freedom of association, expression and/or assembly, in particular when 
they raise concerns over “sensitive” issues such as govern- ance, access to justice, corruption, 
forced displacement and evictions, exploitation of natural resources or the situation in the Cabinda 
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province.” (Masuku et al. 31). 
 
- “The impunity enjoyed by those responsible of acts of harassment and intimidation further 
contribute to this situation of vulnerability.” (Masuku et al. 31).  
 
- “In a context where the State owns the unique daily newspaper, national television and radio, 
independent media, not affiliated to the Government, are facing difficulties in reaching a wide and 
diverse audience, in particular outside Luanda.” (Masuku et al. 24).  
 
- The media has had a “not free” status under the Freedom House “Freedom of the Press” index for 
the past 16 years, even since the end of the civil war in 2002 (Freedom House).  
 
- “While some journalists practice self-censorship when reporting on sensitive issues, the 
private print and broadcast media are generally free to scrutinize government policies. 
However, coverage at state-owned outlets favors the ruling party. The government has 
reportedly paid journalists to publish complimentary stories and has discouraged advertisers 
from buying space in independent newspapers, thus threatening their financial viability.” 
(Freedom House 2003). 
 
- “Laws regarding state security and insult hamper the free activities of the media. In 2010, 
the parliament passed a new state security law to replace a 1978 law, known as Article 26, 
which the government often used to imprison opposition journalists and activists. While the 
new law represents an improvement, it still allows for the detention of persons who “insult” 
the Republic of Angola or the president in “public meetings or by disseminating words, 
images, writings, or sound.”” (Freedom House 2014). 
 
- “The government has used these laws to harass members of the independent media, with 
journalists William Tonet and Rafael Marques de Morais facing regular pressure for their 
efforts to expose corruption and human rights violations.” (Freedom House 2014). 
 
- “The government both owns and keeps tight control over the largest media outlets in the 
country … Nevertheless, several independent weeklies are critical of the government” 
(Freedom House 2014).  
 
- “Conditions remained poor in 2014, which was marked by defamation cases against 
journalists and the closure of one of the country’s last remaining independent newspapers.” 
(Freedom House 2015).  
 
- “Angola enacted a freedom of information law in 2002, ostensibly granting citizens access 
to government-generated documents. However, accessing information remains extremely 
difficult in practice for independent journalists and news organizations without government 
ties, and key parts of the legislation, such as the creation of a monitoring commission, have 
not been implemented.” (Freedom House 2015). 
 
- “While harassment, intimidation, and imprisonment of journalists were less common in 
2014 than during the previous year, coverage of sensitive subjects like antigovernment 
protests, human rights violations, or corruption among government officials remains risky.” 
(Freedom House 2015).  
 
- “No journalists were known to have been murdered in 2014.” (Freedom House 2015).  
 
- “Denial of state and private advertising as a method of pressuring independent news outlets 
continues to be a problem.” (Freedom House 2015).  
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- “Online sources are becoming increasingly important sources of critical news, though not 
many people have internet access outside of urban areas.” (Freedom House 2016).  
 
- “The government prevented independent journalists and members of civil society from 
investigating a botched police operation that reportedly led to a massacre in Huambo 
province in April.” (Freedom House 2016).  
 
- “In Angola, the sudden closure of Semanário Angolense by its unknown new owners in 
2014, and its failure to recommence publication in 2015, leaves Folha 8 as the country’s 
only remaining private, independent newspaper with significant circulation.” (Freedom 
House 2016). 
 
3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system? 
- “International treaties can and has been applied directly to the Courts Angolan whether the 
Constitutional Court whether the courts Commons.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth 
and Seventh” 11). 
 
- “Meanwhile, in Angola there is the Ombudsman, which is a public entity, independent, which 
aims to defend the rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens ensuring, through informal means 
the justice and legality of public administration.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and 
Seventh” 15). 
 
- “A set of organs ensure and administer justice in Angola, taking place the nature of the 
Democratic State and of Law: Constitutional Court, Supreme Court; Provincial Courts; Municipal 
courts; Military courts, the Court of Auditors.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and 
Seventh” 21). 
 
- “The Angolan Constitution guarantees the rights of all citizens to not be arrested or 
put on trial except in accordance with law, the defense, the appeal and to legal representation, 
assuming innocence until the final judgment of conviction sentence (Article 67 of the CRA).” 
[translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 21). 
 
- “With a view to ensuring compliance with Human Rights principles, the President of the Republic 
has delegated powers to: 
• The Ministry of Justice, which has jurisdiction over the Provincial Human Rights 
Committees; 
• The Secretariat of State for Human Rights, which implements human rights policies in 
general.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 10).  
 
“Under the judiciary, human rights issues are handled by the following institutions:  
• The Courts – sovereign bodies administering justice in the name of the people. 
• The Office of the Ombudsman for Justice – a public and independent institution which 
protects human rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens. It uses informal means to 
ensure that justice is served and that public administration operates within the law. 
• The Office of the Attorney General – a State body whose function is to represent the State, 
namely in the exercise of criminal justice and as guardian of the rights of individuals. It 
upholds the law while exercising jurisdictional powers and overseeing criminal 
proceedings, including compliance with sentences.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 11). 
 
- “In its Electoral Manifesto and Government Program (2012-2017), the MPLA committed to 
priori- tise its actions towards consolidation of peace and strengthening of democracy, with 
particular attention being given to structural reforms within the judiciary and promotion of human 
rights” (Masuku et al. 8).  
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- “However, these commitments are yet to be upheld and seen in practice.” (Masuku et al. 
8). 
 
- “Most of the interlocutors met during the mission of the Observatory described the [judiciary] 
sector as one subjected to political interference; obstructed by a lack of proper knowledge and 
reference to national and international human rights laws and treaties in force; suffering from a lack 
of sufficient material and human resources and one afflicted by endemic corruption.” (Masuku et 
al. 12).  
 
- “The lack of appropriate material (obsolescence of the infrastructures, lack of means of 
transporta- tion or communication) and human (lack of prosecutors and judges, lack of sufficiently 
qualified personnel, in particular on national and international human rights law) resources also 
contribute to the inefficiency of the Angolan judicial apparatus. These obstacles result in the 
considerably long delays in the finalisation of judicial cases, a situation that is even worse in the 
provinces.” (Masuku et al. 12).  
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1.4 Republic of Ghana  
(Hypothesized Regime Type: Democratic) 
Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is not present.  
 
Variable 1: State Legitimacy 
 
1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?  
- “Ghana has been identified as one of the few countries in Africa where democracy has recorded 
some remarkable progress” (Akin and Ade 69).  
 
- “However, some political observers lay claim to the fact that Ghana, since the beginning of the 
present Republic, has remained politically stable and made some surprisingly remarkable progress 
which put the country on the path of democratic consolidation.” (Akin and Ade 70).  
 
- “Ghanaian masses have consistently demonstrated complete confidence in democracy and 
accepted it as the only legitimate way to rule. The political elite in the country too have learnt to 
abide by the regulations guiding the practice of democracy while election has been acknowledged 
as the only means of getting access to power.” (Akin and Ade 71).  
 
- “Furthermore, the political sophistication demonstrated in Ghana after the sudden death of 
president Atta Mill in 2012 was another evidence of the love and resilience of Ghanaians for 
democracy” (Akin and Ade 71).  
 
- “Furthermore, the way and manner the supporters of the NPP and NDC in Ghana were appeased 
to shun election violence during the 2008 presidential election debacle was an evidence of the level 
of political sophistication of the Ghanaian masses.” (Akin and Ade 71).  
 
- “ … a survey conducted by Skanning across the countries in sub- Saharan Africa shows that the 
Ghanaians are the most satisfied with the growing level of their democracy in Africa” (Akin and 
Ade 71).  
 
- “Nonetheless, some anti-democratic behaviours like vote buying or money politics are still 
common phenomenal in Ghana. Some politicians in the country believe that Parliamentary 
primaries are won by the highest bidders.” (Akin and Ade 71).  
 
- “As a means of preserving the peace, unity and tranquility which relatively exist in Ghana, leaders 
of faith based organizations and civil society groups regularly adopt various peacekeeping 
initiatives … they usually emphasise the fact that Ghanaians have more to gain staying together 
than when the country is fragmented. This peace effort is usually intensified across the country 
during electioneering campaign. This has to a large extent, helped to keep peace and unity in the 
country.” (Akin and Ade 72).  
 
- “This is why the World Bank, in its 2009 World wide governance indicators, reported that Ghana 
has achieved significant progress on all dimension of governance assessed, including 
accountability, political stability and governance effectiveness which are elements of democratic 
consolidation.” (Akin and Ade 73).  
 
- “Although, it is not yet eureka in Ghana, the country is still struggling with some anti-democratic 
practices such as executive recklessness, abuse of power by political elites, vote buying, money 
politics and campaign of calumny among others which the political elite in the country need to 
address. Nevertheless, when compared with other democracies in Africa, one may conclude that 
Ghana is experiencing a period of political freedom which makes it an example of working 
democracy that is setting the pace for other countries in Africa.” (Akin and Ade 75).  
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- “Although it is not possible to generalise from the one example, Ghana provides a particularly 
favourable context for democracy promotion measures. Therefore, if policy performance is poor 
here, it is argued that it is unlikely to be better elsewhere in Africa in places where the political 
environment is less conducive to external democracy promotion.” (Crawford 572).  
 
- “Worst of all, the NPP [in 2007] appeared more and more to be disregarding the public and taking 
the electorate for granted. During the election year, the government purchased presidential 
airplanes, dismissed the concerns of local fishermen about poaching by foreign trawlers, and 
stubbornly refused to reduce the price of petroleum despite the fall in the world- market price of 
crude oil in the latter part of the year.” (Gyimah-Boadi 140).  
 
- “Until Akufo Addo’s presidency in 2017, it had been mythologised that in order to win an 
elections in Ghana, a presidential candidate had to have the name, ‘John’. The challenge that Akufo 
Addo faced, because of his name, is encapsulated in a comment that an observer made: ‘And if you 
are a superstitious person, Ghanaians have elected only Johns as president since our return to 
democratic rule. But Nana Addo is not a John, unlike Mahama’” (Kwarteng 59). 
 
- “Both the Court and the Church pressured the state to maintain a level playing ground. Their 
major concern was the ‘ghost register’, as opposition groups complained about the names of dead 
persons on the register. The Supreme Court ruled that the Electoral Commission has a duty to 
compile a credible register.” (Kwarteng 63).  
 
1b. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections? 
- “Elections are keenly contested because the two parties have almost equal strength. For instance, 
in the 2008 presidential run-off election, the NDC won 50.22 per cent while the NPP had 49.77 per 
cent. Similarly, the NDC got 50.70 of the total votes cast in 2012 presidential election while NPP 
got 47.74 of the total votes” (Akin and Ade 72).  
- “Despite the robust party system however, the two major political parties in Ghana have been 
challenged for the way and manner they raised their campaign funds … What made this allegation 
more popular is the failure of the two political parties to submit their audited financial records to 
the country’s Electoral Commission as demanded by the constitution” (Akin and Ade 72).  
- “Ghana, in the Fourth Republic has had seven successful general elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016) including three democratic change of party in government.” This 
allows them to pass the two-turn test (TTT) of democracy (Akin and Ade 73).  
- “Of note, 44 percent of Ghanaian Afrobarometer Round 5 survey respondents expressed concern 
about elect- oral intimidation. The 2008 election, which received high marks from elec- tion 
observers after a second round run-off and a razor-thin margin of victory for the opposition NDC, 
nonetheless had pockets of electoral fraud, violence, and intimidation.” (Ferree and Long 632). 
- “Although Ghana prohibits accompanied voting and has adopted techni- ques for ensuring ballot 
secrecy, competitive pressures coupled with per- vasive expectations of patronage create incentives 
to work around these practices.” (Ferree and Long 632). 
- “We also use additional data from a 2008 exit poll conducted in Ghana to show that doubts about 
ballot secrecy cluster by polling station and constituency, suggesting that these perceptions are 
rooted in an underlying, common, community-based source. Finally, we show that perceptions of 
ballot secrecy correlate with several measures of campaign intensity, evidence that these 
perceptions reflect deliberate efforts by parties to convince voters that their ballots are not secret … 
If voters believe outside actors can deter- mine how they vote, then accepting a gift bears a burden 
of reciprocation.” (Ferree and Long 643-644). 
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- “Mills’s inauguration signified Ghana’s second peaceful transition of power from incumbent 
party to opposition. In parliamentary elections held concurrently with the first-round presidential 
contest on December 7, the NDC won 114 of the 230 seats to the NPP’s 107. These exceptional 
events have con- firmed Ghana’s place as a beacon of hope for democracy in Africa.” (Gyimah-
Boadi 138). 
- “The [2008] electoral playing field was general- ly level, and the parties pursued their campaign 
objectives with little hindrance. Most parties had developed and publicized their manifestos, 
helping to make the elections relatively issue-based.” (Gyimah-Boadi 142).  
- “in the context of a hotly contested election, the major parties enjoyed relatively equal 
opportunities to pursue votes.” (Gyimah-Boadi 142). 
- “Ghana transitioned from decades of political instability in the immediate post-independence era 
to a decade of a stable quasi-military experiment (1982-1992) and then to a stable multi-party 
democratic rule from 1993 to date.” (Abdul-Gafaru 87).  
 
1c. Is there state corruption and political violence? 
- “The opposition NPP claimed that the president’s gesture was meant to woo the chiefs who were 
very influential in their respective domains to mobilize votes for the president and his party 
(Abdulai, 2014).This kind of political corruption is one of the things that can engender slow death 
to democracy.” (Akin and Ade 71).  
 
- “The high rankings of Rwanda, Ghana and Mali are a reminder of the democratic achievements in 
many parts of Africa.” This refers to Gilley’s ‘Legitimacy scores, mid to late 2000s, 0 to 10, all 
countries’ table on page 696, placing Ghana (score 6.00) as the second most democratic African 
state, behind Rwanda (6.11). (Gilley 696).  
 
- “The government’s reputa- tion was also tainted by allegations of narcotics trafficking, 
highlighted by the 2007 conviction and imprisonment in the United States of ruling- party 
parliamentarian Eric Amoateng and the botched investigation into cocaine scandals involving 
senior police officers” (Gyimah-Boadi 140). 
 
- “The perception of corruption also dogged the Kufuor government. Reports of extravagant 
exenditures abounded…” (Gyimah-Boadi 140).  
 
- “Outgoing president Kufuor refused to declare a state of emer- gency in the face of looming 
violence in NDC strongholds, and he urged the presidential candidates not to take to the streets but 
rather to accept the authenticated results of the elections and to rely on the courts to redress 
outstanding grievances.” (Gyimah-Boadi 145).  
 
- “Ghana’s civil society—including religious, secular, and professional organizations, as well as 
think tanks and civic-advocacy bodies—acting individually and in groups, was strong and savvy 
enough to monitor the entire electoral process from beginning to end, thereby enhancing its 
transparency. Civil society’s interventions, along with media vigilance, helped to keep the 
campaign issue-based and peaceful.” (Gyimah-Boadi 145).  
 
- “Some eminent diplomats, including the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, 
cautioned the government that such a restraint on the media would be a violation of UN principles. 
Annan, a Ghanaian citizen, further advised that the government should not ban the social media on 
the day of election, in order not to create any wrong impression that the Electoral Commission and 
the Inspector General of Police were colluding to rig the 2016 elections.” (Kwarteng 63).  
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- “Though it is hard to conclude that there is an ideological convergence between the radical NDC 
and the conservative NPP, it can be concluded that there is complementarity of elite values among 
Jerry Rawlings and Akufo Addo. Both leaders campaigned against corruption within the NDC in 
the 2016 elections. After Akufo Addo [of NPP] was installed as president, Jerry Rawlings publicly 
stated that he respects the new President’s ‘principles’ and ‘values’, as well as his anti-corruption 
credentials.” (Kwarteng 64).  
 
- “Rawlings stated that Akuffo Addo is not corrupt, when testifying to the integrity and credibility 
of Akufo Addo. Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings, the wife of the NDC’s founder, told voters to 
root out the NDC in 2016 because of corruption. Rawlings, himself, did not endorse Mahama for a 
second term. The former first family tagged the NDC leadership as incompetent and corrupt, and 
did not publicly support the NDC retaining power in 2016.” (Kwarteng 64).  
 
- “During the 2012 election dispute, Akufo Addo chose the ‘rule of law’ in Court, instead of the 
‘rule of the mob’ on the streets. He was accordingly rewarded in 2016.” (Kwarteng 65).  
 
- “Despite being touted as a vibrant emerging democracy in Africa and rated as a full democracy by 
the Freedom House, corruption is endemic in Ghana.” (Nsia-Pepra 62).  
 
- “The mischaracterization has masked the exploration of the correlation between Ghana’s 
“democracy “and its endemic corruption despite the numerous scholarly works.” (Nsia-
Pepra 62).  
 
- “Ghana’s democracy is flawed with illiberal practices such as monetized politics, winner take-all 
politics, vote buying, electoral frauds and violence, politi- cal vigilantism, judicial corruption and 
selective justice, and a lack of punishment of the politically connected corrupt persons. These 
illiberal practices are incom- patible with democratic ideals of rule of law and accountability and 
perpetuate corruption. The recent revelations of corruption involving officials in governance, 
judiciary, bureaucracy and their cronies in the private sector are clear manifesta- tions of Ghana’s 
failure in fighting corruption.” (Nsia-Pepra 63).  
 
- “The judiciary is corrupt, and some magistrates receive bribes and set criminals free. In 2015, the 
celebrated under- cover journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas exposed 34 judges involved in corruption 
by accepting and making demands for bribes to throw away cases including rob- bery, murder and 
corruption.” (Nsia-Pepra 69). 
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Variable 2: Public Services 
 
2a. How is the public health? 
- “The study has shown that only 35% of the health centres in Ghana [in 2008] are efficient and 
even though this findings is perfectly inline with other findings from other developing countries 
particularly from Africa…” (Akazili et al.).  
 
- “Huge gaps in geographical access to quality health care exists throughout the country due to 
rural-urban differences, poor distribution of health facilities and mal-distribution of health staff 
with rural and urban slum communities having disproportionately poorer access to quality health 
care.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 15). 
 
- “Poor communication and community participation in health care, poor quality of health care 
delivery in the health facilities, inefficiency in resource utilisation and centralized health sector 
decision making are key factors that have been identified to perpetuate this inequity.” (Ghana 
Health Service “National Health” 15). 
 
- “The poor are marginalized in society are most affected due to inadequate strategies to ensure 
financial protection for them. The currently available strategies, which include the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), are limited 
in offering complete protection for all the poor and marginalized.” (Ghana Health Service 
“National Health” 17).  
 
- “Persistently high neonatal, infant and maternal morbidity and mortality, especially at health 
facility level has been the bane of the health service currently and demands a review of the current 
state of proven interventions to address gaps and challenges identified. High numbers of malaria 
cases are reported by health facilities despite the roll of out of interventions over the years and 
declining community level prevalence. Access to HIV treatment and TB cure rates also need to be 
improved.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 23).  
 
- “Ghana is in a health transition with regards to disease burden. Ghana has attained Lower Middle 
Income Status with diseases associated with life style and behavior fast replacing the traditional 
diseases from infections and malnutrition.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 30).  
 
- “The private sector and NGOs, including the Christian Health Association of Ghana, provide over 
40 per cent of health care in Ghana, especially in the rural areas.” (World Health Organization 3).  
 
- “Life expectancy at birth is 57.5 years on average (55.4 years for men and 59.6 years for women). 
Ghana is experiencing an epidemiologic transition with an increasing prevalence of 
noncommunicable diseases.” (World Health Organization 3).  
 
- “The major causes of child mortality include malaria, diarrhoea, and upper respiratory infection” 
(World Health Organization 3).  
 
- “HIV infection, hypertension, diabetes mellitus and road traffic accidents are major causes of 
mortality in adults” (World Health Organization 3).  
 
- “The burden of vaccine-preventable diseases is declining.” (World Health Organization 6).  
 
- “Human resources for health development remain a critical issue for quality health service 
delivery.” (World Health Organization 8).  
 
- “The disease profile is characterized by high levels of communicable and pregnancy-related 
conditions and rising noncommunicable diseases rates resulting from the unfavourable 
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socioeconomic and sociocultural environment. The disease pattern continues to be dominated by 
communicable diseases, under-nutrition and poor reproductive health. The health sector is under-
funded, and there is low human resource capacity because of the emigration of health 
professionals.” (World Health Organization 9).  
 
- “Public spending as a % of GDP (2007-2011*) allocated to: health 2.7” (UNICEF).  
 
- “Total expenditure on health as % of gross domestic product (2012): 5.2” (Ghana Health Sector 
“2017” 19).  
 
- “Total expenditure on health as % of gross domestic product (2007): 8.8” (Ghana Health Sector 
“2011” 15).  
 
- “The calculation shows that the relative allocations to the health sector are significantly lower 
than previously presented. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that government’s commitment to 
health has been increasing over the past 5 years” (Ministry of Health Ghana 20).  
 
- However, the UNDP shows a continuing decrease since 2010, as does the World Bank 
(UNDP; The World Bank “Current Health”)  
 
- “According to the UNAIDS report on the global AIDS epidemic 2013, the risk that a woman 
living with HIV would transmit the virus to her child was 31% in 2009. This risk declined to only 
7% in 2012, but has since been stagnant at this level.” (Ministry of Health Ghana 36).  
 
2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems? 
- “Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate (%) 2008-2012*, male 88.3  
Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate (%) 2008-2012*, female 83.2” (UNICEF).  
 
- Adult Literacy Rates, 15+ years, (%) 2010: Male: 78; Female: 65 (The World Bank “Education”). 
  
- “Primary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%) 2008-2012*, 83.9  male  
Primary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%) 2008-2012*, 84.8 female” (UNICEF). 
 
- “Primary school participation, Survival rate to last primary grade (%) , 2008-2012* 72.2, admin. 
data” (UNICEF).  
 
- Primary Completion Rate (2015): Male: 101; Female: 101 (The World Bank “Education”).  
  
- “Secondary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%)2008-2012*, 48.1 male 
Secondary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%)2008-2012*, 44.4 female” (UNICEF).  
 
- Net Enrollment, Primary (%) (2016) – Male: 87; Female: 88 (The World Bank “Education”). 
- Net Enrollment, Secondary (%) (2016) – Male: 54; Female: 54 (The World Bank “Education”). 
 
- “Public spending as a % of GDP (2008-2010*) allocated to: education 8.2” (UNICEF) 
 
- Percentage of Population with no Education:  
2003 – Male: 17.6; Female: 28.2 
2008 – Male: 13.3; Female: 21.2 
2010 – Male: 18.7; Female: 27.9 
2014 – Male: 9.4; Female: 19.1 (Ghana Health Service “Facts and Figures 2017” 14; Ghana Health 
Service “2011” 11).  
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- “Complementary Basic Education (CBE) programme provided access to 182,652 out-of-school 
children over the last four-years (2013/14-2016/17). The CBE recorded a cumulative completion 
rate of 67 percent of which 92 percent have transitioned to the formal school system;  
•  commenced work on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 76 dilapidated school 
structures and 80 kindergarten blocks for primary schools;  
•  commenced the implementation of the Free SHS Programme in September by absorbing 
all fees approved by GES Council for 353,053 first year students and also released subsidy 
for continuing students in Senior High Schools” (Ghana Ministry of Finance 8).  
- “The growing workforce is well-educated by sub-Saharan standards and nearly 54% of the 
population has at least secondary education. Government expenditure on education – 8.2% of GDP 
– is higher than in Kenya or South Africa.” (PwC 45).  
 
2c. Is there adequate infrastructure? 
- “Ghana has had a four-decade long experience of decentralization reforms, and has also 
experienced one of the fastest growth rates of urbanization in Africa during the last three decades.” 
(Abdul-Gafaru 84).  
 
- “However, as cities have grown in both population and area, they have been less successful at 
providing basic services to local residents. Between 2000 and 2010, there was an increase in the 
proportion of households without any toilet facility in all city size groups.” (Abdul-Gafaru 84). 
- “Importantly, because of the winner-takes-all character of Ghanaian politics, each ruling coalition 
is characterised by a high degree of vulnerability in power, leading to the politicisation of public 
institutions. In this context, patronage-based appointments in Ghana has become a norm; every 
transition of power is accompanied by the removal of a significant number of senior public servants 
perceived to be associated with the previous regime.” (Abdul Gafaru 87). 
- “the findings here suggest that given the constraints imposed on subnational authorities from the 
centre, governance reforms that focus exclusively on the micro-environment (or within-city 
political dynamics) will have little chance of success in terms of improved service delivery for 
urban populations.” (Abdul-Gafaru 101). 
 
- “One of the challenges facing the health care delivery system is the management of resources 
especially human resource … With regards to distribution of the available human resource, there is 
a great inequity to the disadvantage of rural and deprived areas.” (Ghana Health Service “National 
Health” 18).   
 
- “The country’s economy is dominated by agriculture and the service sector which contribute 42% 
and 38% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively… Poverty levels in Ghana decreased from 
51.7% in 1991-1992 to 28.5% in 2005-2006. Extreme poverty has also declined from 36.5% to 
18.2% over the same period.” (World Health Organization 2).  
 
- “Collaboration between the MoH and partners in health development in Ghana is a major reason 
for successes achieved in the health sector.” (World Health Organization 11).  
 
- “Ghana’s HDI for 2015 is 0.579. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI 
falls to 0.391, a loss of 32.5 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension 
indices.” (UNDP 4).  
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- “The breadth of deprivation (intensity) in Ghana, which is the average deprivation score 
experienced by people in multidimensional poverty, is 45.4 percent.” (UNDP 6).  
 
- “The provision of infrastructure and operations in all modes of transport in Ghana are dominated 
by the state. Except in the case of road transport, the public sector has been heavily involved in 
operations in all modes and has monopoly over rail and inland water transport.” (GIPC).  
 
- “On the whole, traffic densities are low, except in the large cities of Accra and Kumasi, where 
peak hour densities are relatively high. The intention is to have many of the existing highways 
tolled and private-sector participation in road construction and ownership” (GIPC).  
 
- “There are firm plans by the Government to develop the rail network more extensively to handle 
up to handle up to 60% of solid and liquid bulk cargo haulage between the ports and the interior 
and /or the landlocked neighbouring countries to the north of Ghana and elsewhere.” (GIPC).  
 
- “Plans are far advanced to privatize the State-owned Ghana Railways Corporation (GRC) through 
concession and to provide much greater capacity for rail haulage of containers and petroleum 
products. Government also has plans of linking the suburbs of Accra to the central business area by 
rail and also links the north to the south to serve the landlocked countries north of Ghana” (GIPC). 
 
- “The country is at the hub of an extensive international (and national) airline network that 
connects Ghana to Africa and the rest of the world. Most major international carriers fly regularly 
to Kotoka International Airport (KIA) in Accra, the main entry point to Ghana by air.” (GIPC).  
 
- “However, for the state of Ghana’s rural economy could simply be described as underdevelopend 
and unstructured, with poverty being a crucial issue. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS, 2000, 2007), 
in its review of poverty trends in the country since the early 1990s, argues that poverty in Ghana is 
predominantly a rural phenomenon.” (Mensah et al. 510).  
 
- “The proportion of households that receive water through public sector infrastructure such as 
pipe-networks for in-housing plumbing, public stand pipes and even protected wells (boreholes) 
remains very low.” (Mensah et al. 510).  
 
- “[the results] suggest that the impact of access to water on household’s economic welfare is 
largely dependent on the level of the household’s private capital endowment, whereas access to 
public transport and electricity has a positive and significant effect for all households, irrespective 
of endowment in private assets.” (Mensah et al. 514).  
 
- “Ghana’s investor attractiveness is buoyed by its political stability (one of Africa’s most stable 
governments), economic liberalism, abundant natural resources and diverse economy.” (PwC 43). 
 
- “On the downside, critical limiting factors are the rising tax burden, weak rule of law, as well as 
the country’s growing fiscal deficit.” (PwC 43).  
 
- “Civil liberty improves Ghana’s investment attractiveness, as does its legal and regulatory 
framework, which the World Bank/IFC’s Doing Business Projects rates highly in sub-Saharan 
Africa for protecting investors’ rights and interests.” (PwC 44).  
 
- “However, despite its political stability and fairly favourable business environment, security 
remains an issue. Violent crime has grown in frequency over the past years and armed robberies 
have occurred in expatriate residential areas.” (PwC 45).  
 
- “Ghana’s most pressing challenge lies in the power sector, where the lack of reliable power is a 
major constraint to economic growth. Due to rising demand and problems with the reliability of 
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hydroelectric supply, the country is increasingly reliant on expensive oil-based generation.” (PwC 
45).  
 
- “Ghana is currently undergoing a transformation from an agriculture- based economy towards one 
that is industry and services based. Oil and gas are playing a role of growing importance in this 
transition.” (PwC 46).  
 
- “However, agriculture is still a vital sector in Ghana and provides employment for more 
than half of Ghanaians.” (PwC 46).  
 
- “Important weaknesses remain in infrastructure, timeliness and tracking and tracing [of customs]. 
Although the efficiency of Ghana’s customs clearance procedures (speed, simplicity and 
predictability of formalities) is not exceptional (103rd), it has improved consistently since 2007.” 
(PwC 46).  
 
- “Ghana has an advanced infrastructure platform when compared with other low-income countries 
in Africa. But as it approaches the middle-income threshold, Ghana will need to focus on upgrading 
its infrastructure indicators in line with this benchmark. Like electricity, infrastructure presents a 
major constraint to growth.” (PwC 46).  
 
- “Unlike in many other African countries, Ghana’s infrastructure backbone covers the entire 
national territory and helps to integrate its different regions. However, the distribution of 
infrastructure networks generally reflects the spatial distribution of economic activity, with a 
greater density of transport, power, and information and communications technology (ICT) 
infrastructure in the south and southwest of the country than in the north.” (PwC 46-47). 
 
- “Ghana’s railways network is insignificant and appears to be largely neglected. It currently 
handles less than 2% of freight and passenger traffic. Rail infrastructure is concentrated in the south 
and was designed to transport export commodities. The network forms a triangle that links Accra-
Kumasi- Takoradi, and currently only the Western line (Kumasi-Takoradi) is partially operational.” 
(PwC 47).  
 
- “Roads carry 95% of passengers and 98% of the country’s freight … Although rural road quality 
is remarkably good, the physical extension of the rural network appears inadequate. Urban 
congestion remains a particular problem in the main centres.” (PwC 48).  
 
 
  
Church 
 123 
Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
 
3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld? 
- “The Government has also ruled out the use of high tariffs to protect domestic industries.” (PwC 
44).  
 
- “Still, the middle- class population, with per capita consumption levels of US$4-20 per day, 
presently constitutes only 19.8% of the total population.” (PwC 44).  
 
- “Civil liberty improves Ghana’s investment attractiveness, as does its legal and regulatory 
framework, which the World Bank/IFC’s Doing Business Projects rates highly in sub-Saharan 
Africa for protecting investors’ rights and interests.” (PwC 44).  
 
- “Property rights are poorly protected and corruption persists due to overall weakness in the rule of 
law. Still, Ghana suffers less from corruption than other countries in the region, and among the 
least of all 10 countries survey in this report.” (PwC 44). 
 
- “The strong support for the rule of law and the belief that the president is law-abiding are 
consistent with the findings of previous Afrobarometer surveys in Ghana. In each survey round 
since 2005, substantial majorities have expressed the views that Parliament ought to monitor the 
president, that the president must obey the laws, that citizens must obey the government, and that 
the president never or rarely ignores the laws or Parliament” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 4). 
 
- “Moreover, most Ghanaians say a wealthy person can probably pay a bribe or use personal 
connections to get around legal obligations. Large majorities see it as “somewhat likely” or “very 
likely” that a rich person could use bribes or personal connections to avoid going to court (83%), 
avoid paying taxes (84%), or register land that does not belong to them (88%) (Figure 5). In 
contrast, about one-third of respondents say it is likely that an ordinary person could do the same.” 
(Dumenu and Armah-Atto 6).  
 
- “The Minister of Finance has not yet established the levy to fund mental health services, provided 
for in the Mental Health Act. Some provisions in the Mental Health Act presume the incapacity of 
persons with psychosocial disabilities, limiting their ability to make decisions about where they live 
and what treatment they receive, and undermining their rights under the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities.” (Human Rights Watch “Ghana Should Implement”).  
 
- “Despite important progress, conditions in psychiatric hospitals and prayer camps have not 
significantly improved since Human Rights Watch extensively documented a range of abuses in 
2012. Psychiatric hospitals remain overcrowded and unsanitary.” (Human Rights Watch “Ghana 
Should Implement”).  
 
- “Violence against women and girls remained rife, with nearly 10,000 cases reported to the Ghana 
police Domestic Violence Support Unit in 2012. Violence against women was thought to be under-
reported, and not adequately addressed by the authorities.” (Amnesty International “Annual 
Report”).  
- “Sexual activity between consenting adults of the same sex remained a crime under Ghana's 
Criminal Code. Violence against people suspected of same-sex relationships continued.” (Amnesty 
International “Annual Report”). 
- “Over the past decade, Ghana has made progress in the advancement of gender equality and 
empowerment of women in political, economic and social spheres.” (Ministry of Gender, Children 
and Social Protection 5).  
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- “Concerns were raised around unfair trials and poor prison conditions for people on death row, as 
well as the shackling of people with psychosocial disabilities. LGBTI people continued to face 
discrimination, violence and police harassment.” (Amnesty International “Ghana”).  
 
3b. Is there an independent media source? 
- “Ghana's status declined from Free to Partly Free due stepped-up attempts to limit coverage of 
news events and confiscation of equipment; increases in violence directed at journalists by the 
police, the military, political party members, and ordinary citizens, including the first murder of a 
journalist in more than 20 years; and continued electricity outages that impaired media production 
and distribution.” (Freedom House 2016).  
 
- “Ghana’s reputation as one of the freest media environments in sub-Saharan Africa was tarnished 
in 2015 by a series of physical attacks against journalists, often by state officials, as well as by 
intensifying legal and financial pressure on reporters and media outlets.” (Freedom House 2016).  
 
- “According to the African Media Barometer, a joint project of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 
foundation and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), in 2016 there were 58 authorized 
television operators in Ghana and 481 FM radio stations, of which 31 were state-owned, 345 were 
private, 79 were community-owned, and 21 were operated by universities.” (Freedom House 2017).  
 
- “Dozens of newspapers, including 2 state-owned and 3 private dailies, publish regularly. Use of 
the internet is growing, with about 35 percent of people accessing it in 2016.” (Freedom House 
2017).  
 
- According to Freedom House reports, Ghana maintained that status of  “Free” from 2001 up until 
2015, when in 2015 the impending elections sparked reactions of attempted censorship and 
violence against journalists (Freedom House).  
 
- “Judging from the scores measuring performance in the three pillars of open governance, Control 
and Oversight stands out as the best performing part of Ghana’s open governance regime, while 
transparency is the weakest. The poor performance in transparency is due largely to lack of a 
Freedom of Information Law.” (Ghana Integrity Initiative 10).  
 
- “The overall performance standards is not impressive. There are still many gaps in many areas of 
Ghana’s open governance regime which need to be addressed by updating existing legislation, 
enacting new ones and creating the necessary supporting institutions to ensure that legislation is 
enforced in practice to achieve the desired goals.” (Ghana Integrity Initiative 3). 
 
- “While these gaps persist in Ghana’s open governance regime, it does appear that the 
country may not have the political appetite to undertake reform measures to improve the 
situation. This is because in spite of eagerly signing on to become a member of the Open 
Government Initiative (OGP) in 2011 it does not show sufficient enthusiasm that it will 
carry through the programme. It has a National Action Plan on the OGP initiative but the 
cabinet has not yet approved it, raising questions over how deep the commitment is.” (Ghana 
Integrity Initiative 3). 
 
3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system? 
- “The Ghanaian judiciary has demonstrated its autonomy and impartiality over the years through 
some politically sensitive landmarkjudgments which it has delivered, in some cases against the 
ruling party.” (Akin and Ade 74).  
 
- “Consequently, the constitutional paradigm in which the national laws and court systems are 
regarded as the only avenues for settling disputes between political and civil disputants is now 
ingrained in Ghanaians civic culture.” (Akin and Ade 75). 
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- “Unfortunately, the Ghanaian constitution permits the president to appoint the serving 
Judges of the highest court to serve on Public Boards … One can say unequivocally that this 
development can compromise the independence of the judiciary especially, on cases which 
involve the executive arm of the government.” ( Akin and Ade 75).  
 
- “Effective combat of corruption requires that offenders, irrespective of their social status or 
political affiliation, be exposed and severely punished. That almost never happens in Ghana. 
Allegations of corruption involving high-level public officials and co- horts of the ruling party 
usually go unpunished.” (Nsia-Pepra 69).  
 
- “According to Afrobarometer’s latest national survey, Ghanaians overwhelmingly reject both 
mob “justice” and the lawless activities of political vigilante groups. An overwhelming majority of 
Ghanaians call for vigilantes to be prosecuted, irrespective of their political-party affiliation.” 
(Appiah-Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 1).  
 
- “Most Ghanaians believe it is “wrong and punishable” for party vigilantes to attack government 
appointees whose appointment they disagree with (88%), to lock up government offices to protest 
unfulfilled expectations of employment (87%), and to destroy state property (91%).” (Appiah-
Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 2).  
 
- “Eight of 10 Ghanaians (81%) say citizens should always rely on the police to deal with suspected 
criminals. About one in seven (15%), however, think it is sometimes acceptable for citizens to 
administer instant “justice” – a view that is shared by 39% of residents in the Upper West and 
Northern regions.” (Appiah-Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 2). 
 
- “After a few months in office, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government gets fairly positive 
marks for how it is handling illegal activities of political-party vigilante groups. A slight majority 
(53%) of Ghanaians say the government is performing “fairly well” or “very well” on the issue. 
However, one-third (34%) of citizens rate the government’s efforts negatively.” (Appiah-
Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 6). 
 
- “The 2017 Afrobarometer survey in Ghana suggests that citizens value and insist on the rule of 
law in the country but see important inequities in how the law is applied.” (Dumenu and Armah-
Attoh 1).  
 
- “Nine in 10 Ghanaians (90%) say it is important for citizens to obey the government in power 
regardless of whom they voted for … Furthermore, Ghanaians overwhelmingly endorse the 
legitimacy of key state enforcement agencies. Large majorities “agree” or “strongly agree” that the 
police always have the right to demand that people obey the law (88%), that tax authorities have 
the right to make people pay taxes (87%), and that the courts have the right to make decisions that 
people must always obey (78%).” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 2).  
 
- “While Ghanaians support the rule of law and say the president respects and obeys the laws and 
courts, there is a widespread – and growing – belief that laws are not applied in an equitable 
manner. Two-thirds (67%) of Ghanaians say officials who commit crimes “often” or “always” go 
unpunished; only about one-quarter (24%) think ordinary people get away with crimes.” (Dumenu 
and Armah-Attoh 4). 
 
- “Over-time trends show that public perceptions of unequal treatment have been increasing (Figure 
4). Between 2008 and 2017, the proportion of respondents who say that officials “often” or 
“always” escape punishment for crimes rose by 39 percentage points. Similarly, the perception that 
people are treated unequally under the law grew by 29 percentage points.” (Dumenu and Armah-
Attoh 5). 
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- “Ghanaians clearly believe in the rule of law and in the president’s respect for democratic 
practices enshrined in the law. However, they increasingly see the law as being applied unequally, 
giving unfair advantages to officials and the wealthy.” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 6).  
 
- “Court procedures were long and slow. Access to legal aid was limited or non-existent and some 
prisoners spent years waiting to be tried. Prisons were overcrowded and failed to provide inmates 
with basic services, including medical care.” (Amnesty International “Annual Report”).  
 
- “The government continues to promote equitable access to Justice through the Judiciary. In this 
direction, there are Human Right Courts that support GE and WE issues. In addition, the Judiciary 
has established two Gender-based and Sexual Offences Courts to expedite the adjudication of cases 
of violence and abuse. There is also the Legal Aid Scheme which facilitates access to justice for 
persons who are unable to afford justice.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 9). 
 
- “Stereotypes and harmful practices continuously affect the protection of women and girls. In this 
respect, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) has played a major 
role since its establishment in 1993. CHRAJ has sustained a vigorous campaign against all aspects 
of injurious and dehumanizing cultural practices such as female genital mutilation, widowhood 
rites, forced marriages, ritual servitude, and maltreatment of women accused of witchcraft, as well 
as other violent practices that subject women and the girl child to cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment and acts that detract their dignity.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 
10).  
 
- “Weak accountable governance: Existing governance institutions and democratic structures are 
weak in gender and social protection. It is not clear how gender equality and social protection are 
accounted for in governance and democracy. The greatest threats to good accountable governance 
come from corruption, violence, especially violence against women and girls and poverty. All of 
these undermine transparency, security, participation and fundamental freedoms.” (Ministry of 
Gender, Children and Social Protection 18).  
 
- “Women have limited access to justice: weak legal frameworks, poor institutional infrastructure, 
non-compliance, lack of knowledge about service delivery points, inadequate legal aid scheme and 
personnel worsen women’s access to justice. These continue to limit progress towards the 
empowerment of women in Ghana, and results in failure to attain the required gender justice and 
human development targets.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 17). 
 
- “Access to justice remained limited, especially for people from low income or marginalized 
backgrounds. The Ghana Legal Aid Scheme suffered from funding shortages; just 23 lawyers 
offering legal aid were available to the country’s population of more than 28 million people.” 
(Amnesty International “Ghana”).  
 
- “The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in 
the security forces or elsewhere in the government, but impunity remained a problem.” (US 
Department of State 1). 
 
- “Police brutality, corruption, negligence, and impunity were problems. While the 
constitution and law prohibit such practices, there were credible reports police beat, raped, 
and otherwise abused suspects and other citizens. There were delays in prosecuting suspects, 
reports of police collaboration with criminals, and a widespread public perception of police 
ineptitude.” (US Department of State 5). 
 
- “While the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, it was subject to unlawful 
influence and corruption. Judicial officials reportedly accepted bribes to expedite or postpone 
cases, or to “lose” records.” (US Department of State 5).  
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1.5 Evidence of Shift in Victimology  
 
DRC 
Are children victimized as witches? 
- “Unfortunately, in Kinshasa children are often accused of witchcraft and they are blamed for the 
family’s tough living conditions. Such accusations often drive children away from their homes and 
into the streets.” (SOS Children’s Villages International “Kinshasa”).  
 
- “The information and analyses presented are all drawn from various research studies as well as 
from the experience our programme has gained through the reunification and reintegration of 
almost 2,000 children in the cities of Kinshasa and Mbuyi-Mayi.” (Molina 5).  
 
- “In September 2004, a brutal example of violence against children took place in the town of 
Mbuyi-Mayi. Small-scale miners successfully encouraged the population to hunt down and kill 
street children. At least 16 children were killed in horrific circumstances, burned alive, stoned, their 
throats slit, or knifed to death. Dozens more were wounded and hundreds fled the town to hide in 
the bush. According to a report from the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, some of the victims were scarcely 10 years old. Reunification programmes supported by 
Save the Children have shown that a large number of these children had been rejected by their 
families, accused of witchcraft.” (Molina 20-21). 
 
- “Since the early 1990s, particularly in large towns, accusations have shifted to children, the 
number of such allegations skyrocketed, and the subsequent treatment has become increasingly 
violent.” (Schnoebelen 14)  
 
- “Advocates estimate that more than sixty percent of the 25,000 street children in Kinshasa have 
been kicked out of their homes due to allegations of witchcraft, “making it the number one cause of 
homelessness among youths.”” (Schnoebelen 14-15).  
 
- “The Minister of Social Affairs estimates that there might be as many as 50,000 children being 
held in churches—often in dismal conditions—as they await exorcism.” (Schnoebelen 15-16). 
 
- “In the context of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, decades of war have lead to 
the breakdown of family and social networks, contributing to the increase in witchcraft accusations 
against children.” (Schnoebelen 4). 
- “According to available sources and our own information, thousands of children accused of 
witchcraft have been thrown out of their homes and are currently living in the streets of Kinshasa 
and Lubumbashi in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 14) 
- “Reports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suggest that most of the 25,000 – 
50,000 children living on the streets of the capital, Kinshasa are there because they have been 
accused of witchcraft and rejected by their families. In 2009 The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child noted that in the DRC “violence against children accused of witchcraft is increasing…” 
(OHCHR “Witches in the 21st”).  
- “Cases of children being harmed, abused or killed as a consequence of witchcraft allegation 
practices have been documented mainly in countries in Africa and concern Angola, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.” (Hanson 
and Ruggiero 5). 
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- “The rise of the phenomenon of child witchcraft in central Africa, in particular the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is, according to de Boeck, also due to changes in the concept of 
childhood.” (Hanson and Ruggiero 10). 
- “A recent survey [in 2017] of 1,000 pastors in Kinshasa, DRC, found that 70 per cent of 
respondents knew at least one child aged five or under who had been abused as a result of 
witchcraft accusations.” (Howe et al. 4).  
- “Unicef estimates that there are 20,000 children living on the streets of Kinshasa alone as a direct 
result of such accusations.” (Howe et al. 8).  
- “In Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, accusations are mostly levelled 
against children. NGOs in the city estimate that as many as two thirds of all of the city’s tens of 
thousands of street children have been chased away from home due to witchcraft allegations.” 
(Dörrie).  
 
Are elderly women victimized as witches? 
- “Fabrice and his friend did not mention the classic ingredients of African Pentecostal witchcraft 
such as “tradi- tion” (biloko ya bakoko), “the village” (mboka), “féticheurs”, “the elderly” or nkisi 
(power objects used by witch doctors); rather they used analo- gies with American society to 
explain Kinshasa’s spiritual insecurity. And technology was central: television was the theme of the 
pamphlet, while smartphones and the Internet dominated our conversations.” (Pype 118).  
 
 
CAR 
Are children victimized as witches? 
- “Cases [of child accusations] have also been reported – although in lower numbers – in Douala, 
Cameroon (Pirot, 2004), in the Republic of the Congo, between Brazzaville and Pointe‐Noire 
(Yengo, 2008; Makulo, 2005) and in the Central African Republic (CAR).” (Cimpric “Children 
Accused” 15). 
 
- “Hundreds, or even thousands, of children and elderly people – women in particular – have been 
accused of being witches in CAR. Belief in witchcraft is widespread in the region, but accusing 
children is a more recent development.” (Bannor-Addae). [published in 2009] 
 
- “Cases of children being harmed, abused or killed as a consequence of witchcraft allegation 
practices have been documented mainly in countries in Africa and concern Angola, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.” (Hanson 
and Ruggiero 5). 
 
- “Anti-witchcraft violence is therefore social (and gender) domination as well as social coercion. 
Indeed, some social groups seem to be more vulnerable to violence than others. Marc Augé (1976) 
had already pointed out that, although anyone can be suspected of witchcraft, the accusation 
usually focuses on the poorest people, especially women. It is as if some social actors – old widows 
without families, disabled people and, increasingly, abandoned children – embody the failures of 
their community.” (Cimpric “Kill the Witch” 128).  
 
Are elderly women victimized as witches? 
- “In the Central African Republic, since the beginning of 2001, around thirty people suspected of 
involvement in “suspicious” deaths have been accused of witchcraft and lynched.” (Cimpric 
“Children Accused” 13). [It is assumed that these 30 “people” are adults, and not children, for 
otherwise it would have been specified as such] 
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- “There is little data to document witchcraft accusations in CAR – so UNICEF is gathering 
comprehensive information on the issue to support advocacy work and help stop these serious 
human rights violations against women and children.” (Bannor-Addae).  
 
- “It is noteworthy that the [2012 EU annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy] report also 
mentions witchcraft practices in two countries but not related to children, in particular Tanzania (in 
relation to the killing of elderly women), and the Central African Republic (as a general human 
rights issue raised during the political dialogue meetings)” (Hanson and Ruggiero 26).  
 
- “UNHCR indicated that between 2010 and 2011, around 400 victims of witchcraft accusations 
were reported. It recommended the reinforcement of prevention and response mechanisms to 
effectively address violence against women, with the assistance of the international community; 
and increase sensitization campaigns with the local authorities and judiciary to fight violence 
resulting from witchcraft accusations as well as traditional practices and socio-cultural factors 
which endanger women and girls in particular.” (UNHRC “Compilation Prepared” 6).  
 
- “Although the number of incidents is likely to be higher, the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights documented 45 cases of human rights violations related to 
witchcraft accusations during the reporting period. Women, the elderly, children, and people with 
disabilities are common targets of witchcraft accusa- tions, which have resulted in detention, 
torture, or death.” (USCIRF).  
 
- “In the Central African Republic (CAR), many of the accused elderly women are languishing in 
various jails. The interim president of that country who herself is a woman was in 2014 quoted as 
saying that, “in CAR witchcraft is real. Some 60 percent of female prisoners were sent to jail for 
witchcraft”” (Eboiyehi 248).  
 
- “HRD recorded 32 cases of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment against persons accused 
of practising witchcraft. This affected 85 victims, including at least 30 women, one boy and five 
girls, and resulted in 12 deaths and severe injuries. The majority of victims were elderly, widows, 
persons with disabilities or persons who do not have strong support in the local communities.” 
(OHCHR “Report on the Situation” 17-18).  
 
- “Meanwhile, in areas of the Central African Republic and Angola it is again mostly old women 
who are accused, even though there are increasing reports of child accusations in the former.” 
(Dörrie) 
 
- “By contrast, the Central African Republic has kept its colonial-era law and, contrary to some 
other African states, is making frequent use of it. According to a study by UNICEF, about 25% of 
all cases brought to court in the capital Bangui and 80-90% of all cases in rural areas are 
witchcraft-related. 70% of all prisoners in Bangui central prison are incarcerated because of 
witchcraft accusations.” (Dörrie).  
 
 
Angola 
Are children victimized as witches? 
- “Children in Angola also face the possibility of witchcraft allegations and the “surge in 
persecutions of children” has been attributed to 27 years of war in Angola.” (Schnoebelen 16). 
[published in 2009] 
 
- “The practice of witchcraft allegations against children is particularly rampant in Zaire, Uige and 
Luanda provinces, where many of the accused end up on the streets.” (Schnoebelen 16). 
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- “Accused children have been subjected to much the same abuse that those in the DRC have 
suffered; two cases involved a mother using chlorine bleach to blind her daughter and a father 
injecting his son’s stomach with battery acid in attempts to exorcise them.” (Schnoebelen 16). 
 
- “Community child protection committees have been established in Zaire province and a shelter 
for abandoned children run by the Catholic Church and the NGO Crianca Futuro operates in 
Mbanza Congo, 50 miles from the DRC border. Despite these positive developments, children 
continue to be accused and subjected to ill-treatment.” (Schnoebelen 17).  
 
- “In the context of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, decades of war have lead to 
the breakdown of family and social networks, contributing to the increase in witchcraft accusations 
against children.” (Schnoebelen 4). 
 
- “More recently, in Angola, “where children were accused of transforming into animals and eating 
crops during the night, ‘scientific analysis of the situation at the time revealed that there was poor 
crop yield due to late rains.’”” (Schnoebelen 5). 
 
- “In 2005, three adults were found guilty of child cruelty after abusing ‘Child B’ for months for 
being a witch. Abuse included cutting her on the chest with a knife, beatings, kickings, starvation, 
and rubbing chilli peppers into her eyes. Child B and one of the women, who claimed to be her 
mother, arrived to England in 2002 as Angolan refugees.” (Schnoebelen 30).  
 
- “A case in point is the current ‘epidemic’ (as it is usually framed in the local media) of child 
sorcery accusations in Luanda, related to both an idea of a corrupted use of ndoki knowledge and a 
heightened sense of insecurity and paranoia in the particularly harsh context of the city’s 
neighborhoods.” (Rio, MacCarthy, and Blanes 96). [published in 2017] 
 
- “… in the Palanca neighborhood of Luanda, child sor- cery accusations, although not new in local 
history, have been object of the ‘social construction of a problem’ (2008: 31) that involves 
traditional authorities, the state and concurrent institutions, and local media, within a progressive 
narrative that invokes the destructuration of the traditional familial model, the consequences of war, 
the perils of urban life and eco- nomic crisis” (Rio, MacCarthy, and Blanes 96). 
 
- “Likewise, child sorcery accusations also become part of the same dis- course of abjection. In one 
such example, in early 2008, several news pieces circulated in the local media concerning how 
members of a Catholic congregation rescued several children in the Palanca who had been beaten 
and abandoned by their parents, accused of sorcery. One of the Catholic nuns involved in the 
rescue, sister Rita, declared to the local media that what was beneath such phenomena was “social 
disorder and extreme pov- erty, and the main victims are the children”” (Rio, MacCarthy, and 
Blanes 96). 
 
- “Many more [children accused of witchcraft] are living in the streets of Mbanza Kongo, the 
capital of Zaïre Province, Uíge and Luanda in northern Angola.” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 14-
15).  
 
- “Cases of infanticide are also reported among the M’bali in Angola, where the birth of twins 
represented a disaster for the whole country, and the children were therefore killed” (Cimpric 
“Children Accused” 32).  
 
- “In Angola, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has called for “immediate action to 
eliminate the mistreatment of children accused of witchcraft”.” (OHCHR) 
 
- “Cases of children being harmed, abused or killed as a consequence of witchcraft allegation 
practices have been documented mainly in countries in Africa and concern Angola, Central African 
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Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.” (Hanson 
and Ruggiero 5).  
 
- “Around 140,000 children in Angola have been orphaned due to AIDS. The total number of 
orphans in Angola is as high as 1,500,000. During the civil war, an estimated 700,000 children lost 
either one or both their parents. 100,000 children were separated from their families as a result of 
the war. It is not uncommon in Angola for children to be abused, abandoned or even killed for 
imagined acts of witchcraft. Thousands of Angolan children roam the streets of Luanda and other 
major cities. Some have been banished from their homes, while others have lost their parents in the 
war or because of AIDS.” (SOS Children’s Villages International “General”).  
 
- “Witchcraft is a belief that is widespread in Angola and neighbouring countries. It is valued as 
part of the Bantu cultural tradition and traditional beliefs. In the past, adults and some children 
were accused of witchcraft, but from the end of the 1990s in provinces of northern Angola an 
unusual number of children were observed living on the streets having been thrown out by their 
families. It was reported that most of the children had been accused of witchcraft, either by their 
parents, extended family, neighbours, pastors or soothsayers” (UNHRC “Promotion and 
Protection” 14).  
 
- “After a child accused of witchcraft was stabbed to death in 2000, Government officials and Save 
the Children Fund rounded up 432 street children and reintegrated 380 of them with relatives.” 
(UNHRC “Promotion and Protection” 15).  
 
- “Whilst not a phenomenon reported throughout the country, children accused of witchcraft are a 
cause for concern…” (UNHRC “Promotion and Protection” 14). 
 
Are elderly women victimized as witches? 
- “Like the DRC, elderly women in Angola were traditionally “vulnerable to accusations of 
witchcraft and subsequent abuse,” including beatings, expulsion or death.” (Schnoebelen 16).  
 
- “Meanwhile, in areas of the Central African Republic and Angola it is again mostly old women 
who are accused, even though there are increasing reports of child accusations in the former.” 
[published in 2013] (Dörrie).  
 
 
Ghana 
Are children victimized as witches? 
- “A phenomenon that has increasingly affected girls and women, especially those from poor, rural 
areas, is the branding and persecution of females as witches. This can affect babies as young as one 
month old. The baby, child or woman is accused of employing witchcraft to cause a death or 
illness, or even a business failure or financial difficulties, and is physically brutalised, tortured, 
abandoned or killed. In northern Ghana, there are so-called “witch camps” where these women take 
refuge, never to return to their communities. Around 1,000 women and 700 girls are estimated to be 
living here.” (SOS Children’s Villages International “Tamale”).  
 
- “Based on the author’s review of Ghana’s newspapers of the past 2 decades and electronic news 
media over the past 5 years, there appears to be a diminution in witchcraft accusations against 
women while accusations against children appear to be on the rise.” (Adinkrah “Child Witch 
Hunts” 750). 
 
- “… Children in Ghana currently do not have the support from advocacy groups to champion their 
cause in the same way that elderly women have from women’s groups.” (Adinkrah “Child Witch 
Hunts” 750).  
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- “The camps, which are home to around 800 women and 500 children, offer poor living conditions 
and little hope of a normal life.” (ActionAid 3).  
 
- “Around 700 women and 800 children live in the Gambaga camp and five other camps across 
northern Ghana and they are virtually cut off from the outer world” (United Kingdom: Home 
Office 14). 
 
- “Often women who are banished to the camps are „given‟ a young child – perhaps a grandchild 
and almost always a girl – to help look after them. This happens in cases where the families of the 
accused still want to support them but cannot protect them in their own community. In other cases, 
where the accused woman is living with a child in her village – for example an orphaned 
grandchild – the child is also banished to the camp.” (United Kingdom: Home Office 14).  
 
- “This orphanage, built in a typical northern Ghanaian style of a ring of small rooms linked by 
short fences has around 32 children … This center managed by catholic nuns, can as well be called 
Ghana’s ‘child witch camp’ … According to the managers of the orphanage, at least half of the 
children were abandoned due to witchcraft accusation.” (Igwe “‘Child Witches’”).  
 
- “Very little is known about this ‘home’ in Sang where children accused of witchcraft or of being 
‘agents’ and instruments of the devil are taken care of. The children are from a day old to sixteen 
years.” (Igwe “‘Child Witches’”).  
 
- “Children are among those who populate the witch camps in the Northern Ghana. These children 
are not at the sanctuary because they were accused of witchcraft. They are at these shelters because 
their mothers or grand mothers were accused.” (Igwe “From Children”).  
 
Are elderly women victimized as witches? 
- “In northern Ghana, women accused of witchcraft are banished and forced to live in “witch 
villages” in dehumanizing conditions” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 13).  
 
- “In Ghana it is thought as many as 2,000 accused witches and their dependents are confined in 
five different camps. Most of the camp inmates are destitute, elderly women and some have been 
forced to live there for decades.” (OHCHR).  
 
- “While witches are perceived to be predominantly elderly and female, Akan witch beliefs and 
those of other ethnic groups acknowledge the existence of child witches” (Adinkrah “Child Witch 
Hunts” 744). 
 
- “Females were disproportionately the victims of witch homi- cides in the cases surveyed … The 
results of this study reveal a greater vulnerability of poor elderly women to witchcraft accusations 
and lethal attacks …” (Adinkrah “Witchcraft Accusations” 339; 345).  
 
- “This tendency for the killer to be the younger party stems from the notion that witches are dis- 
proportionately elderly.” (Adinkrah “Witchcraft Accusations” 340). 
 
- “In contrast to a small number of academic studies on aging, gender, and witchcraft accusations, 
there are hundreds of articles printed and reproduced through national and international media on 
the plight of women, mostly older women, attacked, banished, and murdered as witches.” 
(Crampton 202). 
 
- “Rather than focus on witchcraft accusations as an older woman’s rights problem, a more useful 
approach may be to address harmful accusations as a form of elder abuse that disproportionately 
impacts women.” (Crampton 209).  
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- “Though both men and women can be accused of witchcraft, the vast majority are women, 
especially the elderly.” (ActionAid 8).  
 
- “The six ‘witch camps’ of Gambaga, Kukuo, Gnani, Bonyase, Nabuli and Kpatinga are located 
close to or even within ‘ordinary’ towns or villages and all are in remote areas of northern Ghana.” 
(ActionAid 4).  
 
- “Most accused witches were older women, often widows, who were accused by fellow villagers 
of being the cause of difficulties, such as illness, crop failure, or financial misfortune. Persons 
suspected of witchcraft were also killed in recent years.” (United Kingdom: Home Office 18).  
 
- “The camps have existed since the 19th century and population estimates vary wildly between 
2000 and 6000 women and children.” (Stromberg 2).  
 
- “Though witch is often thought to refer to women in particular, there is no inherent gender of 
witchcraft. Some respondents felt that witches were more commonly women. However, when 
asked to clarify, this view was often sup- plemented by the caveat that women are more often 
victims of accusations, thus more frequently associated with witchcraft. Though some individuals 
did argue that women are predisposed to seek and engage in witchcraft this was not a consistent 
view.” (Roxburgh 896).  
 
- “In parts of northern Ghana, elderly women can be accused of witchcraft and branded as witches 
or purveyors of social ills that befall their families or villages. Elderly women who are accused and 
labeled as witches may be removed by NGOs and government representatives to “witch camps” to 
ensure their safety and protection from families and communities’ inhu- mane and degrading 
treatment.” (Sossou and Yogtiba 424).  
 
General evidence: 
“Accusations of witchcraft are often directed at children considered difficult or different; at least 
fourteen of the forty-seven children involved had “some degree of disability, imperfection or 
blemish.” The nationality of families and children involved were: Mauritius, Tanzania, Burundi, 
DRC, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Caribbean, South Asian, and White English.” 
(Schnoebelen 30-31). 
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2. Appendix: Interview Transcript with Mr. Itauma 
 
Name:  Sam Ikpe Itauma 
Position:  CEO and President of ‘Child Rights And Rehabilitation Network’ (CRARN) 
Date/Time:  19 May 2018, 13.00 CST 
Duration:  46 minutes 
 
*Was audio-recorded with consent from the interviewee for transcription purposes. 
 
Church: Before we start, is it alright with you if I audio-record our conversation for 
transcription purposes for my thesis?  
 
Itauma: No, no it is no problem, I probably am going to record it too. 
 
Church: Alright, so do you know what my thesis is about, first of all?  
 
Itauma: Yes.  
 
Church: Yes. Okay good. So pretty much I’m trying to test to see if the increase in child 
witchcraft accusations only takes place in collapsed and deteriorated states, and failed states, 
or if it can also occur in semi-democratic and democratic states.  
 
Itauma: My country –  
 
Church: I’m sorry, your country, which one? 
 
Itauma: My country, Nigeria, is a democratic state and would have had had this issue, going 
on there. So, it does not exempt any state in Africa at the moment. Except one country that was 
recently divided. It was a country that was recently divided in Africa, I’m trying to get the 
name, but I know that that is the only country – I’m going to check that later and let you know 
– the name of the country. Sudan and South Sudan. 
 
Church: Okay, Sudan and South Sudan, yes, that’s the most recent nation state that has been 
created, yes.  
 
Itauma: Yes, so that is the only state at the moment in Africa that, where we are yet to see the 
issue of witchcraft, where children are being labeled with witchcraft, in that country. That is 
the only country at the moment in Africa that I can say we no record of it. That does not mean 
that it is not there, so that goes a long way to tell you that in every part of Africa we have issues 
like that. In Cameroon, which I have been there, I have witnessed it we have issues like that. 
Nigeria, Chad, Congo DR, CAR, all of these countries we have this issue, even in some of the 
countries we have issue where the government believes that people are witches and sanction 
those who are believed to be witches. And to stop them from practicing an existent witchcraft 
issue. Like recently the outgoing president, Jon[athan] government, was believed to go against 
people who were said to be witches so you understand that kind of suspicion that in some of 
the government believe that witchcraft exist. And a lot of them first still believe its prevalent, 
so you definitely realize that people there are going to suffer the impact.  
 
Church: So you don’t believe that regime type or government type would essentially have as 
big of an influence as just the presence of a belief system itself?  
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Itauma: Well my understanding is that the system of government at the moment in Africa does 
not change the perception of witchcraft, especially as long as those governments and religious 
practices are there. There is actually no country in Africa where religion is not practiced, so … 
[inaudible]..  a modern religion like Islam or Christianity the most, and I also understand that 
Christianity is a religion that really hyped much on this witchcraft issue, so there is no religious 
country that does not consider or witness the issue of witchcraft abuse or torture. 
 
Church: And if I may ask, so I agree with what you say, but do you believe that there is a 
particular type of victim of witchcraft accusations for example, from what I’ve read in my 
studies the typical victim would be elderly women within society that would be accused of 
witchcraft more frequently than any other type of person. Do you believe that children are 
becoming more commonly accused or is there another victimology present?  
 
Itauma: I understand that children at the moment are vulnerable instead of people, but 
witchcraft abuse started with the elderly who are about the age of 70 upward, but today I 
consider those from 65 – those with 65 years of age are also beginning to get the impact. 
Especially those who have poverty, lived and are effected by poverty, you know, are actually 
the ones affected. But children from my understanding in my country in Nigeria for instance, 
child witches started in early 2000. So, before then we didn’t have anything like child witches 
we had issues involving elderly people who are stigmatized, tortured, and abused. But from 
2000 we begin to have issues with a connection with children, but since then that has not 
departed, it is ongoing and I say it is unabated even though the government has enacted laws 
to prohibit that we still have issues of witchcraft. And my belief is that people need orientation, 
people need enlightenment, people need to be very careful of saying education, in this context 
because to enlighten is actually different from being educated. So you have people who are 
educated but believe in witchcraft, you have actual doctors, lawyers, people who have PHD, 
that believe in witchcraft. When I was schooling, I was, in the time of school, my, an initial 
friend of mine who was doing his PHD, was a PHD candidate, I was doing BA, so we happened 
to meet on the same boat where we were traveling back home. So he complemented me on my 
work, but told me that he heard of my interview but all of what I was saying was false, and I 
asked him what was the false aspect that he got? It was for me to stand on television and say 
that witchcraft is not real, [mixed and maxed] my insincerity. You know, so he even told me 
that I should stop preaching against a witchcraft belief otherwise there is going to be someone 
who is pissed that I mound the podium to preach and somebody’s going to stone me.  
 
Church: Oh no… But I do understand, I also agree that there is a difference between education 
and enlightenment, often people say education is the problem but it’s not the particular 
problem. If I may circle back to another question, you said that since the early 2000s has been 
when children have been the victims of witchcraft, do you have any professional idea as to why 
this could be started in 2000, why it happened then?  
 
Itauma: A simple reason to, that is… We had people, some religious persons, filmmakers who 
came out with a particular theme. This theme portrays children to be witches, the theme 
portrays how children torture their parents, how children man-handle their parents and 
dehumanize them in the coven. In particular, it is due to them, such themes were distributed in 
the whole country, given that it was a kind of home-made movie, everyone likes to watch 
home-made movie, you know, so watching those themes changed the narrative of the 
witchcraft belief. It made a consequence now, given that fact that witchcraft is no longer the 
issue of elderly people, it is now involving children. Children are having the issue of 
HIV/AIDS, coming to decimate parents, and allow children to become orphans, you find the 
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same thing in orphanages, children find themselves on the street. They are actually vulnerable 
because more often than not, when they are asked questions, of their involvement in witchcraft, 
and they deny it, they are going to be beaten. So once a child is beaten, and he accepts that I’m 
a witch, he actually does not have any platform to denounce that. Because, sometimes, those 
who accept that they are witches, they believe that if they accept being a witch they are 
definitely going to be treated with some sort of leniency, or be pardoned. You know, because 
as long as they keep denying that they are not witches, they are going to continue to receive 
the torture, they are going to be beaten, you know, until they finally concede, that, Oh I’m a 
witch. So it was in that kind of period that we started having children being labelled as witches. 
I was taking the [notion] that these kind of themes, they just music, and preaching that came 
out in that period that really portrayed children to be witches.  
 
Church: Okay, so that is a different angle than what I have mostly been seeing within the 
research that I’ve been looking at – for often times they will say that the early 2000s is the time 
when child soldiers became a large phenomenon in many African countries so that changed 
also the narrative of the way children are seen. Would you agree with that as well, or have any 
opinion on that? 
 
Itauma: Well it depends actually on the country. Depends largely on the country and the 
specific region, what exactly took place given that period, but my understanding is that African 
countries we do share cultures or we share religion and we also share some social phenomenon. 
For instance, the theme, the movie that I am talking about is not only watched in Nigeria, it is 
watched everywhere in Africa and these religious preachers who center their preaching mostly 
on witchcraft, they do travel a lot to different African countries. They even travel to European 
countries to sell themselves, to sell their religion, to sell their beliefs, to sell their teachings. So 
they preach out to people and sell their movies, they also have their preaching recorded in 
different videos and you have them on Youtube. And they spread them. Especially in this era 
of social media now. There is not limit, no bound to that. So during that period, my strongest 
belief is that such a belief must have been spread to different countries despite the regime that 
was there at the moment, of whether there was a war, or peace, does not stop people from 
buying movies, does not stop people from accessing Youtube, does not stop preachers from 
going to those countries and putting out their preachings. So churches and groups of people 
going to see that create those teachings. So whether you have collapsed civil states or 
democratic state does not hold any water, it does not mean anything, it does not make any 
difference. So if you say that maybe a country where there was a war, actually that is, we have 
many countries where there has been war but you don’t have witchcraft going on there. You 
have some countries where there is no war and you have witchcraft going on there. For 
instance, I don’t see, I don’t know if there is a war in Papua-Guinea. But there is witchcraft 
going on there in Papua-Guinea. Papua-Guinea it’s not Africa, it’s not, so we have things like 
that also in countries like, different countries. I would not say that it’s only Africa alone that 
we have this issue. In the UK, right now there is a witchcraft issue going on there. The 
government in the UK is seriously tackling this issue and if you look at it closely you will see 
the nexus of African people who are living in Britain and are coming from Africa to Britain 
and having a connection with their home country and some of them even have to consult the, 
what they call ju-ju black magic, you know, understand the concept or the prevalence of 
witchcraft that are threatening them directly or indirectly. Some of them who bring close 
relation to the Britain from Africa, it tends to be those children or person as involved in 
witchcraft practice, so you can still see the connection has not been severed from Africa.  
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Church: I also have read that, actually I think I read about mostly Angolans, who would travel 
to the UK and as a diaspora community, and then as a consequence of that, that’s where the 
witchcraft beliefs in the UK stemmed from.  
 
Itauma: I think I have seen that – this is like that –  prevalence in the United Kingdom. Like I 
said we have a democratic state in the United Kingdom, and that’s not really Africa. You have 
a good [angles] between Africa and the UK relative to witchcraft issue that is going on there. 
Good news is that if a government is tackling those issues, in Africa, given that some of the 
politicians – did I say some? No a lot of politicians – believe in witchcraft. 
 
Church: So, do you think that laws could help stop the abuses and the violations of child and 
human rights in this area? Do you think preventative laws can help?   
 
Itauma: Law can help, but law does not stop it. You can put in one kind of law you can put in 
even if the law would trigger capital punishment, that does not stop witchcraft. What actually 
stops witchcraft is the enlightenment of the community, to teach of mentality of the people the 
involvement of the government – let me say for instance. The biggest [time I have ever 
concerned] children in flocks, was when the government had put out a commission to 
investigate witchcraft in my State, Nigeria, in the part of the state in Nigeria. That was the 
biggest moment we reconciled, we reunited children, and I would say in flocks. That amount 
has never been before that time and after that period. So you see children, the parents, flocking 
in coming to feed their children. Letting us, you know, persuaded us to give them their children. 
Why? Because it’s all government involved. The government was announcing the issue and 
the radio – the commission – let me put it that way, the commission that the government set up 
was announcing the witchcraft information activities in the radio which the local community 
actually listened a lot, the radio. And TV discuss about it, and I will say, that some of the 
commission issue was streamlined and were broadcast in real life, you know in real-time. They 
were broadcasting in real-time and people became aware of government’s involvement a lot in 
that period. So it started in the government talking about it, condemning it, and children who 
were in our cinema in that time, we in fact were actually looking for more chance, looking for 
more staff to get involved in the process of reconciling children because reconciling children 
or sometimes give up to two weeks to educate a parent and make them sign different papers 
involved before they can pick up their children. And for us to go there, the community, and 
look at where those children are going to be staying. And even going there to visit the children 
once the children get back home. So, it actually was a lot of [tax road] because we had other 
things at that moment to handle. We were also given the commission report, compiling reports 
to give to them, so you understand the situation became that when it was an extra job for us to 
reconcile, a better chunk of the children were going home. And before then, a law was in place, 
the law was in place but people did not come this far to pick their children. But once the 
commission setting and begin to make broadcast on TV and radio, people were gripped with 
the fact that oh the government is involved. So if imperative measures are going to be taken, 
so let’s get involved, let’s pick my children. I will say less actual children were rescued during 
that period, more children were reconciled during that period. So the government involvement, 
the announcement of the activities of the witchcraft commission were actually a part of 
enlightenment. The greatest enlightenment campaign that we have ever witnessed, was at that 
time. Our own campaign I will say did not create that impact as the commission that was set 
up by the government. 
 
Church: Okay, so it was more of an impact movement because it came from the government 
itself.  
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Itauma: Of course it came from the government, because here the government is [picking], and 
they understand that the government meant business and that the government was going to 
come down heavily if people stigmatized children as witches, so whatever they were doing 
come and pick up their children and we had a lot of volunteers that that time who were telling 
us where children were hiding. Where children were being kept secretly in churches, 
warehouses, to identify such children and brought to us. In fact some of the prayer houses 
deliberately who were keeping those children for I would say as a cash cow. Release those 
children! You know, I reconciled with the parents because some time they give their children 
treatment by carrying out deliverance on the children and those children were really in that 
prayer house for more than 6 months sometimes a year and they could even transfer them, they 
would live there, but go to other churches because the parent believed that oh the preacher or 
prophet was not able to deliver in that very prayer house so denounce it, and need to transfer 
them to a different powerful place, a place they believed more powerful than that. So in that 
process we had a lot of children coming out on the street but going back to their parents. When 
government is involved, the narrative changed. That is what I would say, but it is actually very 
difficult to get the government involved. But I would say that in my own state for instance the 
government had been involved but the problem is the politicians working with the government, 
they are worshippers of all these churches. They are worshippers of these preachers. So they 
protect the preachers and they believe that our campaign, our activities, is [immunable] to what 
the preachers are saying. And they see us as enemies at the same time, working against the 
preachers. We are not enemies we are also part of a – to build a community and a mission.  
 
Church: So do you think that the … (loss of connection) … Oh I’m sorry we lost connection 
there for a moment. But I think I only have two more questions, you answered a lot in between 
your answers. One of them being that do you think there is a higher prevalence of child 
accusations in urban areas or rural areas? or does it matter?  
 
Itauma: It really doesn’t matter. But if you look at it critically, the urban area is where you 
have a lot of vulnerable children … (loss of connection) … to help them in handling different 
domestic choice. So you have a lot of vulnerable children drifting to the urban area, so in this 
case once they are identified as being vulnerable, they are targeted by these preachers, 
witchcraft preachers. They target them easily, especially in prayer houses in the church. I would 
say during prayer stations like, morning prayer, what you call? Prayer night, prayer night is a 
religious prayer moment which normally takes effect from evening from like 7 o’clock in the 
morning… (loss of connection)… so that is going to be able to have all these children 
stigmatized. But it doesn’t really say that it is more of the urban area, but to a better extent that 
could be the case.  
 
Church: Thank you, sorry for the connection loss. Finally, you were talking about how you, 
for example in the early 2000s, this perception and the narrative of children changed due to 
this film theme that came out, and you said that due to technology this narrative spread, if I 
understood it correctly, and it spread easier, do you think that there is a particular point of 
origin where this belief started from and then spread?  
 
Itauma: My understanding is that witchcraft beliefs are practiced the most where modern day 
Christianity, the Pentecostal Christianity, is prevalent. It is everywhere in Africa. Well you 
have to look at those aspects, despite the fact that our technology has enhanced this situation, 
but the origin of child witchcraft comes from, I would say it comes from a Pentecostal 
movement. Because during the – I remember when I was a youngster, and I do anything that 
is delightful to my dad, he would call me a witch, you know. Back then calling me a witch was 
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a kind of praise, oh you’ve done very well, you are a witch. So, that was not a stigma. It wasn’t 
a stigma it was a sort of a praise. Thank you for what you have done, you are a wizard, oh what 
you have done is so awesome and marvelous. So in my days, but and I look at that very 
retrospectively if my dad had told me today that I was a witch, then I would have been … (loss 
of connection) … 1999, then by 2000 children were already on the street, children were already 
let loose in the woods, you know, so it actually comes from those preachings, those Pentecostal 
preachings, then technology was deployed to spread those beliefs.  
 
Church: Alright so it was more the Pentecostal preaching that was then facilitated by the 
technological advances? 
 
Itauma: I would say that here and there Pentecostal movements are responsible for the child 
witch phenomenon.  
 
Church: Alright well thank you, you have answered a lot of my questions – and more – so 
thank you for agreeing to meet with me and have this interview.  
 
(Exchanges of pleasantries and goodbyes)  
 
 
